Merrell v. Ralph Lauren Corporation

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: August 12, 2025
• Docket: 4:23-cv-06669
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RICHARD PAUL MERRELL, Case No. 23-cv-06669-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 60 10 RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION, 11 Defendant.

12 13 Before the Court is Defendant Ralph Lauren Corporation’s motion to transfer venue, Dkt. 14 No. 60. The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the 15 matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). The Court DENIES the motion. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 In December 2023, Plaintiff Vivian Salazar filed a putative class action complaint against 18 Defendant alleging claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Unruh Civil 19 Rights Act. See Dkt. No. 1. Ms. Salazar, a resident of Contra Costa County, alleged that, due to 20 the coding of Defendant’s website, she was unable to locate Defendant’s physical store locations 21 as a legally blind individual. Id. ¶¶ 4, 10. Ms. Salazar sued Defendant on behalf of a putative 22 nationwide class and California statewide class. Id. ¶¶ 48, 49. According to Salazar, personal 23 jurisdiction over Defendant, as well as venue in the Northern District of California, were satisfied 24 as to her claims because she alleged that she had “been denied the full use and enjoyment of the 25 facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s website in Contra Costa County.” Id. ¶¶ 10, 14. 26 In May 2025, counsel filed an amended complaint replacing Ms. Salazar with Richard 27 Merrell (“Plaintiff”) as named plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 58 (“FAC”). Plaintiff brings the same 1 “Defendant’s failure to ensure that its website is coded to sufficiently interface with . . . screen 2 readers . . . prevented [him] from consummating a purchase, as Defendant’s coding failures made 3 Defendant’s website impossible to navigate.” Id. ¶ 28. As such, he was unable “to make an 4 online purchase for instore pickup.” Id. Unlike Ms. Salazar, Plaintiff resides in Riverside County, 5 which is located within the Central District of California. See id. ¶ 4. Despite this, Plaintiff 6 maintains that he, too, was denied “full use and enjoyment . . . of Defendant’s website in Contra 7 Costa County, including the inability to locate directions to the Ralph Lauren store in this 8 jurisdiction.” Id. ¶ 10. 9 Defendant now moves to transfer this case to the Central District. Dkt. No. 60 (“Mot.”). 10 Plaintiff opposes transfer. Dkt. No. 65 (“Opp.”). 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 Defendant brings its motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which permits a district court to 13 transfer any civil action to “any other district or division where it might have been brought” for the 14 convenience of the parties and witnesses and “in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The 15 Court engages in a two-step analysis in deciding a motion to transfer under this provision. First, it 16 determines “whether the transferee district was one in which the action ‘might have been brought’ 17 by the plaintiff.” Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1960) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). 18 If it is, the Court engages in an “individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and 19 fairness.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. 20 Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). In this district, courts weigh private interest factors (such as 21 the plaintiff’s choice of forum and the convenience of the parties, witnesses, and evidence) and 22 public interest factors (such as the familiarity of the court in each forum with the applicable law, 23 the feasibility of consolidation with other claims, any local interest in the controversy, and the cost 24 differential of litigation in the two forums) to determine if transfer is warranted. See, e.g., Jones v. 25 GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2000); Perez v. Performance Food Grp., Inc., 26 No. 15-cv-02390-HSG, 2017 WL 66874, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017). 27 A motion to transfer venue lies within the broad discretion of the district court. See 1 against transfer involves subtle considerations and is best left to the discretion of the trial judge.” 2 (citation omitted)). The moving party bears the burden of showing that the transferee district is a 3 “more appropriate forum.” See Jones, 211 F.3d at 499. 4 III. DISCUSSION A. Whether This Action Could Have Been Brought in the Central District of 5 California 6 “An action could have been brought in any court that has subject matter jurisdiction over 7 the claims and personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and where venue would have been 8 proper.” Doe v. Epic Games, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1040 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2020) (citation 9 modified). The parties do not dispute that the Northern and Central Districts both have subject 10 matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims due to diversity of citizenship. See FAC ¶¶ 3–4; 28 11 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). Plaintiff also does not affirmatively dispute that the Central District 12 would have been able to assert personal jurisdiction over Defendant. See Opp. at 4–5. 13 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), venue in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of 14 the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is 15 the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Defendant contends that because 16 Plaintiff resides in Riverside County, his suit necessarily “revolves around his interaction with 17 Defendant’s website in Riverside, and his alleged inability to access Defendant’s brick-and-mortar 18 stores closest to his residence in Riverside.” See Mot. at 7. Consequently, “a substantial part of 19 the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in the Central District,” and venue in the 20 Central District is therefore proper. See id. at 12–13. 21 In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Central District is not a proper forum because he 22 “inherited [Ms. Salazar’s] choice of forum,” and she does not reside in the Central District, and 23 her injuries did not take place there. See Opp. at 4. However, he does not cite any authority to 24 support the proposition that, even though Ms. Salazar is no longer the named plaintiff in this case, 25 facts regarding her residence or injuries are relevant to the transfer analysis for Plaintiff’s claims. 26 See id. In addition, Plaintiff contends that although he resides in the Central District, his own 27 “allegations related to issues in this jurisdiction make the Northern District an appropriate venue.” 1 and enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s website in Contra Costa 2 County,” and that “a substantial portion of the conduct complained of herein occurred in this 3 District.” FAC ¶ 10, 14.1 4 The Court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing that this action could have 5 been brought in the Central District. In deciding discretionary motions, the Court can make 6 “inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.” See United States v. Hinkson, 585 7 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Further, courts do not “accept as true 8 allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 9 inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations 10 and quotations omitted); see also InMode Ltd. v. BTL Indus., Inc., 756 F. Supp. 3d 809, 818 (C.D. 11 Cal. 2024) (holding that “the Court is not obligated to accept [Plaintiff]’s conclusions as true” on a 12 § 1404(a) motion). Applying these principles here, given the nature of Plaintiff’s claims, his 13 undisputed residence in Riverside County, and the lack of any detailed allegations connecting him 14 and his theory of liability to Contra Costa County, it is reasonable to conclude that Plaintiff likely 15 suffered his alleged injury in Riverside County. See Perez v. Performance Food Grp., Inc., 2017 16 WL 66874, at *3 n.6 (inferring where “the alleged violations must have occurred” based on facts 17 in the record); Garland v. Duane Morris, LLP, No. 24-cv-04639-HSG, 2024 WL 4428976, at *2 18 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2024) (same). Consequently, the Court finds that venue would be proper in the 19 Central District. 20 // 21 // 22

23 1 On reply, Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of an exhibit purporting to show Plaintiff’s LinkedIn profile, in order to argue that he works from home in Riverside County in 24 addition to residing there. See Dkt. No. 66-1. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), a court may take judicial notice of a fact “not subject to reasonable dispute” because it either (1) “is 25 generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” or (2) “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 26 201(b). However, a court may not take judicial notice of any fact that is “subject to reasonable dispute.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the veracity and 27 accuracy of the contents of the Linkedin profile are reasonably subject to dispute because Plaintiff 1 B. Convenience Factors 2 1. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum 3 Ordinarily, “the defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant 4 upsetting the plaintiff’s choice of forum.” Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 5 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). However, this deference is reduced in certain circumstances. See 6 Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987). “[W]hen an individual brings a derivative suit 7 or represents a class, the named plaintiff’s choice of forum is given less weight.” Id. 8 Additionally, where the plaintiff is not a resident of the chosen forum, “[their] choice of forum is 9 entitled to less weight.” Perez, 2017 WL 66874, at *3. Finally, where “the operative facts have 10 not occurred within the forum and the forum has no interest in the parties or subject matter,” any 11 deference to the chosen forum is diminished to “only minimal consideration.” See Lou, 834 F.2d 12 at 739. 13 To start, Plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to minimal consideration as he is 14 representing a putative nationwide and statewide class. See FAC ¶ 2. Further, he is not a resident 15 of his chosen (or more accurately, inherited) forum. See id. ¶ 4. Under the circumstances, 16 Plaintiff’s entitlement to deference is substantially reduced. See Lou, 834 F.2d at 739. 17 Accordingly, this factor weighs minimally against transfer. 18 2. Private Factors 19 “The relative convenience to the witnesses is often recognized as the most important factor 20 to be considered in ruling on a motion under § 1404(a).” Saleh v. Titan Corp., 361 F. Supp. 2d 21 1152, 1160 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (citation omitted). Defendant argues that the testimony of “store 22 managers and customer service representatives who work at numerous stores throughout the 23 Central District,” Reply at 8, likely will be necessary to “shed light on Defendant’s processes and 24 procedures for instore pickup and aid of disabled customers.” Mot. at 15. For his part, Plaintiff 25 identifies “web coding witnesses” as those most likely to testify, but concedes that he “does not 26 know where [they] . . . are located.” See Opp. at 8. Ultimately, given that Plaintiff’s theory is that 27 the design of the website itself interferes with visually disabled customers’ ability to make 1 who actually manage the logistics of in-store pickups will be as central as Defendant suggests. 2 See FAC ¶ 28 (“As Plaintiff can only interact with websites using his screen reader and keyboard 3 due to his visual impairment, this lack of functionality prevented Plaintiff from finding the product 4 that he wanted to order for instore pickup and completing his desired purchase. . . . The barriers 5 Plaintiff encountered prevented Plaintiff from consummating a purchase, as Defendant’s coding 6 failures made Defendant’s website impossible to navigate and impossible to understand what 7 goods and services are being sold.”). The Court accordingly finds this factor to be neutral, given 8 that neither party explains where witnesses knowledgeable about the website design live. 9 Regarding the convenience of the parties, Plaintiff and his counsel are located in the 10 Central District. See Dkt. No. 67; FAC ¶ 4. However, “courts do not consider the convenience to 11 parties that have chosen to bring a case in a forum where they do not reside.” Perez, 2017 WL 12 66874, at *3. For venue purposes, Defendant is deemed to reside in any judicial district in which 13 it is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction, and it does not contest that it would be subject to 14 personal jurisdiction in either forum. See 28 U.S. Code § 1391(c)(2). Accordingly, this factor is 15 neutral. 16 Finally, as neither party contends that ease of access to relevant evidence differs between 17 the Central and Northern Districts, this factor is neutral. See Mot. at 19–20; Opp. at 4 n.3. 18 3. Public Factors 19 Defendant argues that “the Northern District has no interest in adjudicating the 20 controversy.” Mot. at 18. The Court disagrees for several reasons. 21 First, the Northern District has a local interest in Plaintiff’s claim because he purports to 22 represent both a nationwide and statewide class, presumably with members who reside in this 23 district. See Arreola v. Finish Line, No. 14-CV-03339-LHK, 2014 WL 6982571, at *11 (N.D. 24 Cal. Dec. 9, 2014) (observing that “the Northern and Central Districts would have an equal interest 25 in a certified class’s case”). 26 Second, and most importantly, this case has been pending in this district since December 27 2023. See Dkt. No. 1. Discovery is nearly complete, and Plaintiff’s motion for class certification 1 that this issue arose late in the litigation after the originally-proposed named plaintiff withdrew 2 from the case. But regardless, whatever the merits of this transfer motion might have been at an 3 || earlier stage in the case, the Court finds that the public interest in a timely resolution here weighs 4 || dispositively against asking a new judge in a new district to take on this case at this late date. The 5 case simply has progressed too far in this Court for a transfer to the Central District to make sense 6 || now, and this factor weighs very heavily against transfer. 7 IV. CONCLUSION 8 On balance, the discretionary factors here weigh decisively against transferring this case at 9 this late stage. The Court thus DENIES Defendant’s motion to transfer, Dkt. No. 60. 10 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 || Dated: = 8/12/2025

4 HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. United States District Judge

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28