Meniooh v. Two Jinn, Inc.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: July 15, 2021
• Docket: 3:21-cv-02840
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 RA-TAH MENIOOH, Case No. 21-cv-02840-SI

9 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION TO 10 v. DISMISS FILED BY HON. JOYCE D. HINRICHS AND HUMBOLDT 11 TWO JINN, INC., et al., COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT AND (2) DISMISSING REMAINING CLAIMS 12 Defendants. AFTER IFP EVALUAITON

13 Re: Dkt. Nos. 7, 8, 2, and 34

14 15 On April 16, 2021, plaintiff filed the complaint in this action alleging various claims for 16 constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. The complaint names the following 17 defendants: (1) Humboldt County, (2) Humboldt County correctional officers David Mullen, David Swim, and Lee Myers, (3) Humboldt County Sherriff William Honsal, (4) Two Jinn, Inc. (DBA 18 “Aladdin Bail Bonds,” for purposes of this order “Aladdin”), (5) Presiding Humboldt County 19 Superior Court Judge Joyce Hinrichs, and (6) Humboldt County Superior Court. Dkt. No. 1. 20 On June 1, 2021, defendant Judge Joyce Hinrichs and defendant Humboldt County Superior 21 Court (“Judicial Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss all claims against them. Dkt. No. 7. Plaintiff 22 did not file an opposition thereto. Pursuant to Local Rule 7-2(b), the Court found the matter should 23 be resolved without a hearing and therefore vacated the July 16, 2021 hearing on the motion. For 24 the reasons articulated below, the Judicial Defendants’ motion is hereby GRANTED WITH 25 PREJUDICE. 26 Further, on April 16, 2021, plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis 27 (“IFP”). The application states plaintiff has no assets and very little income. Dkt. No. 2. The Court 1 However, when an unincarcerated plaintiff proceeds IFP, the Court must dismiss the case 2 upon determining the case is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim upon which relief may 3 be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pro se complaints must be liberally construed. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 4 342 (9th Cir. 2010). As detailed below, having reviewed the complaint in full under the IFP 5 standard, the Court DISMISSES plaintiff’s other claims against all defendants WITH PREJUDICE. 6

7 BACKGROUND 8 I. Facts re Allegations Against Judicial Defendants 9 Plaintiff Rah-Tah Meniooh is an African American/Aborigine. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 110. Plaintiff 10 alleges the following causes of action against the Judicial Defendants: 11 - Claim 2: § 1983 – Racial Discrimination in Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 12 Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶108-119) 13 - Claim 3: Violation of § 1983 – Deliberate Indifferent Policies, Practices, Customs, Training, 14 and Supervision in violation of the Fourth, Fourteenth, and First Amendments in violation 15 of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 120-135). 16 - Claim 4: Violation of §1983 – Right to Procedural Due Process of Law in violation of the 17 Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment: ART. 1 sect 7 (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 136 – 144). 18 - Claim 5: § 1985. Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 145-153) 19 - Claim 6: Violation of §1983 – Excessive Bail, Cruel and unusual punishment in violation 20 of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment: ART 1 sect. 7 (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 154-161) 21 - Claim 7: Declaratory Relief1 22 Plaintiff’s allegations against the Judicial Defendants arise from three state court rulings from 23 separate actions, discussed in turn below. 24

25 1 Specifically, a declaratory judgment finding (1) the defendants’ conduct in applying Vehicle Code section 14601.2 (a misdemeanor offense for driving with a revoked driver’s license 26 due to a previous DUI violation) violated plaintiff’s Constitutional rights; (2) that defendants acted without jurisdiction; (3) a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Judicial Defendants 27 from enforcing Vehicle Code section 14601.2 in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner; (4) and 1 A. Juvenile Dependency Proceedings 2 The complaint generally alleges Judge Hinrichs acted without jurisdiction or probable cause 3 when she allegedly granted Child Welfare Services’ ex parte investigation warrants in August 2017 4 and March 2019 with respect to plaintiff’s children. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 57-59. Plaintiff alleges his 5 children are not “persons” described by California Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.2.2 Id. 6 at ¶ 49. The March 2019 warrant was allegedly based on false allegations. Id. at ¶ 60. On November 7 9 and December 7, 2020, Judge Hinrichs allegedly “permit[ed an] ex parte attachment, ie, seizure 8 of property (children) without a noticed hearing.” Id. 9 10 B. Vexatious Litigant Proceedings 11 Plaintiff alleges he was denied access to the courts from 2016-2021 because Judge Hinrichs 12 and the Superior Court denied him access to courts declaring him a vexatious litigant.3 Id. at ¶ 61. 13 14 C. Criminal Proceedings 15 Plaintiff was arrested on March 30, 2015 and later charged with violating California Vehicle 16 Code section 14601.2, subdivision (a) in People v. Meniooh, Superior Court case number 17 CR1502055. Dkt. No. 7-1 (Ex. 1 to Bartleson Decl. ISO Mot. to Dismiss – Register of Actions). 18 The register of actions reflects Judge Hinrichs took no part in the criminal proceeding after January 19 3, 2017. Id. According to the register of actions, various judicial officers issued bench warrants 20 after plaintiff failed to appear in court on at least three occasions. Dkt. No. 7-1 at 9 (Ex. 1 to 21 Bartleson Decl. – Register of Actions) 22 The complaint alleges that in February 2018, plaintiff was found guilty of violating 23 § 14601.2 and sentenced to twenty-three days in jail. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 25. The jury found plaintiff 24 guilty on five counts and, because plaintiff did not attend the trial, a bench warrant issued. Dkt. No. 25 2 California Welfare & Institutions Code section 300 provides, inter alia, that a child who 26 suffers physical or emotional harm caused by a parent “is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court.” 27 1 7-1 at 12 (Ex. 1 to Bartleson Decl. – Register of Actions). 2 Plaintiff further alleges that, on an unspecified date, Judge Hinrichs set bail at $25,000 for a 3 prior conviction of violating Section 14601.2 and an additional misdemeanor traffic offense at 4 $10,000 for a total of $35,000. Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff posted bail. Id. at ¶¶ 19-20. 5 The register of actions shows four separate bench warrants issued due to plaintiff’s failure 6 to appear in the criminal proceedings, with separate bail amounts: (1) May 21, 2105 with a bail 7 amount of $5,000; (2) June 8, 2016 with a bail amount of $25,000; (3) November 13, 2017 with a 8 bail amount of $15,000; and (4) May 24, 2018 with no bail. Dkt. No. 7-1 at 13 (Ex. 1 to Bartleson 9 Decl. – Register of Actions). 10 In March 2018, Plaintiff alleges that he petitioned the court to remove the arrest warrant, but 11 the court denied the petition. Dkt. No 1 at ¶ 32. Finally, on May 22, 2018, Plaintiff alleges that he 12 appeared in court and was incarcerated. Id. at ¶ 33a. At a hearing on May 25, 2018, the court refused 13 Plaintiff’s request for release. Id. 14 15 D. Prior Litigation 16 Plaintiff has instituted at least four actions, including the instant matter, stemming from his 17 March 30, 2015 arrest. In Meniooh v. State of California, et al (Superior Court case number 18 CV160118), plaintiff challenged, inter alia, judicial officers’ rulings denying plaintiff’s motion to 19 dismiss the charges against him. Dkt. No. 8-1 (Ex. 1 to RJN – Complaint in CV160118). The 20 Superior Court’s demurrer was sustained without leave to amend. Dkt. No. 8-2 21 In Meniooh v. State of California, et al. (Superior Court case number CV160696), plaintiff 22 alleged a variety of errors regarding his arrest, including abuse of discretion by the judicial officers 23 presiding over the action. Dkt. No. 8-3 (Ex. 3 to RJN – Notice of Preemptory Writ in CV160696). 24 Again, the Superior Court’s demurrer was sustained without leave to amend. Dkt. No. 8-4. 25 Finally, in Meniooh v. State of California, et al. (United States District Court, Northern 26 District of California case number C16-00715- CRB), plaintiff attacked the Vehicle Code as vague, 27 overbroad, and oppressive. Dkt. No. 8-5 (Ex. 5 to RJN – Complaint in CV16-715). Plaintiff sought 1 of the Vehicle Code was unconstitutional and an injunction restraining enforcement of the Vehicle 2 Code. Id. Judge Charles Breyer granted a motion to dismiss without leave to amend filed by the 3 Superior Court and various judicial officers. Dkt. No. 8-6. 4 In each prior action, plaintiff named the Superior Court as a defendant but did not name 5 Judge Hinrichs as a defendant until the instant action. 6 7 II. Facts re County Defendants 8 Plaintiff alleges he served a 23-day sentence in the Humboldt County Correctional Facility 9 (“HCCF”) commencing on May 22, 2018, after a jury found him guilty of violating California 10 Vehicle Code section 14601.2(a)1 (driving on a suspended license). Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶18, 33a. In 11 connection with incidents that occurred during this sentence, plaintiff has also sued: (1) correctional 12 officers Mullen, Swim, and Myers, (2) Humboldt County, and (3) Humboldt County Sherriff 13 William Honsal (collectively, the “County Defendants”). 14 During his incarceration, plaintiff alleges he suffered various constitutional violations, 15 primarily violations of §1983, including, but not limited to: excessive force 4 (claim 1), racial 16 17 18

19 4 Plaintiff alleges one morning he informed correctional officer Mullen, that plaintiff “does not break-fast in the early day…” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 39. Defendant Mullen allegedly took plaintiff’s 20 breakfast and replied “I’m going to eat it.” Id. The conversation escalated and plaintiff ultimately told Officer Mullen to “get the fuck away from me.” Id. In response, plaintiff alleges defendant 21 Mullen became “upset/mad and … and put plaintiff in a janitor’s closet for more than 45 minutes.” Id. at ¶ 40. Plaintiff asked Officer Mullen to see his supervisor - defendant correctional officer 22 Swim. Plaintiff alleges he was ultimately “sent to the Box” for “no reason.” Id. at ¶ 41. Plaintiff goes on to allege that later while he was in the Box, plaintiff heard several officers 23 outside his cell who then used “unreasonabl[e] force by using five ‘officers’ to enter the cell with the wrath of the Crusaders from the Med Evil times.” Id. at ¶ 42. Plaintiff alleges two of the officers 24 watched, one threated plaintiff with a taser and “the other two ‘Officers’ push[ed] plaintiff against the wall forcefully to handcuff plaintiff.” Id. Plaintiff alleges defendants engaged in “unreasonable 25 and excessive force by [slamming] plaintiff on the floor and on his chest while handcuffed.” Id. at ¶ 43. He alleges “the ‘officers’ then bent [his] legs back towards his head in a ‘Ho[g] Tie’ position.” 26 Id. “The ‘officers’ un handcuff[ed] plaintiff, as plaintiff was stripped naked in a forceful manner.” Id. Plaintiff alleges this incident caused an injury to his right knee. Id. Plaintiff alleges he was 27 “given medical services and requested an emergency MRI, due to the type of injury (to his knee 1 discrimination5 (claim 2), deliberately indifferent policies and practices6 (claim 3, a Monell claim), 2 violation of his right to due process (claim 4), conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights (claim 5), 3 and excessive bail (claim 6). 4 5 III. Facts re Bail Defendants 6 Finally, plaintiff has also sued Aladdin and its agent Charles Eli Blasigame (collectively, the 7 “Bail Defendants”). The facts regarding the Bail Defendants are difficult to decipher from the 8 complaint. It appears that, at an unspecified date prior to the February 2018 trial in which plaintiff 9 was found guilty of violating vehicle code 14601.2, plaintiff received a bail bond from defendant 10 Aladdin. Because plaintiff failed to attend the February 2018 trial, the complaint alleges defendant 11 Aladdin 12 “stood to lose so much [and] bail bond agents typically have the authority under State of California law to authorize what amounts to the arrest of plaintiff who did not 13 attend trial… [Aladdin,] to avoid forfeiture of the bond/contract … hired a bounty hunter [defendant Charles Eli Blasigame] to find [plaintiff] for the [court]… 14 [P]laintiff did not show for trial, therefore a bench warrant was issued by the [court]…. [Defendant Blasigame was] to receives funds from his employer 15 [defendant Aladdin] for the rearrest of plaintiff for the defendant ("courts."). Defendants [Judge Hinrichs] set bail for $35,000 [incentivizing Defendant 16 Blasigame] to track down plaintiff as a felony which the State law authorizes, not for a misdemeanor offense. This was the case after plaintiff did not to show for 17

18 5 Plaintiff alleges he was “forced into racial segregation by defendant ‘officers’ [sic] act of omission.” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶34. He claims he was “forced to sit, read, eat, workout and shower with 19 other humans that had dark skin.” Id. at ¶35. He alleges the “setting section for ‘Blacks’ is in the back of the dormitory of 555, while the ‘Whites’ sit in the front with no rotation of the groups.” Id. 20 Plaintiff alleges he tried to give a “pale/tan” friend his milk, but the milk was taken by “an older ‘White’ guy and said you can’t take milk form [sic] the ‘Blacks’ [and correctional officer Mullen] 21 just look [sic] on and did not show any reaction [sic] this racial slur.” Id. at ¶35a. Plaintiff alleges “[t]he older racist guys subject the younger guys to acts of violence by having them fight other [sic] 22 another’s whites as a way of discipling [sic].” Id. at ¶36. Plaintiff further claims “the ‘officers’ show bias and prejudice toward non ‘White’ intimae [sic] by an act of omission.” Id. Plaintiff 23 alleges correctional officers Mullens and Swim “do nothing to prevent racial segregation from what plaintiff witnessed and horribly was a victim [sic].” Id. at ¶37. 24

6 Plaintiff alleges defendant County and Sherriff Honsal failed “to adopt a needed policy for 25 giving newly admitted inmates, the inmates orientation handbook….” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 80. Plaintiff further alleges the County and Sheriff Honsal’s “training program was inadequate to train its 26 ‘officers’ to carry out their duties.” Id. at ¶ 81. Plaintiff also alleges “[d]efendants [County and Sheriff Honsal] failed [to] adequately supervise its employees.” Id. at ¶ 82. Plaintiff claims “[i]n 27 this case it was the supervising officer [defendant Swim] and [defendant Myers] who [sic] conduct defendants quasi-criminal trial due to an absence of Jurisdiction. On March 23, 1 2018 [defendant Blasigame] trespassed [while] looking for plaintiff. [Defendant Blasigame] and DOE broke residence fence, tased plaintiff four times and assaulted 2 plaintiff before plaintiff fled for his life. 3 Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 26-29 (emphasis added). Based on this March 23, 2018 incident, plaintiff alleges 4 three causes of action against the Bail Defendants: 5 - Claim 1: violation of § 1983 for excessive force, 6 - Claim 4: violation of § 1983 for violation of right to due process 7 - Claim 5: violation of § 1985 for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights 8 9 LEGAL STANDARD 10 I. 12(b)(1) – Judicial Defendant’s Motion 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) allows a party to challenge a federal court's subject matter 12 jurisdiction. As the party invoking subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court, the plaintiff bears 13 the burden of establishing that the court has the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to grant the 14 relief requested. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) . A 15 complaint will be dismissed if, looking at the complaint as a whole, it appears to lack federal 16 jurisdiction either "facially" or "factually." Thornhill Publ'g Co., Inc. v. General Tel. & Elecs. 17 Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 18 Cir. 2004) ("A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual."). 19 A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is a factual attack where the moving party relies 20 on extrinsic evidence and does not assert a lack of subject matter jurisdiction solely based on the 21 pleadings. Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 22 920, 924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003)). "In resolving a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, the 23 district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss 24 into a motion for summary judgment." Id. (citing Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 25 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003)). If the moving party converts its motion to dismiss into a factual 26 motion by submitting affidavits, the opposing party must then also present affidavits or other 27 evidence to meet its burden for satisfying subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 1 II. 12(b)(6) - IFP 2 When an unincarcerated plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the court must dismiss the 3 case upon determining it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 4 granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 5 § 1915(e). Pro se complaints must be liberally construed. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 6 (9th Cir. 2010). 7 8 DISCUSSION 9 I. Judicial Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss7 10 The Judicial Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them arguing this Court does not 11 have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. 8 The Court agrees. 12 The Eleventh Amendment states “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be 13 construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 14 States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. 15 Amend. XI. “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive relief 16 against a state, an ‘arm of the state,’ its instrumentalities, or its agencies.” Franceschi v. Schwartz 17 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995), citing Durning v. Citibank, N.A. 950 F.2d 1419, 1422-23 (9th Cir. 18 1991). State courts are state entities for the purpose of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Greater 19 Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (1987) (“state case law and 20 constitutional provisions make clear that the Court is a State agency.”). Further, “[t]he Eleventh 21 Amendment bars a suit against state officials when ‘the state is the real, substantial party in 22 interest.’” Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984) (internal 23 citations omitted). As such, the Eleventh Amendment precludes a district court from asserting 24 jurisdiction over claims against state officials sued in their official capacities. Leer v. Murphy, 844 25 7 Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the Judicial Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Dkt. 26 No. 26 (Notice of Non-Opposition).

27 8 On June 1, 2021, the Judicial Defendants filed a Request for Judicial Notice in support of 1 F.2d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 1988). 2 The Court GRANTS the Judicial Defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims against them 3 WITH PREJUDICE.

4 II. IFP Review 5 A. Many of Plaintiff’s Claims are Barred by Statutes of Limitations 6 1. Claims Against County Defendants 7 Plaintiff served a 23-day sentence in Humboldt County Jail commencing on May 18, 2018 8 —over three years ago. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 34-48; ¶¶ 79-85. During plaintiff’s 23 days of incarceration, 9 pursuant to California law, the statute of limitations was tolled (suspended). Cal. Code Civ. Proc., 10 §352.1(a). The statute of limitations for plaintiff’s § 1983 and §1985 claims against the County 11 Defendants, began to run on June 15, 2018—when plaintiff was released from jail. 12 In actions brought under § 1983 and § 1985, courts apply the forum state’s statute of 13 limitations for personal injury actions. Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 14 2007); see also, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 277-78 (1985) (holding 1983 claims are best 15 analogized to personal injury actions); Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 16 1048 (9th Cir. 2008) (California’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts applies to §1983 17 and §1985 claims). 18 In California, the statute for personal injury actions is the two-year period set forth in 19 California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 20 2004). Accordingly, all of plaintiff’s §§ 1983 and 1985 claims against the County Defendants are 21 subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim brought pursuant to Monell 22 (claim 3) is also governed by the two-year statute of limitations. Baker v. California Highway 23 Patrol, 601 F. App’x 556, 557 (9th Cir. 2015) (applying California’s two-year statute of limitations 24 to Monell claim); Daniels v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, No. 17-CV-05914-MEJ, 2018 WL 25 2215740, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2018) (same). “Although state law determines the length of the 26 limitations period, federal law determines when a civil rights claims accrues.” Morales v. Los 27 Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153–54 (9th Cir.2000). Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when 1 the “plaintiff knows or had reason to know” of the injury underlying the action. Id. 2 Plaintiff did not file his complaint until April 16, 2021, nearly three years after the two-year 3 statute of limitations began to run on May 18, 2018. Because of plaintiff’s failure to timely file his 4 complaint, plaintiff’s section 1983 and 1985 claims against the County defendants—claims 1, 2, 3, 5 5, and 6—are barred by the statute of limitations and therefore DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 6 7 2. Claims Against Bail Defendants 8 Plaintiff also alleges three causes of action for violations of §1983 and §1985 against the 9 Bail Defendants all based on the March 23, 2018 incident where Defendant Balisgame allegedly 10 tasered plaintiff and otherwise used excessive force. For the same reasons plaintiff’s claims against 11 the County Defendants are barred by the statute of limitations, so too are his claims against the Bail 12 Defendants. 13 14 B. Plaintiff’s Final Claim for Declaratory Relief is Also DISMISSED 15 Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief argues Vehicle Code § 14601.2 is vague and “meets 16 neither of the two due-process essentials.” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶163. In Meniooh v. State of California et 17 al, case no. 16cv715, Judge Breyer addressed this argument and dismissed plaintiff’s 2016 action. 18 See Meniooh v. State of California, et al. (Case number C16-00715- CRB) (Plaintiff’s complaint 19 attacking the Vehicle Code as vague, overbroad, and oppressive was dismissed on a motion to 20 dismiss without leave to amend). See Dkt. No. 8-6 (Judge Breyer’s Order Granting Mot. To 21 Dismiss). 22 Accordingly, plaintiff’s 7th claim for declaratory relief is frivolous, unsupported by the 23 complaint, and is barred by res judicata, having been previously dismissed by the District Court. 24 Plaintiff’s 7th claim is therefore DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 25 26 27 1 CONCLUSION? 2 The Judicial Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE. 3 Further, after reviewing the complaint as required in connection with plaintiff's in forma 4 || pauperis application, the Court: 5 (1) DISMISSES claims 1-6 WITH PREJUDICE as to all defendants as they are barred by statues 6 of limitations and 7 (2) DISMISSES plaintiffs 7" claim WITH PREJUDICE as barred by res judicata and for failure 8 to state a claim. 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 || Dated: July 15, 2021 Site WU tee a (12 SUSAN ILLSTON 13 United States District Judge

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Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ? The County Defendants have a pending motion for to dismiss which is rendered MOOT by this order. See Dkt. No. 34.