Merchant v. Smith

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided August 3, 2023·No. 2:21-cv-01593·Unknown

Opinion

1 MGD 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Steven Sentre Merchant, No. CV-21-01593-PHX-JAT (ESW) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Unknown Smith, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 Plaintiff Steven Sentre Merchant, who is currently confined in the Arizona State 16 Prison Complex (ASPC)-Douglas, brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 17 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding events that occurred while he was incarcerated in the Red Rock 18 Correctional Center (RRCC) in Eloy, Arizona. (Doc. 1.) Defendant Smith moves for 19 summary judgment. (Doc. 73.) Plaintiff was informed of his rights and obligations to 20 respond pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) 21 (Doc. 77), and he opposes the Motion. (Doc. 89.) Also pending is Plaintiff’s “Request for 22 Rule (d)56 [sic] Relief and for Expedited Hearing” (Doc. 89), which the Court has deemed 23 to be both a motion and Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary 24 Judgment.1 (See Doc. 92.) 25 . . . . 26 . . . . 27 28 1 Plaintiff was provided two extensions of time to file a separate response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, but he did not do so. 1 I. Background 2 Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that on September 19, 2019, he saw an officer 3 sleeping while on duty and reported it to Captain Site. (Doc. 1 at 3.) Site allegedly 4 informed Correctional Officers (COs) Smith and Calvin, who then entered Plaintiff’s pod 5 and told other prisoners that Plaintiff was a “snitch.” (Id.) As a result of being called a 6 snitch, Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by other prisoners, “force[d] to use a ‘pill,’” 7 and “was force[d] to ‘805’ off the yard.” (Id.) 8 On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated 9 a First Amendment retaliation claim in Count One and an Eighth Amendment threat-to- 10 safety claim in Count Three against Defendants Smith and Calvin and directed them to 11 answer the claims. (Doc. 7.) The Court dismissed the remaining claims and Defendants. 12 (Id.) The Court subsequently dismissed Defendant Calvin without prejudice for failure to 13 timely effect service of process. (Doc. 49.) 14 Defendant Smith now moves for summary judgment based on failure to exhaust 15 administrative remedies and on the merits. 16 II. Summary Judgment Standard 17 A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 18 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The 20 movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 21 those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 22 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 23 If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 24 produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 25 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts 26 to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in 27 contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 28 governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 1 jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 2 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th 3 Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its 4 favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, 5 it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 6 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal 7 citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 8 At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 9 determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 10 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw 11 all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited 12 materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 13 III. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 14 A. Legal Standard 15 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner must exhaust “available” 16 administrative remedies before filing an action in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); 17 Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 18 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). The prisoner must complete the administrative review process in 19 accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). 20 Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 21 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through the administrative process, Booth v. 22 Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 23 The defendant bears the initial burden to show that there was an available 24 administrative remedy and that the prisoner did not exhaust it. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 25 1162, 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014); see Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37 (a defendant must 26 demonstrate that applicable relief remained available in the grievance process). Once that 27 showing is made, the burden shifts to the prisoner, who must either demonstrate that he, in 28 fact, exhausted administrative remedies or “come forward with evidence showing that there 1 is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available 2 administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. The 3 ultimate burden, however, rests with the defendant. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate 4 if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner, shows a 5 failure to exhaust. Id. at 1166, 1168; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

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