Merrell-Soule Co. v. Rico Milk Products Co.

268 F. 366, 1920 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 887
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMay 27, 1920
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 268 F. 366 (Merrell-Soule Co. v. Rico Milk Products Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Merrell-Soule Co. v. Rico Milk Products Co., 268 F. 366, 1920 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 887 (E.D. Wis. 1920).

Opinion

GEIGER, District Judge.

This is an application'for a preliminary injunction to restrain alleged infringement of letters patent numbered 860,929, issued July 23, 1907, covering a process of separating the moisture from liquids. The defendant is engaged in the business of condensing and pulverizing milk. The application is resisted on the ground that the patent is invalid and that the defendant is not shown to infringe. In a general way the process consists — dealing with the particular subject of drying or pulverizing milk — in introducing it to a concentrating chamber wherein it may be heated, and wherein also a vacuum or minus pressure is maintained for condensing purposes. When the product has been condensed to a requisite degree, it is withdrawn through a pipe and introduced into a desiccating chamber under pressure through a spraying device, and immediately carried through such chamber under the influence of air or gas as a desiccating agent, whereby evaporation takes place to such degree that the particles of solids are precipitated and removed, after passing through a screen, from a collecting chamber.

The claims are two in number:

“1. The process of obtaining the solid constituents of liquids and semi-liquids in the form of powder, which process consists in concentrating the substance by removing a large percentage of the water therefrom, converting the concentrated mass into a fine spray, bringing such spray into a current of dry air or gas having an avidity for moisture, so that substantially all the remaining liquid constituents are separated, .thereby conveying-the dry powder into a suitable collecting space away from the air or gas current and discharging the air or gas separately from the dry powder.”
“2. The process of obtaining tlie solid constituents of liquids and semi-liquids in the form of powder, which process consists in concentrating the substance by removing a large percentage of water therefrom, converting the concentrated mass into a spray, bringing such spray into a current of dry heated air or gas, having an avidity for the moisture of the substance treated, retaining the atoms momentarily in said current so that substantially all the remaining moisture is converted into vapor and the product is prevented by tbe cooling ei'fect of such evaporation from undergoing chemical change, conveying the dry powder into suitable collecting spaces away from the evapo-rizing current and discharging the air or gas separately from the dry powder.”

In respect of the claimed invalidity of the patent, it is broadly asserted that, in so far as the .method or process involves additional [368]*368steps to those disclosed in, one or more patents of the prior art, the process of the patent in suit discloses mere aggregation, and in no event additional steps, or a combination of steps, patentably novel. The defense of want of infringement is rested wholly upon the claimed absence, in the method in fact pursued by the defendant, of the use of “dry” air or “dry heated air.”

The patent in suit was issued 13 years ago, and, while it has received no adjudication of validity, that circumstance is not controlling upon an application for preliminary injunction, if it can be said upon the proofs that the novelty and distinctiveness of the process is clear, and that by reason thereof it has received recognition and has been adopted. This phase of the case will be referred to later.

[1] Upon the case as made by. the parties, the question of infringement is not open, if the plaintiff can maintain its position respecting the 'fair interpretation of the claims of the patent. The' only distinction claimed by the defendant is that it eliminates from its process the use of either “dry air” dr “dry heated air,” as taught by the respective claims of the patent; and the defendant insists that those terms import, not only indispensable elements but elements of such clear definitive scope as must exclude the step taken by the defendant. In lieu of using what the defendant claims must be rigidly defined as “dry air,” or “dry heated air,” its process is thus differentiated in this respect by its expert Hunziker:

“At East Troy [defendant’s factory] heated atmospheric air was used, while patent 860,929 directs the use of dry air or dry heated air.”

In differentiating the mechanism used by the respective parties in the use of either heated atmospheric air or dry heated air, in the respective processes, the expert says:

“The'atomizing spray and the heated air at East Troy enter at one side of the drying chamber at an elevation about two-thirds from the bottom, while in patent 860,929 the atomizing spray and the dry heated air enter at or near the bottom of the drying chamber.”
“At Bast Troy the heated air enters the dry chamber through a slot extending along the entire side of the dry chamber, while in patent 860,929 the dry heated air enters at the bottom through a series of openings.”

A consideration not only of tire art but also the defendant’s interpretation of .it, as well as the objective of any process for drying and powdering milk, certainly discloses the fundamental idea that, howsoever the spraying and drying process may be practiced, it must exclude a step which would hinder the removal of moisture. In other words, no one would suggest, in carrying out the spraying process, the concurrent use of moisture-laden air. When, therefore, we have the three terms “dry air,” “dry heated air,” and “heated atmospheric air,” the query is naturally presented respecting any essential distinction between the steps involving the use of one rather than the use of the other. True, it may be conceded that dry air may be cold, and that atmospheric heated air may be moist; but, with respect to the latter, can that' be indulged when the. claim is pressed that identity of product in fact resulted in the use of it by 1he defendant? In other words, is it possible that the use of [369]*369moisture-laden,,but heated, atmospheric air was, or in fact could be, used by the defendant, or any one, in making a dry powder said to be identical in consistency and quality with that resulting from the use of what the art has called “dry air,” or “dry heated air”? The argument, if identity of result is admitted, necessarily leads to the exclusion of the particular quality of “heated,” or “dry heated,” or “heated atmospheric air,” as immaterial. “Air,” or “heated air,” will suffice.

The other slight differences in the mechanism or arrangement practiced by the defendant in its process, noted by its expert, are not, and have not, been insisted upon as sufficient to escape the charge of infringement, if plaintiff’s patent is valid. The case is therefore advanced directly to a consideration of the validity of the patent, and the proposition over which the contention arises is directly suggested, in view of the art and the file history of the patent in suit, by the steps indicated in the respective claims through this language:

“Concentrating the substance by removing a large percentage of water therefrom.” (See claims 1 and 2.)

This phase of the alleged invention was sharply in issue in the Patent Office; the applicant appreciating the force of patent references which deal with the conversion of liquids into- powders by the spraying method. The applicant discussed this step, saying:

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Related

Merrell-Soule Co. v. Northland Dairy Co.
28 F.2d 924 (Sixth Circuit, 1928)

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Bluebook (online)
268 F. 366, 1920 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 887, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/merrell-soule-co-v-rico-milk-products-co-wied-1920.