Merino v. Commissioner
This text of 1997 T.C. Memo. 385 (Merino v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
*462 Decision will be entered under Rule 155.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
DAWSON, *463
OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE
WOLFE,
In a notice of deficiency dated April 9, 1985, respondent determined deficiencies in petitioners' joint Federal income taxes for the years 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 in the respective amounts of $ 505, $ 12,647.87, $ 4,503, and $ 32,463. Respondent also determined that interest on the deficiencies accruing after December 31, 1984, would be calculated at 120 percent of the statutory rate under
*465 In a
The parties filed a Stipulation of Settled Issues concerning the adjustments relating to petitioners' participation in the Plastics Recycling Program. The stipulation provides: 1. Petitioners are not entitled to any deductions, losses, investment credits, business energy investment credits or any other tax benefits claimed on their tax returns as a result of their participation in the Plastics Recycling Program. 2. The underpayments in income*466 tax attributable to petitioners' participation in the Plastics Recycling Program are substantial underpayments attributable to tax motivated transactions, subject to the increased rate of interest established under 3. This stipulation resolves all issues that relate to the items claimed on petitioners' tax returns resulting from their participation in the Plastics Recycling Program, with the exception of petitioners' potential liability for additions to the tax for valuation overstatements under 4.
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*462 Decision will be entered under Rule 155.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
DAWSON, *463
OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE
WOLFE,
In a notice of deficiency dated April 9, 1985, respondent determined deficiencies in petitioners' joint Federal income taxes for the years 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 in the respective amounts of $ 505, $ 12,647.87, $ 4,503, and $ 32,463. Respondent also determined that interest on the deficiencies accruing after December 31, 1984, would be calculated at 120 percent of the statutory rate under
*465 In a
The parties filed a Stipulation of Settled Issues concerning the adjustments relating to petitioners' participation in the Plastics Recycling Program. The stipulation provides: 1. Petitioners are not entitled to any deductions, losses, investment credits, business energy investment credits or any other tax benefits claimed on their tax returns as a result of their participation in the Plastics Recycling Program. 2. The underpayments in income*466 tax attributable to petitioners' participation in the Plastics Recycling Program are substantial underpayments attributable to tax motivated transactions, subject to the increased rate of interest established under 3. This stipulation resolves all issues that relate to the items claimed on petitioners' tax returns resulting from their participation in the Plastics Recycling Program, with the exception of petitioners' potential liability for additions to the tax for valuation overstatements under 4. With respect to the issue of the addition to the tax under
The issues remaining in this case are: (1) Whether petitioners are liable for the additions to tax for negligence under
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulated facts and attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference.
A. The Plastics Recycling Transactions
This case concerns petitioners' investment in Northeast Resource Recovery Associates (Northeast), a limited partnership that leased seven Sentinel expanded polyethylene (EPE) recyclers. The transactions involving the Sentinel EPE recyclers leased by Northeast are substantially identical to those in the Clearwater Group limited partnership (Clearwater), the partnership considered in
In transactions closely resembling those in the
All of the monthly payments required among the entities in the above transactions offset each other. These transactions were done simultaneously. Although the recyclers were sold and leased for the above amounts under the structure of simultaneous transactions, the fair market value of a Sentinel EPE recycler in 1981 was not in excess of $ 50,000.
PI allegedly sublicensed the recyclers to entities that would use them to recycle plastic scrap. The sublicense agreements provided that the end-users would transfer to PI 100 percent of the recycled scrap in exchange for a payment from FMEC Corp. *469 based on the quality and amount of recycled scrap. Neither PI nor the end-users carried out the terms of the sublicense faithfully. In practice, those terms regularly were ignored.
Both Clearwater and Northeast leased Sentinel EPE recyclers from F & G Corp. and licensed those recyclers to FMEC Corp. Apart from leasing and licensing seven recyclers instead of six, the underlying transactions involving Northeast do not differ in any substantive respect from the Clearwater transactions considered in the
For convenience, we refer to the series of transactions among PI, ECI Corp., F & G Corp., Northeast, FMEC Corp., and PI as the Northeast transactions. In addition to the Northeast transactions, a number of other limited partnerships entered into transactions similar to the Northeast transactions, also involving Sentinel EPE recyclers and Sentinel expanded polystyrene (EPS) recyclers. We refer to these collectively as the Plastics Recycling transactions.
B. Northeast Resource Recovery Associates
Northeast is a New York limited partnership that closed on October 7, 1981. Richard Roberts (Roberts) is the general partner of Northeast.
A private placement memorandum*470 for Northeast was distributed to potential limited partners. Reports by F & G Corp.'s evaluators, Dr. Stanley M. Ulanoff (Ulanoff), a marketing consultant, and Dr. Samuel Z. Burstein (Burstein), a mathematics professor, were appended to the offering memorandum. Ulanoff owns a 1.27-percent interest in Plymouth Equipment Associates and a 4.37-percent interest in Taylor Recycling Associates. Burstein owns a 2.605-percent interest in Empire Associates and a 5.82-percent interest in Jefferson Recycling Associates. Like Northeast, Plymouth Equipment Associates, Taylor Recycling Associates, Empire Associates, and Jefferson Recycling Associates are partnerships that leased Sentinel recyclers. Burstein also was a client and business associate of Elliot I. Miller (Miller), the corporate counsel to PI.
The Northeast offering memorandum states that the general partner will receive fees from Northeast in the amount of $ 25,000. The offering memorandum further states that the general partner "may retain as additional compensation all amounts not paid as sales commissions or offeree representative fees" According to the offering memorandum, it was anticipated that 10 percent of the proceeds from*471 the offering--$ 95,000--would be allocated to the payment of sales commissions and offeree representative fees. Roberts therefore was to receive a minimum of $ 25,000 and up to $ 120,000 from Northeast.
The offering memorandum lists significant business and tax risk factors associated with an investment in Northeast. Specifically, the offering memorandum states: (1) There is a substantial likelihood of audit by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the purchase price paid by F & G Corp. to ECI Corp. probably will be challenged as being in excess of fair market value; 3 (2) Northeast has no prior operating history; (3) the general partner has no prior experience in marketing recycling or similar equipment; (4) the limited partners have no control over the conduct of Northeast's business; (5) there is no established market for the Sentinel EPE recyclers; (6) there are no assurances that market prices for virgin resin will remain at their current costs per pound or that the recycled pellets will be as marketable as virgin pellets; and (7) certain potential conflicts of interest exist.
*472 The Sentinel EPE recycler had a "nuts and bolts", or manufacturing, cost of $ 18,000. It was a simple batch type machine designed to grind expanded polyethylene foam and film into a densified form called "popcorn" that could be further processed to produce resin pellets suitable for some uses in the plastics industry. The Sentinel EPE recycler was incapable of recycling low density polyethylene by itself and had to be used in connection with grinders, extruders, and pelletizers. Operation of the Sentinel EPE recycler was performed by low wage factory help with minimal training. The Sentinel EPE recyclers were placed with end-users that did not have sufficient amounts of scrap ever to pay off the notes on the machines. There is no evidence that FMEC Corp. ever made payments to end-users although on occasion PI made some payments for scrap produced by end-users.
Although the offering memorandum represented that the Sentinel EPE recycler was a unique machine, it was not. Specially designed systems for densifying polyethylene and polystyrene were commercially available prior to 1981 from such companies as Cumberland Engineering Division of John Brown Plastics Machinery and the NRM Corp. *473 Ranging in price from $ 20,000 to $ 200,000, other plastics recycling machines available during 1981 included the Foremost Densilator, Nelmor/Weiss Densification System (Regenolux), Buss-Condux Plastcompactor, and Cumberland Granulator. See
C. Richard Roberts
Roberts is a businessman and the general partner in Northeast and many other limited partnerships that leased and licensed Sentinel EPE recyclers. He also is a 9-percent shareholder in F & G Corp., the corporation that leased the recyclers to Northeast. From 1982 through 1985, Roberts maintained the following office address with Raymond Grant (Grant), the sole owner and president of ECI Corp.: Grant/Roberts Investment Banking Tax Sheltered Investments 745 Fifth Avenue, Suite 410 New York, New York 10022
Prior to the Northeast transactions, Roberts and Grant were clients of the accounting firm H. W. Freedman & Co. (Freedman & Co.). Harris W. Freedman (Freedman), a certified public accountant (C.P.A.) and the named partner in Freedman & Co., was the president and chairman of the board of F & G Corp. He also owned 94 percent of a Sentinel EPE recycler. Freedman & Co. prepared the partnership returns for ECI Corp., F & G Corp., and Northeast. It also provided tax services to John D. Bambara (Bambara). Bambara is the 100-percent owner of FMEC Corp., as well as its president, treasurer, clerk, and director. He, his wife, and his daughter also owned directly or indirectly 100 percent of the stock of PI.
D. Petitioners and Their Introduction to Northeast Resource Recovery Associates
Petitioners resided in Tenafly, New Jersey, at the time their petition was filed. Hereafter, reference to petitioner in the singular denotes Donald N. Merino.
Petitioner earned a master's degree in industrial engineering in 1963 and a Ph.D. in managerial economics in 1975. He has been a licensed professional engineer in industrial engineering*475 and has been a member of the American Institute of Industrial Engineers, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and the National Society of Professional Engineers. Petitioner's professional experience includes employment with Standard Brands, Exxon Corp., Mobil Corp. (Mobil), and the Celanese Corp. (Celanese). At Mobil, petitioner worked as a financial analyst, a project manager for distribution facilities, and as a senior consultant for marketing and distribution in Mobil's international division. In the latter capacity he was employed in analysis of the economics of the oil business. Petitioner left Mobil after 10 years and in 1974 joined Celanese, where he remained employed through the tax years in issue.
Petitioner started at Celanese as manager of the hydrocarbons planning group of the company, which was the largest merchant buyer of ethylene in the United States. Celanese's primary business concerned hydrocarbons--plastics, chemicals, and fibers. According to petitioner, at one point Celanese was the 100th largest corporation in the United States and had revenues of approximately $ 4 billion. Celanese subscribed to services provided by nearly every major forecasting *476 entity, including Arthur D. Little, Inc., the Stanford Research Institute, and Data Resources, Inc. It budgeted approximately $ 500,000 annually for consultants and purchased a broad range of reports. Celanese also subscribed to numerous magazines and trade publications such as Chemical Reporter, Modern Plastics, Plastics World, and Plastics Technology. In 1975 or 1976, Celanese participated in a series of conferences presented by the Department of Energy (DOE) in connection with the National Energy Policy Plan. When the DOE published one of the periodic updates of the National Energy Policy Plan concerning energy projections in July 1981, Celanese held internal seminars analyzing the report and circulated internal reports commenting on its conclusions.
As manager of the hydrocarbons planning group at Celanese, petitioner forecasted prices for crude oil, ethylene, and related products, and helped establish a purchasing pattern for ethylene and propylene. Subsequent positions held by petitioner included director of the Celanese Chemical Co.; worldwide director of chemicals, plastics, and specialties for Celanese; corporate director of new business development; director of the quality*477 program; and director of strategic business development. Petitioner was at various times responsible for "the planning and economics of" plastics, petrochemicals, chemicals, and capital expenditures; and new business ventures. In two of his positions, petitioner had responsibilities related to the budgeting and appropriation of funds for new materials and equipment such as extruders and machinery to manufacture plastics.
In 1981, through a nominee, petitioner acquired a 24-percent interest in two limited partnership units in Northeast for $ 24,000. 4*478 As a result of petitioner's investment in Northeast, on their 1981 return petitioners claimed an operating loss in the amount of $ 19,526.16, and investment tax and business energy credits totaling $ 22,431.29. 5 Petitioners carried back a total of $ 18,279 in unused business energy credits to their 1978, 1979, and 1980 returns. 6 Respondent disallowed petitioners' claimed operating loss and credits related to Northeast in full.
Petitioner learned of the Plastics Recycling transactions and Northeast from a personal friend Norman Lewis (Lewis), who was a C.P.A. Lewis was considering the Plastics Recycling transactions for some of his clients, and he asked petitioner to examine the proposal. Petitioner agreed to do so, and Lewis sent him the offering materials for Northeast and another Plastics Recycling partnership. Before and after reviewing the offering materials, petitioner spoke to Roberts. Petitioner questioned whether PI was "a real company" and whether it had a "real machine". Petitioner told Roberts: "If you have a demonstration of this, and I'm going to do this, I certainly understand the economics. I understand what you're trying to do, but I want to see it working." He*479 explained: "I would never invest in anything unless I saw it".
Roberts suggested that petitioner visit the PI plant in Hyannis, Massachusetts, and arranged a date for him to visit. PI was located near a house on Cape Cod where petitioners vacationed at the time. At PI, petitioner spent the first "hour to two hours" in Bambara's office discussing and examining samples of plastics products made by PI. Bambara "asked [petitioner] to sign a secrecy agreement, and sort of twisted [his] arm a little bit about nondisclosure, and things like that." After signing the agreement, petitioner was allowed to tour the plant. Petitioner recalled that the PI representatives "were a little uncomfortable that somebody that knew plastics technology and plastics economics was going to visit the plant" and "were very reluctant to give me any information." According to petitioner, the PI representatives refused to give petitioner any of the information that he asked for, such as company records, purportedly because petitioner was there to perform due diligence and was not an investor.
Petitioner viewed a demonstration of the machine, which he recalled as follows: What they did was they took the plastic*480 scrap that they were manufacturing * * * [and] ran it through one of the machines, made the popcorn material. Had a very small-barrelled extruder. They ran it through the extruder. And they took the pellets that came out of the extruder and they put it back in the process, which was very difficult to do, by the way, because they used cyclone feeding. So, getting the pellets back in the process wasn't easy.
Attorneys from the law firm of Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives (WMDI) visited the PI plant on the same day as petitioner. WMDI prepared the offering memorandum, tax opinion, and other legal documents for all of the 1981 Plastics Recycling partnerships, including Northeast. During a lunch break, petitioner asked the attorneys some questions about the legal aspects of the venture, such as whether the transactions qualified for the recently enacted safe-harbor leasing provisions of section 168(f). Petitioner "knew that the government was not happy with" nonrecourse leveraged lease transactions, and he considered the Northeast transaction to be "a classic leveraged *481 lease deal."
After lunch petitioner questioned Bambara, particularly with respect to factors bearing on the price of resin, which he purportedly considered "the crucial part of the economics of this deal". Petitioner understood that PI purchased resin at "a volume discount", but Bambara did not indicate the amount of the discount. Petitioner also learned that because PI received resin shipments by truck instead of rail, it paid a penalty that petitioner estimated at "about a 4-cent per pound penalty". In addition, PI was not in a good location; trucks had difficulty getting in and out, especially during the summer, and therefore it also paid a "location differential" that petitioner estimated at several cents per pound.
Petitioner also questioned Bambara about the sources of PI's recyclable scrap. Petitioner testified that in his view "it's difficult to make money in plastics recycling. You need to have enough product in terms of the volume." Petitioner understood from Bambara that PI's customers purchased plastic foam from an average of 3 to 5 suppliers. Consequently, petitioner reasoned, "if the machines went to those suppliers, it was not only PI's volume that could supply those*482 machines, but also two or three or four other suppliers could supply that". Petitioner also understood from Bambara that PI had been working on the machine for "a long time" and had been using it in practice. To confirm this claim, petitioner allegedly spoke to one of his Cape Cod neighbors who worked in PI's machine shop in Hyannis. Petitioner claims that he understood from his neighbor that PI first began working on the Sentinel EPE recycler under a prior president at PI, and that it had been using the machine in practice.
Petitioner recalled being satisfied that the Sentinel EPE recycler was unique because it recycled 1- to 2-pound low density polyethylene foam. He recalled: I was surprised that they could do this, the 1- to 2-pound. I read pretty much all the literature. * * * If somebody else had had a machine that did 1- to 2-pound low density polyethylene foam, you would have seen an article in one of the, you know, whatever, Modern Plastics, or Technology, whatever.
Petitioner used the projections in the Northeast offering memorandum to run "a series of sort of back of the envelope calculations to see whether or not the business made any sense from an economic standpoint." He described the Northeast transaction as "basically a closed loop deal", which "is very important to the economics of this". Petitioner analyzed the economics from both a full equity basis and a cash basis. In so doing, he did not give any consideration to the manufacturing costs of the recycler. Petitioner explained: Manufacturing costs, per se, of this particular item is only a small part of the economics. In this particular case, I didn't really think it had much relevance to the decision.
Petitioner explained his consideration of the fair market value of the Sentinel EPE recycler as follows: When I looked at the price of the machine and the business deal, I looked at it as a business deal. From a business perspective, * * * it's not just the price of the machine. It's really the price of the business deal, of which the machine is one part of it. * * * So, when you looked at it, you didn't look at it to see whether or not it costs $ 50,000 or $ 100,000 to build the machine. You looked to see whether or not the overall economics justified that kind of investment and made sense. So it was really a systems, or a group look at the whole thing.
Price difficulties arose soon after petitioner invested in Northeast. He recalled that even though*485 the price of crude oil continued to rise during the latter part of 1981 and into the next year, the price of low density polyethylene actually decreased. Petitioner visited PI to inquire about the machines during his summer vacation trips to Cape Cod, but became "very discouraged after about maybe a year and a half or 2 years into this deal". He "gave up after that point because then it really became apparent that the price of crude [oil] was really declining." Petitioners never made a profit in any year from their participation in Northeast.
OPINION
We have decided a large number of the Plastics Recycling group of cases.
In
Although petitioners have not agreed to be bound by
Based on the entire record in this case, including the extensive stipulations, testimony of respondent's experts, and petitioner's testimony, we hold that the Northeast transaction was a sham and lacked economic substance. In reaching this conclusion, we rely heavily upon the overvaluation of the Sentinel EPE recyclers. Respondent is sustained on the question of the underlying deficiencies. We note that petitioners have explicitly conceded this issue in the stipulation of facts and stipulation of settled issues filed shortly before trial. The record plainly supports respondent's determinations regardless of such concession. For a detailed discussion of the*488 facts and the applicable law in a substantially identical case, see
A. Section 6653(a) --Negligence
Respondent asserted the additions to tax for negligence under
Negligence is defined as the failure to exercise the due care that a reasonable*489 and ordinarily prudent person would employ under the circumstances.
Petitioners contend that they were reasonable in claiming deductions and credits with respect to Northeast. They maintain that petitioner "conducted a good faith investigation of the Northeast transaction and did not merely rely on the offering memorandum or other materials supplied by the investment vendor." Petitioners*490 further assert that they reasonably expected to make a profit from Northeast because plastic is an oil derivative and the United States was experiencing a so-called oil crisis during the latter 1970's and early 1980's.
Petitioner's educational background and professional experience should have enabled him to make a reasonable and informed assessment of the Sentinel EPE recycler and the Northeast transaction. His own testimony is that he reviewed the offering memorandum repeatedly; visited PI and viewed a demonstration of the machine; spoke with members of WMDI, Roberts, Bambara, and Celanese personnel; and analyzed the economics of the transaction. However, the record in this case, particularly the basic sham nature of the transaction, undermines critical aspects of petitioner's testimony and analysis and does not support the conclusions he purportedly reached with respect to the Sentinel EPE recycler and the Northeast transaction.
The Northeast offering memorandum warned: (1) Northeast had no prior operating history; (2) management of Northeast's business was dependent upon the general partner, who had no prior*491 experience in marketing recycling or similar equipment; (3) the general partner had other business commitments that required a substantial portion of his time; (4) the general partner was required to devote only such time to Northeast as he, in his absolute discretion, deemed necessary; (5) the limited partners had no control over the conduct of Northeast's business; and (6) there was no established market for the Sentinel EPE recyclers. In addition, PI faced added costs because it shipped resin by truck instead of rail, and because PI was in an inconvenient location with high costs for supplies.
To some extent these added costs were offset by a volume discount PI purportedly received on its resin purchases. However, Bambara did not tell petitioner the amount of the discount, nor, for that matter, did he tell petitioner how much PI paid in added costs as a "location differential". The PI representatives refused to provide petitioner with any of the records or information that he requested, ostensibly because he "was doing due diligence and * * * was not an investor." Petitioner testified that he did not find this refusal odd. Yet petitioner was visiting PI as a potential investor; *492 Roberts arranged for his visit because petitioner "would never invest in anything unless [he] saw it." Moreover, petitioner had signed a secrecy agreement, and the offering memorandum disclosed that PI did not intend to seek patent protection. Petitioner knew from experience that "it's difficult to make money in plastics recycling," even for a preeminent corporation such as Celanese. The business risk factors listed in the offering memorandum, PI's high costs, petitioner's knowledge of the basic difficulty in making money in plastics recycling, and the uncooperative attitude of the PI personnel in simply refusing to furnish any information concerning corporate finance or actual operating costs should have raised serious questions in petitioner's mind about the financial and economic viability of Northeast.
Petitioner claims that he concluded that the Sentinel EPE recycler was unique because it could recycle 1-to-2 pound density polyethylene. He testified: At that time--this is August of 1981--I was not aware, and neither were any of the people I talked to aware of any machines that [recycled] low density*493 [polyethylene] down in the 1 and 2 pound range. * * * * I specifically asked people who were knowledgeable in the area whether they knew of anybody in that area, that anybody had produced. And, the answer was no. So I felt that from a technology standpoint that [PI] had worked on something unique.
However, respondent's expert witnesses, Richard S. Lindstrom (Lindstrom) and Steven Grossman (Grossman), testified otherwise. Lindstrom, who consulted in plastics and plastics equipment at Arthur D. Little, Inc. from 1956 until 1989, testified that "there were available in 1981 commercial units that could be purchased for $ 50,000 or less that were totally equal to the Sentinel EPE Recycler in function, product quality, *494 and capacity." Grossman, who has a Ph.D. in Polymer Science and Engineering and was at the time a professor of Plastics Engineering at the University of Massachusetts-Lowell, testified that the Sentinel EPE recycler "represented no new technology to the plastics recycling industry at the time of its offering", and that comparable and "more efficient technology was available to recycle film/foam polyethylene scrap." See
The offering memorandum also disclosed that "competition could adversely affect the amount of Additional Rent which the [recyclers] are anticipated to produce". This admission undermines petitioner's argument for a purported fair market value for the machine based upon a projected stream of royalty income. See
With respect to the fair market value of the recycler, petitioner claims that he did not view the investment as a purchase of the machines standing alone, and that he did *496 not "look at it to see whether or not it costs $ 50,000 or $ 100,000 to build the machine." Instead, he "looked to see whether or not the overall economics justified that kind of investment and made sense." Petitioner asserted that the Sentinel EPE recycler could not be valued in isolation from the Northeast transactions, but within the context of said transactions, he concluded that it was worth $ 1,162,666.
However, as petitioners stipulated, the fair market value of a Sentinel EPE recycler was not in excess of $ 50,000 in 1981. Respondent's expert Lindstrom testified that prices of commercially available machines that were similar to the Sentinel EPE recycler were in the range of $ 50,000 in 1981. An example of a machine "that provided equivalent capability of recycling polyethylene and polystyrene film and foam waste", according to respondent's expert Grossman, was the Foremost Densilator, which had been available since 1978 and sold for approximately $ 20,000 in 1981. Petitioner testified that he was familiar with the Foremost Densilator, as well as other plastics recycling machines. In view of the gross disparity in the prices of such other machines and the Sentinel EPE recycler, *497 petitioner's purported valuation estimate was not reasonable.
Petitioner's testimony to the effect that the Sentinel EPE recycler was worth $ 1,162,666, within the context of the artificial Northeast transactions, is specious. Petitioner's refusal to value the EPE recycler by itself and his insistence on valuing it only as part of an "overall system" amounts to considering the sham transaction as though it were a valid transaction. In his calculations of value, petitioner allows an investment credit of 20 percent of $ 1,162,666 and allows depreciation on the basis of the same inflated value. He treats the nonrecourse loans as though they were enforceable loans. In his discussion, he ignores all possibility of competition from users of machines purchased for $ 50,000 or less. In short, petitioner's valuation of the "overall system" is based on an artificial inflation of values in isolation from real-world prices or influences. As the rapid collapse of the sham transaction demonstrated, the EPE machines were grossly overvalued by comparison with similar machinery.
4. The Carmagnola Reports
In support of the reasonableness of his valuation estimate, petitioner submitted into evidence*498 preliminary reports prepared for respondent by Ernest D. Carmagnola (Carmagnola), the president of Professional Plastic Associates. Carmagnola had been retained by the IRS in 1984 to evaluate the Sentinel EPE and EPS recyclers in light of what he described as "the fantastic values placed on the [recyclers] by the owners." Based on limited information available to him at that time, Carmagnola preliminarily estimated that the value of the Sentinel EPE recycler was $ 250,000. However, after additional information became available to him, Carmagnola concluded in a signed affidavit, dated March 16, 1993, that the machines actually had a fair market value of not more than $ 50,000 each in the fall of 1981.
We accord no weight to the Carmagnola reports submitted by petitioners. The projected valuations therein were based on inadequate information, research, and investigation, and were subsequently rejected and discredited by their author. In one preliminary report, Carmagnola states that he has "a serious concern of actual
Respondent rejected the Carmagnola reports and considered them unsatisfactory for any purpose, and there is no indication in the record that respondent used them as a basis for any determinations in the notice of deficiency. Even so, counsel for petitioners obtained copies of these reports and urge that they support the reasonableness of the value reported on petitioners' 1981 return. Not surprisingly, counsel for petitioners did not call Carmagnola to testify in this case, but preferred instead to rely solely upon his preliminary ill-founded valuation estimates. (Carmagnola has not been called to testify in any of the Plastics Recycling cases before us.) The Carmagnola reports were a part of the record considered by this Court and reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the
*500
Petitioner testified that he reasonably expected to make an economic profit from Northeast and that speculation regarding crude oil prices "was the critical factor" in his decision to invest. He indicated that the price of plastic is directly proportional to the price of crude oil, and that when he invested in Northeast, the prevailing opinion in both the public and private sectors was that, due to the so-called oil crisis, the price of crude oil was going to increase significantly. As evidence of such speculation, petitioners placed into the record several articles from Modern Plastics, dated April 1980, May 1981, and August 1981, and an energy projections report from the DOE, published in July 1981. The prefatory overview to the DOE report, however, cautioned about "the tremendous uncertainties underlying energy projections" and warned "that [the] projections [in the report] do not constitute any sort of blueprint for the future." Reflective of such uncertainties, the April 1980 Modern Plastics article contemplated resin price hikes, while the May 1981 article predicted a leveling of prices, market disruptions, and an industrywide shakeout.
In *501 contrast to petitioner's testimony, respondent's expert Grossman explained that the price of plastics materials is not directly proportional to the price of oil. In his report, Grossman stated that less than 10 percent of crude oil is utilized for making plastics materials and that studies have shown that "a 300% increase in crude oil prices results in only a 30 to 40% increase in the cost of plastics products." An even greater disparity was reported in the May 1981 article from Modern Plastics, which stated: "A rule-of thumb unproven by cost-accounting but
Petitioners' reliance on
In the present case, however, as explained by respondent's expert*503 Grossman (and the May 1981 Modern Plastics article submitted by petitioners), the price of plastics materials is not directly proportional to the price of oil. The
Petitioners also cite a number of cases in which courts rejected the negligence additions to tax because the taxpayers reasonably relied upon offering materials and/or qualified expert advice.
6. Conclusion
In view of petitioner's educational background and extensive experience in plastics and the nature and extent of his investigation, he learned or should have learned that the Sentinel EPE recycler was not unique and not worth in excess of $ *505 50,000, and that Northeast lacked economic substance and had no potential for profit. Petitioner's self-serving testimony to the contrary is not credible, and this Court is not required to accept it as true.
Under the circumstances of this case, petitioners failed to exercise due*506 care in claiming a large loss deduction and tax credits with respect to Northeast on their Federal income tax returns for the years 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981. The direct reductions claimed on petitioners' tax returns for those years, from the investment tax credits alone, equaled 170 percent of their cash investment. Therefore, like the taxpayers in
B. Section 6659 --Valuation Overstatement
In the amended*507 answer, respondent asserted that petitioners were liable for the
A graduated addition to tax is imposed when an individual has an underpayment of tax that equals or exceeds $ 1,000 and "is attributable to" a valuation overstatement.
Petitioners claimed tax benefits, including investment tax credits and business energy credits, based on a purported value of $ 1,162,666 for each Sentinel EPE recycler. Petitioners concede that the fair market*508 value of a Sentinel EPE recycler in 1981 was not in excess of $ 50,000. Therefore, if disallowance of petitioners' claimed tax benefits is attributable to such valuation overstatement, petitioners are liable for the
Petitioners contend that respondent erroneously failed to waive the
We note initially that there is no showing in the record that petitioners timely requested a waiver. We are reluctant to find that respondent abused any discretion in this case when respondent was not timely requested to exercise it and there is no direct evidence of any abuse of administrative discretion.
However, we do not decide this issue solely on petitioners' failure timely to request a waiver but instead, we have considered the issue on its merits. Petitioners urge that petitioner "did all that one could reasonably be expected to do" in deciding on the valuation claimed on their 1981 tax return. However, as we explained above in finding petitioners liable for the negligence additions to tax, petitioner's purported conclusion with respect to the fair market value of the Sentinel EPE recycler was not reasonable. In view of his extensive knowledge and experience in plastics, and the resources*510 readily available to him, petitioner learned or should have learned that the Sentinel EPE recycler was not worth in excess of $ 50,000 in 1981.
In support of their contention that they acted reasonably, petitioners cite
For the same reasons that we held petitioners negligent,
Footnotes
1. The deficiency notice refers to
sec. 6621(d) . This section was redesignated assec. 6621(c) by sec. 1511(c)(1)(A) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2744 and repealed by sec. 7721(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA 1989), Pub. L. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, 2399, effective for tax returns due after Dec. 31, 1989, OBRA 1989 sec. 7721(d), 103 Stat. 2400. The repeal does not affect the instant case. For simplicity, we refer to this section assec. 6621(c) . The annual rate of interest undersec. 6621(c)↩ for interest accruing after Dec. 31, 1984, equals 120 percent of the interest payable under sec. 6601 with respect to any substantial underpayment attributable to tax-motivated transactions.2. The deficiencies for 1978, 1979, and 1980 derived from disallowed credit carrybacks from 1981.↩
3. The offering memorandum notes that "Such purchase price is the basis for computing the regular investment and energy tax credits to be claimed by the Partnership" and that "if a challenge by the [Internal Revenue] Service with respect to the fair market value of the Sentinel Recyclers * * * were successfully made, all or part of the regular investment and energy tax credits * * * would be lost."↩
4. Petitioner's nominee was Norman Lewis (Lewis). Lewis acquired a 10.421050-percent interest in Northeast for $ 100,000. Petitioners therefore indirectly owned an approximately 2.5 percent interest in Northeast (24 percent x 10.421050 percent = 2.5 percent).↩
5. Petitioners' interest in Northeast generated $ 20,355 in investment tax credits and $ 20,355 in business energy credits. However, their business energy credit was subject to limitation in the amount of $ 2,326.↩
6. The record does not reveal the respective amounts of the claimed carrybacks to petitioners' 1978, 1979, and 1980 returns.↩
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
1997 T.C. Memo. 385, 74 T.C.M. 370, 1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 462, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/merino-v-commissioner-tax-1997.