RENDERED: MARCH 13, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0541-MR
MERICA MARTIN AND ESTATE OF RENEE MARIE JONES, BY AND THROUGH ITS EXECUTRIX, MERICA MARTIN APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE GREGORY A. LAY, JUDGE ACTION NO. 21-CI-00851
JAMES JONES APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Merica Martin and Estate of Renee Marie Jones,
By and Through its Executrix, Merica Martin (Appellants) appeal from an order of
the Laurel Circuit Court overruling their motion to alter, amend, or vacate a partial
summary judgment in favor of James Jones (Appellee). Appellants argue that the circuit court improperly interpreted Trust and Transfer on Death (TOD) documents
to conclude that Appellee is entitled to one-half of the decedent’s Single
Investment Accounts. After careful review, we find no error and affirm the order
on appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts are not in dispute. Merica Martin (Ms. Martin) and
Appellee are siblings. On February 19, 2018, their mother, Renee Marie Jones
(Ms. Jones) created the Renee Marie Jones Living Trust (the Trust). The Trust
designated Ms. Martin, Appellee, and their half-brother, Brian Owens (Mr.
Owens), as beneficiaries. Per the Trust, Appellant and Mr. Owens were to receive
their shares outright, with Appellee’s share remaining in the Trust after Ms. Jones
death for the benefit of Appellee.
Per Article 6 of the Trust, Mr. Owens was to receive 1/4 of an
Individual Retirement Account (IRA); Ms. Martin was to receive 3/8 of the IRA
and 1/2 of the Single Investment Accounts; and Appellee was to receive 3/8 of the
IRA and 1/2 of the Single Investment Accounts.
Thereafter, Ms. Jones executed TOD documents on all three of her
Edward Jones accounts.1 Per the TOD documents, Ms. Jones’ IRA would transfer
1 Accounts designated to transfer on death “pass outside of probate, with ownership passing directly to the named beneficiaries on the death of the owner.” Estate of Mcvey v. Department of Revenue, 480 S.W.3d 233, 236 (Ky. 2015) (citation omitted).
-2- on her death directly to her three children, with Mr. Owens receiving 1/4;
Appellant receiving 3/8; and Appellee receiving 3/8. The TOD documents also
provided that on Ms. Jones’ death, one-half of the Single Investment Accounts
would be directly transferred to Ms. Martin, with the other one-half remaining in
the Trust for the benefit of Appellee.
On January 13, 2020, Ms. Jones amended her Trust so that on her
death, Appellee’s one-half share of the Single Investment Accounts would go
directly to him and would no longer be held in trust for his benefit. She did not
change the TOD beneficiary forms.
Ms. Jones died on April 23, 2021. Per her estate plan and supportive
documentation, the IRA was distributed according to the Trust. The IRA
distribution is not at issue. In addition, and per the TODs, one-half of the Single
Investment Accounts was transferred to Ms. Martin, with the remainder being
placed in the Trust. About two months later, Appellant, in her capacity as
successor Trustee, transferred the Trust’s Single Investment Account funds into a
trust account. She then removed from it $20,442.00, which she said were funeral
expenses.
On November 21, 2021, Appellee filed the instant action seeking his
half of the Single Investment Accounts. In July and August, 2022, both parties
filed motions for summary judgment as to these accounts. On November 22, 2022,
-3- the circuit court granted partial summary in favor of Appellee. The judgment
ordered Ms. Martin, in her capacity as successor Trustee, to distribute the funds
remaining in the Trust to Appellee; to reimburse him for the funeral expenses paid
out of the Trust; and, to pay the funeral expenses from the Estate account.
Thereafter, the Estate was closed and Appellee moved to dismiss the
action. The court granted the motion and made the partial summary judgment in
favor of Appellee final and appealable. Appellants then filed their motion to alter,
amend, or vacate the summary judgment. In that motion, Ms. Martin argued that
the half of the Single Investment Accounts that went into the Trust should be
divided 50-50 between herself and Appellee, rather than all of it being distributed
to Appellee. The court heard oral arguments on the motion on February 14, 2025,
and subsequently denied Ms. Martin’s motion. This appeal followed.2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
2 Orders denying Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05 motions generally “are interlocutory, i.e., non-final and non-appealable and cannot be made so by including the finality recitations.” Tax Ease Lien Investments 1, LLC v. Brown, 340 S.W.3d 99, 103 (Ky. App. 2011). Under circumstances void of prejudice, we may consider the appeal as “properly taken from the final judgment that was the subject of the CR 59.05 motion.” Id. at 103 n.5 (citation omitted).
-4- material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” CR 56.03. “The record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his
favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.
1991). Summary judgment should be granted only if it appears impossible that the
nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in
his favor. Id. “Even though a trial court may believe the party opposing the
motion may not succeed at trial, it should not render a summary judgment if there
is any issue of material fact.” Id. Finally, “[t]he standard of review on appeal of a
summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that there were no
genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App.
1996).
ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS
Ms. Martin argues that the Laurel Circuit Court erred in its
interpretation of the Trust, amendment, and TOD documents. While agreeing that
the TOD documents designated that one-half of the Single Investment Accounts
were to be distributed directly to her, with the remaining one-half going into the
Trust, she maintains that the one-half that was transferred to the Trust should then
be split 50-50 between herself and Appellee. She asserts that per the Trust
-5- language, this is a proper distribution of the Single Investment Account assets in
the Trust. She maintains that the circuit court’s interpretation of the Trust,
amendment, and TOD documents was erroneous, as it acknowledged Ms. Martin’s
receipt of one-half of the Single Investment Account fund, but improperly
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RENDERED: MARCH 13, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0541-MR
MERICA MARTIN AND ESTATE OF RENEE MARIE JONES, BY AND THROUGH ITS EXECUTRIX, MERICA MARTIN APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE GREGORY A. LAY, JUDGE ACTION NO. 21-CI-00851
JAMES JONES APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Merica Martin and Estate of Renee Marie Jones,
By and Through its Executrix, Merica Martin (Appellants) appeal from an order of
the Laurel Circuit Court overruling their motion to alter, amend, or vacate a partial
summary judgment in favor of James Jones (Appellee). Appellants argue that the circuit court improperly interpreted Trust and Transfer on Death (TOD) documents
to conclude that Appellee is entitled to one-half of the decedent’s Single
Investment Accounts. After careful review, we find no error and affirm the order
on appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts are not in dispute. Merica Martin (Ms. Martin) and
Appellee are siblings. On February 19, 2018, their mother, Renee Marie Jones
(Ms. Jones) created the Renee Marie Jones Living Trust (the Trust). The Trust
designated Ms. Martin, Appellee, and their half-brother, Brian Owens (Mr.
Owens), as beneficiaries. Per the Trust, Appellant and Mr. Owens were to receive
their shares outright, with Appellee’s share remaining in the Trust after Ms. Jones
death for the benefit of Appellee.
Per Article 6 of the Trust, Mr. Owens was to receive 1/4 of an
Individual Retirement Account (IRA); Ms. Martin was to receive 3/8 of the IRA
and 1/2 of the Single Investment Accounts; and Appellee was to receive 3/8 of the
IRA and 1/2 of the Single Investment Accounts.
Thereafter, Ms. Jones executed TOD documents on all three of her
Edward Jones accounts.1 Per the TOD documents, Ms. Jones’ IRA would transfer
1 Accounts designated to transfer on death “pass outside of probate, with ownership passing directly to the named beneficiaries on the death of the owner.” Estate of Mcvey v. Department of Revenue, 480 S.W.3d 233, 236 (Ky. 2015) (citation omitted).
-2- on her death directly to her three children, with Mr. Owens receiving 1/4;
Appellant receiving 3/8; and Appellee receiving 3/8. The TOD documents also
provided that on Ms. Jones’ death, one-half of the Single Investment Accounts
would be directly transferred to Ms. Martin, with the other one-half remaining in
the Trust for the benefit of Appellee.
On January 13, 2020, Ms. Jones amended her Trust so that on her
death, Appellee’s one-half share of the Single Investment Accounts would go
directly to him and would no longer be held in trust for his benefit. She did not
change the TOD beneficiary forms.
Ms. Jones died on April 23, 2021. Per her estate plan and supportive
documentation, the IRA was distributed according to the Trust. The IRA
distribution is not at issue. In addition, and per the TODs, one-half of the Single
Investment Accounts was transferred to Ms. Martin, with the remainder being
placed in the Trust. About two months later, Appellant, in her capacity as
successor Trustee, transferred the Trust’s Single Investment Account funds into a
trust account. She then removed from it $20,442.00, which she said were funeral
expenses.
On November 21, 2021, Appellee filed the instant action seeking his
half of the Single Investment Accounts. In July and August, 2022, both parties
filed motions for summary judgment as to these accounts. On November 22, 2022,
-3- the circuit court granted partial summary in favor of Appellee. The judgment
ordered Ms. Martin, in her capacity as successor Trustee, to distribute the funds
remaining in the Trust to Appellee; to reimburse him for the funeral expenses paid
out of the Trust; and, to pay the funeral expenses from the Estate account.
Thereafter, the Estate was closed and Appellee moved to dismiss the
action. The court granted the motion and made the partial summary judgment in
favor of Appellee final and appealable. Appellants then filed their motion to alter,
amend, or vacate the summary judgment. In that motion, Ms. Martin argued that
the half of the Single Investment Accounts that went into the Trust should be
divided 50-50 between herself and Appellee, rather than all of it being distributed
to Appellee. The court heard oral arguments on the motion on February 14, 2025,
and subsequently denied Ms. Martin’s motion. This appeal followed.2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
2 Orders denying Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05 motions generally “are interlocutory, i.e., non-final and non-appealable and cannot be made so by including the finality recitations.” Tax Ease Lien Investments 1, LLC v. Brown, 340 S.W.3d 99, 103 (Ky. App. 2011). Under circumstances void of prejudice, we may consider the appeal as “properly taken from the final judgment that was the subject of the CR 59.05 motion.” Id. at 103 n.5 (citation omitted).
-4- material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” CR 56.03. “The record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his
favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.
1991). Summary judgment should be granted only if it appears impossible that the
nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in
his favor. Id. “Even though a trial court may believe the party opposing the
motion may not succeed at trial, it should not render a summary judgment if there
is any issue of material fact.” Id. Finally, “[t]he standard of review on appeal of a
summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that there were no
genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App.
1996).
ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS
Ms. Martin argues that the Laurel Circuit Court erred in its
interpretation of the Trust, amendment, and TOD documents. While agreeing that
the TOD documents designated that one-half of the Single Investment Accounts
were to be distributed directly to her, with the remaining one-half going into the
Trust, she maintains that the one-half that was transferred to the Trust should then
be split 50-50 between herself and Appellee. She asserts that per the Trust
-5- language, this is a proper distribution of the Single Investment Account assets in
the Trust. She maintains that the circuit court’s interpretation of the Trust,
amendment, and TOD documents was erroneous, as it acknowledged Ms. Martin’s
receipt of one-half of the Single Investment Account fund, but improperly
distributed the remaining one-half to Appellee. It is on this basis that she seeks an
opinion reversing the order on appeal. Appellee has not filed an appellate brief.
The issue for our consideration is whether the Laurel Circuit Court
properly interpreted the Trust, the January 13, 2020, amendment, and TOD
documents as directing Appellee to receive one-half of the Single Investment
Accounts. In examining trust language, courts employ the same rules applicable to
interpreting wills. Todd v. Hilliard Lyons Tr. Company, LLC as Tr. Under Will of
Todd, 633 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Ky. App. 2021). As noted by the Laurel Circuit
Court, the most basic rule of trust interpretation is to determine the settlor’s intent.
Id. This intent has been characterized as “the polar star” toward which
all interpretive efforts are guided, and absent some illegality, this intent will be
controlling. Id. As summary judgment involves only legal questions and a
determination of whether a disputed issue of material fact exists, we apply a de
novo standard of review. Id.
Here, the intent of the settlor or grantor, Ms. Jones, is clearly
expressed in the Trust language. It states at Section 6.01 as follows:
-6- My Trustee will divide my residuary trust estate into separate shares for my descendants, based on the following fractions:
Brian Owens 1/4 of my IRA
Merica Martin 3/8 of my IRA 1/2 of my Single Investment Account(s)
James Jones 3/8 of my IRA 1/2 of my Single Investment Accounts(s)
This language is subject to but one interpretation. The Trust language
unambiguously communicates that Ms. Jones intended for Ms. Martin and
Appellee each to receive one-half of her Single Investment Account(s).
The TOD documents, however, complicate the analysis. They
provide that one-half of the Single Investment Accounts was transferable on Ms.
Jones’ death directly to Ms. Martin, with the other one-half going to the Trust.
This leaves the door open for the interpretation argued by Ms. Martin. The
dispositive question, then, is this: did Ms. Jones intend for Ms. Martin and
Appellee each to receive one-half of the Single Investment Accounts or did she
intend for each of them to receive one-half of the portion of the Single Investment
Accounts that were in the Trust?
Based on our de novo review of the record and the law, we agree with
the Laurel Circuit Court that Ms. Jones intended for Ms. Martin and Appellee each
-7- to receive one-half of the Single Investment Accounts. The Trust language clearly
expresses this intent. Though the TOD documents somewhat muddy the water, the
circuit court was properly guided by the settlor’s intent, which is the polar star by
which the court must be guided. Todd, supra. The circuit court’s interpretation
provides for distribution of the funds in conformity with the TOD documents (half
each to Ms. Martin and the Trust), while also distributing those funds in alignment
with Ms. Jones’ clearly expressed intent in the Trust (half each to Ms. Martin and
Appellee). This interpretation of the Trust, the amendment, and the TOD
documents is supported by the record and the law.
CONCLUSION
When the record is viewed in a light most favorable to Ms. Martin,
with all doubts resolved in her favor, Scifres, supra, we conclude that Ms. Jones
intended for Ms. Martin and Appellee each to receive one-half of the Single
Investments Accounts. The Trust states this without ambiguity. Ms. Martin’s
interpretation, i.e., that she should receive one-half of the Single Investment
Accounts held at Edward Jones, plus one-half of the Single Investment Accounts
which flowed into the Trust, would result in her receiving 75% of the Single
Investment Accounts with Appellee receiving 25%. This interpretation cannot be
reconciled with Ms. Jones’ directive in the Trust that the Single Investment
Accounts be distributed 50-50 between Ms. Martin and Appellee.
-8- The circuit court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as
to any material fact, and that Appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
For these reasons, we affirm the summary judgment of the Laurel Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.
Brittany N. Riley London, Kentucky
-9-