Menefield v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 24, 2025
• Docket: 23-2108
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES W. MENEFIELD, No. 23-2108

Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-03812-PA-E

v. MEMORANDUM* CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION; CONNIE GIPSON; JOSIE GASTELO, Former Warden of California Men's Colony,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 24, 2025**

Before: WALLACE, O’SCANNLAIN, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner James W. Menefield appeals pro se from the district

court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendant

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). prison officials failed to protect him from COVID-19. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Long v. Sugai, 91 F.4th 1331, 1336 (9th

Cir. 2024), and we affirm.

I

The district court properly dismissed Menefield’s Eighth Amendment claim

because he failed to allege facts showing that defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his risk of contracting COVID-19. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 837 (1994) (holding that prison official violates Eighth Amendment if official

was deliberately indifferent, that is, knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to

inmate’s safety; official must have been aware of facts from which inference could

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, and must have drawn that

inference); id. at 844 (holding that official who actually knew of substantial risk of

harm may not be liable if they reasonably responded to risk, even if harm

ultimately was not averted); see also Polanco v. Diaz, 76 F.4th 918, 928–29 (9th

Cir. 2023) (holding that alleging solely that prison officials transferred inmates

despite their knowledge of a significant risk of transmitting COVID-19 between

institutions does not compel an inference of deliberate indifference; however, an

allegation that defendants did not attempt to mitigate the risk by taking basic

measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 is sufficient to survive a motion to

dismiss).

2 II

The district court properly dismissed Menefield’s equal protection claim

because he failed to allege facts showing that he was similarly situated to inmates

with a higher risk score who were transferred to closed cell housing. See United

States v. Quintero, 995 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2021) (examining equal

protection claims by first asking whether plaintiff’s class is similarly situated to the

claimed disparate group and, if so, whether classification is justified); Fournier v.

Sebelius, 718 F.3d 1110, 1124 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that different treatment of

unlike groups does not support equal protection claim). Defendants’ legitimate

government interest in containing the effects of the pandemic appears rationally

related to a policy of prioritizing certain protective measures for prisoners who

were five times more likely than Menefield to develop complications from

COVID-19. See Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1277-78 (9th Cir. 2004)

(applying rational basis test to determine legitimacy of classification when no

suspect class is involved and no fundamental right is burdened); see also Seaplane

Adventures, LLC v. County of Marin, 71 F.4th 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2023) (holding

that, for actions taken during a time of great uncertainty with a novel disease,

health officials do not need to act perfectly to establish rational basis).

III

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend

3 based on its conclusion that amendment would be futile. See Coronavirus Rep. v.

Apple, Inc., 85 F.4th 948, 958 (9th Cir. 2023) (granting court discretion to deny

leave to amend); Nguyen v. Endologix, Inc., 962 F.3d 405, 420 (9th Cir. 2020)

(holding that discretion is particularly broad when plaintiff has previously been

granted leave to amend and has subsequently failed to add requisite particularity to

claims).

AFFIRMED.