Meriden National Bank v. Gallaudet

24 N.E. 994, 120 N.Y. 298, 30 N.Y. St. Rep. 999, 75 Sickels 298, 1890 N.Y. LEXIS 1262
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 29, 1890
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 24 N.E. 994 (Meriden National Bank v. Gallaudet) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Meriden National Bank v. Gallaudet, 24 N.E. 994, 120 N.Y. 298, 30 N.Y. St. Rep. 999, 75 Sickels 298, 1890 N.Y. LEXIS 1262 (N.Y. 1890).

Opinion

Haight, J.

This action was brought to recover damages for breach of warranty in the sale of a promissory note purporting to be made by Franklin Farrell & Co., to the order of W. M. Babbott, and indorsed by him, the plaintiff claiming that there was no such firm as Franklin Farrell & Go., and that consequently 'the note was not genuine. The defendant claims that he sold the note to plaintiff as the agent of Babbott; that there was such a firm, and that the note was a genuine note thereof.

A person who sells commercial paper as his own is under•stood to warrant his title thereto to be good, and that the •instrument is genuine. (Littauer v. Goldman, 72 N. Y. 506 ; Delaware Bank v. Jarvis, 20 N. Y. 226; Fake v. Smith, 7 Abb. [N. S.] 106.)

Assuming, therefore, that the note was sold by the defendant as his own, and that the law implies a warranty on his part that the note was genuine, it becomes necessary to determine whether or not it was the genuine note of Franklin Farrell & Go. The evidence is that the name of Franklin Farrell & Go. was signed by W. M. Babbott, and it is claimed that Franklin Farrell and William M. Babbott were copartners, engaged in business-; that the note was given to raise money to carry on such business, and that Babbott had lawful •authority to so execute the instrument. This question was submitted to the jury, and it remains for us to determine whether there was sufficient-evidence to justify such submission. It appears that business:relation commenced between Farrell and Babbott about the month of February, 1879; they then had some conversation .in .reference to the manufacture and sale of *304 ice refrigerating machines. The first arrangement which appears in writing was made with one Thomas Oook, in which Oook was to apply for and assign all of his patents relating tool’ growing out of the business to the company; that he was to put his one-third interest in the Pennsylvania company into the Oook Ice and Refrigerating Machine Company, and to use his influence to combine all interests for the benefit of the company; he was to teach Farrell and Babbott the business in all its branches, and at the earliest possible moment to complete drafts and specifications for small machines and adapt them to transportation, and was to put Farrell and Babbott on the board of directors. “ Mr. Farrell and Mr. Babbott to have transportation to work on moiety of profits on the same terms as proposed by the Philadelphia parties when called for, etc.” This instrument is signed by Thomas Oook, Franklin Farrell and W. M. Babbott. The next instrument is a contract dated the 22d day of March, 1879, between the Oook Ice and Refrigerating Machine Company of the first part, and Franklin Farrell of Ansonia, in the state of Connecticut, and W, M. Babbott of the city of Rew York, of the second part. It recites certain letters-patent issued by the United States for certain improvements in ice refrigerating machines and apparatus,, and that the parties of the second part are desirous of acquiring certain rights which are therein specified, and then, among other things, provides: “ First. The said parties of the second part shall, with all diligence and despatch and without expense or charge to the party of the first part, manufacture a refrigeratering machine under the said patents, and for the purpose of aiding and benefitting the business hereinafter mentioned ; shall run the said machine at least for two months succeeding the time of its completion; and second, the said parties of the second part shall use their best endeavor to introduce machines and apparatus containing said patented improvements to public notice and create a demand therefor, and shall use reasonable diligence to build or cause to be built said machines and apparatus to fill any bona fide orders which may be given for the same by responsible parties for such prices and upon such *305 terms and conditions as shall from time to time be agreed upon by the parties hereto, and shall also nse reasonable diligence and their best endeavors to effect sales of interests, rights or licenses in or under said letters-patent, etc.” The next contract executed by the parties bears date July 1,1879, and is in the form of a letter addressed to David Smith, Esq., in which Franklin Farrell and W. M. Babbott agree to pay him $175 per month, for nine months, with the privilege of extending the time to October 1, 1880, for the purpose of developing, as they may think best, the Cook principle of manufacturing cold air by refrigerating machines, etc. It is true that these instruments are executed by each of the parties thereto in their own name, and that Farrell and Babbott may be said to be joint contractors, but these instruments establish the fact that they had engaged in a joint enterprise and business, and had made contracts with other parties. Humerous letters, telegrams and talks took place between them in reference to the' contemplated business. They had agreed to construct a trial machine, and to run it for a specified time so as to test its practicability and create a demand for it in the market Babbott testifies to the oral arrangement between him and Farrell, in which it was understood that he was to have the general management of the business; that Farrell was to manufacture the machines and furnish the money therefor, and that the profits were to be divided equally between them; that Smith, who was employed by them, was a practical machine manufacturer, and that the trial machine was to be constructed by him in Blackwell’s warehouse in Greenwich street, but was finally placed in building Ho. 45 Clarkson street; that Farrell employed a man by the name qf Green to draw plans for a part of the machine and sent him to Hew York with a letter of introduction to Babbott; that a portion of the machine was ordered immediately after the employment of Mr. Smith; that Babbott proceeded with the construction of the trial machine and arranged with Blackwell & Co. to put it up in the warehouse at No. 45 Clarkson street, putting the arrangement into writing in the form of a letter, which *306 was signed Franklin .Farrell & Co.,” lie sending a copy by mail to Farrell. It further appeared that this note was given after he had incurred expenses in putting up this machine.

Whilst this evidence may not be very satisfactory, we are inclined to the opinion that it is sufficient to carry the case to the jury for its determination as to whether or not there was a copartnership. It is true that nothing was said about how the losses should be shared, but we must assume that it was understood that they were to be borne equally in view of the fact that, it was agreed that the profits were to be shared equally. It is also true that it does not apjiear that there was any firm name agreed upon under which they should conduct their business, but a copartnership may exist and the parties be bound even though there is no firm name. Had the note in suit been drawn payable to the order of Smith and delivered to him in payment for his services and expenditures 'in the construction of the machine we should not long hesitate upon the liability of Farrell thereon. (First Nat. Bk. of Chittenango v. Morqan., 73 N. Y. 593; Whitaker v. Brown, 16 Wend. 505.)

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Bluebook (online)
24 N.E. 994, 120 N.Y. 298, 30 N.Y. St. Rep. 999, 75 Sickels 298, 1890 N.Y. LEXIS 1262, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/meriden-national-bank-v-gallaudet-ny-1890.