OPINION
ONION, Presiding Judge.
This is an appeal entered in a habeas corpus proceeding.
On original submission the appeal was dismissed for lack of a notice of appeal. By supplemental transcript, it has been shown that notice of appeal was timely given. The appeal is reinstated.
The question presented is apparently one of first impression. Is an indictment returned against a juvenile after a discretionary transfer from juvenile court void for the failure of the district court, to which the transfer was made, to conduct an examining trial prior to the return of the indictment?
An agreed statement of facts is in the record before us. It reflects that on February 25, 1977 the Judge of the County Court of Jefferson County, sitting as Judge of the Juvenile Court, entered an order waiving jurisdiction and transferring the cause in question to the Criminal District Court of Jefferson County.
On March 7, 1977 the Honorable Danny Doyle, attorney for petitioner, requested an examining trial for the petitioner from the said Criminal District Court in accordance with the Texas Family Code. On March 9, 1977 the Judge of the Criminal District Court, noting the above request, wrote the Juvenile Court Judge for the record of the certification and all papers in connection therewith.
Subsequent to March 9,1977 the Criminal District Judge held several conversations with petitioner’s counsel and members of the District Attorney’s staff. As a result of congestion of the court’s docket, the District Attorney’s staff was instructed to present the matter to the grand jury immediately “or notify the Court so that an examining trial could be scheduled at the earliest possible time.”
On March 24, 1977 the grand jury indicted the petitioner for murder in Cause No. 34453.
On March 31,1977 the petitioner filed his application for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the indictment was void because he had been denied an examining trial prior to the return of the indictment in violation of V.T.C.A., Family Code, § 54.02(b). Petitioner contended that he had been deprived of one of the essential steps provided by law before a juvenile can be tried as an [824]*824adult — to have the District Court consider whether petitioner should be remanded to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court rather than being referred to the grand jury for consideration of whether an indictment should be presented. He thus urges that there has been a violation of Article 54.02, supra, and a deprivation of due process and that the indictment is void.
On April 4, 1977, acting upon an agreed statement of facts, the Judge of the Criminal District Court entered an order denying relief. On the same date notice of appeal was given. Petitioner’s counsel has filed no brief and the District Attorney has filed a brief simply adopting Attorney General’s Opinion M-1151 (1972) interpreting Article 2338-1, § 6(j), Vernon’s Ann.C.S., the forerunner of V.T.C.A., Family Code, § 54.02(b). Said opinion held that a District Court was not required to conduct an examining trial in the case of a child transferred from Juvenile Court for prosecution as an adult when no examining trial is requested and that the return of an indictment terminates the right of such juvenile to an examining trial.
At the outset we must determine whether this court may review the question presented by writ of habeas corpus. In Ex parte Dickerson, 549 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), this court wrote:
“. . . Ordinarily, in this State, when there is a valid statute or ordinance under which a prosecution may be brought, habeas corpus is not available either prior to or after trial to test the sufficiency of the complaint, information, or indictment. Ex parte Jarvis, 109 Tex. Cr.R. 52, 3 S.W.2d 84 (1928); Ex parte Minor, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 159, 172 S.W.2d 347 (1943); Ex parte Meers, 129 Tex.Cr.R. 465, 88 S.W.2d 100 (1935); Ex parte Beverly, 34 Tex.Cr.R. 644, 31 S.W. 645 (1895); Ex parte Williford, 50 Tex.Cr.R. 417, 100 S.W. 919 (1907); Ex parte Webb, 113 S.W. 545 (Tex.Cr.App.1908); Ex parte Wolf, 55 Tex.Cr.R. 231, 115 S.W. 1192 (1909). However, if the pleading, on its face, shows that the offense charged is barred by limitations the complaint, information, or indictment is so fundamentally defective that the trial court does not have jurisdiction and habeas corpus relief should be granted. Ex parte Hoard, 63 Tex.Cr.R. 519, 140 S.W. 449 (1911); cf. Ex parte Stein, 61 Tex.Cr.R. 320, 135 S.W. 136 (1911); People v. McGee, 1 Cal.2d 611, 36 P.2d 378 (1934); Ex parte Vice, 5 Cal.App. 153, 89 P. 983 (1907); Ex parte Connolly, 16 Cal.App.2d 709, 61 P.2d 490 (1936).”
If a juvenile who has been transferred to the District Court for criminal proceedings has the right to an examining trial before indictment, then an indictment returned prior to the examining trial is premature and void. The District Court has no jurisdiction to proceed on a void indictment, and habeas corpus relief is available.
We turn to a consideration of the question before us. The first discretionary transfer provision in Texas was enacted by amendment of § 6 of Article 2338-1, Vernon’s Ann.C.S. (Acts 1965, 59th Leg., p. 1256, ch. 577, § 3), which provided:
“Section 6. A transfer may be made of cases from one Juvenile Court to another Juvenile Court where a child under the jurisdiction of one Juvenile Court has moved from one county to another, and where it is to the best interest of such child so to do. The Juvenile Court having jurisdiction of a child may transfer the case to the Juvenile Court of the county in which the child may be then residing, and shall send transcripts of records to the Judge of the other Court, which shall be filed in the office of the clerk of such Court.
“If a child sixteen (16) years of age or older is charged with an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult and if the Court, after diagnostic study, social evaluation and full investigation, deems it contrary to the best interest of such child or the public to retain jurisdiction, the Court may, in its discretion, certify such child for proper criminal proceedings in any court which would have jurisdiction of the offense, if committed by an adult; but no child under [825]*825sixteen (16) years of age at the time the offense is committed shall be so certified and no child under sixteen (16) years of age at the time the offense is committed shall be prosecuted as an adult at any later date unless transferred by the Juvenile Court, and all such offenses committed by children not so transferred shall be subject to disposition by the Juvenile Court only. Such certification shall include the written order and findings of the Juvenile Court and shall be accompanied by a complaint against the accused in accordance with applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the State of Texas.
“Upon certification . to the District Judge having jurisdiction under the provisions of this Act, the District Judge shall have the powers and duties conferred upon examining magistrates by Chapter 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the State of Texas.
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OPINION
ONION, Presiding Judge.
This is an appeal entered in a habeas corpus proceeding.
On original submission the appeal was dismissed for lack of a notice of appeal. By supplemental transcript, it has been shown that notice of appeal was timely given. The appeal is reinstated.
The question presented is apparently one of first impression. Is an indictment returned against a juvenile after a discretionary transfer from juvenile court void for the failure of the district court, to which the transfer was made, to conduct an examining trial prior to the return of the indictment?
An agreed statement of facts is in the record before us. It reflects that on February 25, 1977 the Judge of the County Court of Jefferson County, sitting as Judge of the Juvenile Court, entered an order waiving jurisdiction and transferring the cause in question to the Criminal District Court of Jefferson County.
On March 7, 1977 the Honorable Danny Doyle, attorney for petitioner, requested an examining trial for the petitioner from the said Criminal District Court in accordance with the Texas Family Code. On March 9, 1977 the Judge of the Criminal District Court, noting the above request, wrote the Juvenile Court Judge for the record of the certification and all papers in connection therewith.
Subsequent to March 9,1977 the Criminal District Judge held several conversations with petitioner’s counsel and members of the District Attorney’s staff. As a result of congestion of the court’s docket, the District Attorney’s staff was instructed to present the matter to the grand jury immediately “or notify the Court so that an examining trial could be scheduled at the earliest possible time.”
On March 24, 1977 the grand jury indicted the petitioner for murder in Cause No. 34453.
On March 31,1977 the petitioner filed his application for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the indictment was void because he had been denied an examining trial prior to the return of the indictment in violation of V.T.C.A., Family Code, § 54.02(b). Petitioner contended that he had been deprived of one of the essential steps provided by law before a juvenile can be tried as an [824]*824adult — to have the District Court consider whether petitioner should be remanded to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court rather than being referred to the grand jury for consideration of whether an indictment should be presented. He thus urges that there has been a violation of Article 54.02, supra, and a deprivation of due process and that the indictment is void.
On April 4, 1977, acting upon an agreed statement of facts, the Judge of the Criminal District Court entered an order denying relief. On the same date notice of appeal was given. Petitioner’s counsel has filed no brief and the District Attorney has filed a brief simply adopting Attorney General’s Opinion M-1151 (1972) interpreting Article 2338-1, § 6(j), Vernon’s Ann.C.S., the forerunner of V.T.C.A., Family Code, § 54.02(b). Said opinion held that a District Court was not required to conduct an examining trial in the case of a child transferred from Juvenile Court for prosecution as an adult when no examining trial is requested and that the return of an indictment terminates the right of such juvenile to an examining trial.
At the outset we must determine whether this court may review the question presented by writ of habeas corpus. In Ex parte Dickerson, 549 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), this court wrote:
“. . . Ordinarily, in this State, when there is a valid statute or ordinance under which a prosecution may be brought, habeas corpus is not available either prior to or after trial to test the sufficiency of the complaint, information, or indictment. Ex parte Jarvis, 109 Tex. Cr.R. 52, 3 S.W.2d 84 (1928); Ex parte Minor, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 159, 172 S.W.2d 347 (1943); Ex parte Meers, 129 Tex.Cr.R. 465, 88 S.W.2d 100 (1935); Ex parte Beverly, 34 Tex.Cr.R. 644, 31 S.W. 645 (1895); Ex parte Williford, 50 Tex.Cr.R. 417, 100 S.W. 919 (1907); Ex parte Webb, 113 S.W. 545 (Tex.Cr.App.1908); Ex parte Wolf, 55 Tex.Cr.R. 231, 115 S.W. 1192 (1909). However, if the pleading, on its face, shows that the offense charged is barred by limitations the complaint, information, or indictment is so fundamentally defective that the trial court does not have jurisdiction and habeas corpus relief should be granted. Ex parte Hoard, 63 Tex.Cr.R. 519, 140 S.W. 449 (1911); cf. Ex parte Stein, 61 Tex.Cr.R. 320, 135 S.W. 136 (1911); People v. McGee, 1 Cal.2d 611, 36 P.2d 378 (1934); Ex parte Vice, 5 Cal.App. 153, 89 P. 983 (1907); Ex parte Connolly, 16 Cal.App.2d 709, 61 P.2d 490 (1936).”
If a juvenile who has been transferred to the District Court for criminal proceedings has the right to an examining trial before indictment, then an indictment returned prior to the examining trial is premature and void. The District Court has no jurisdiction to proceed on a void indictment, and habeas corpus relief is available.
We turn to a consideration of the question before us. The first discretionary transfer provision in Texas was enacted by amendment of § 6 of Article 2338-1, Vernon’s Ann.C.S. (Acts 1965, 59th Leg., p. 1256, ch. 577, § 3), which provided:
“Section 6. A transfer may be made of cases from one Juvenile Court to another Juvenile Court where a child under the jurisdiction of one Juvenile Court has moved from one county to another, and where it is to the best interest of such child so to do. The Juvenile Court having jurisdiction of a child may transfer the case to the Juvenile Court of the county in which the child may be then residing, and shall send transcripts of records to the Judge of the other Court, which shall be filed in the office of the clerk of such Court.
“If a child sixteen (16) years of age or older is charged with an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult and if the Court, after diagnostic study, social evaluation and full investigation, deems it contrary to the best interest of such child or the public to retain jurisdiction, the Court may, in its discretion, certify such child for proper criminal proceedings in any court which would have jurisdiction of the offense, if committed by an adult; but no child under [825]*825sixteen (16) years of age at the time the offense is committed shall be so certified and no child under sixteen (16) years of age at the time the offense is committed shall be prosecuted as an adult at any later date unless transferred by the Juvenile Court, and all such offenses committed by children not so transferred shall be subject to disposition by the Juvenile Court only. Such certification shall include the written order and findings of the Juvenile Court and shall be accompanied by a complaint against the accused in accordance with applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the State of Texas.
“Upon certification . to the District Judge having jurisdiction under the provisions of this Act, the District Judge shall have the powers and duties conferred upon examining magistrates by Chapter 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the State of Texas. Provided that upon hearing the District Judge shall make an order committing the child to jail, discharging him, admitting him to bail, or remanding him to the custody of the Juvenile Court as the law and facts of the case may require. Provided further that if the child is held or bound over for action by the Grand Jury, the Grand Jury may return an indictment for the offense charged or may recommend that the child be remanded to the custody of the Juvenile Court. If the Grand Jury recommends that the child be returned or remanded to the custody of the Juvenile Court, no further action by the Grand Jury or future Grand Jury can be taken against the child in regard to the offense charged or the acts for which the child stood accused and which were investigated by the Grand Jury. If the Grand Jury returns an indictment, the child shall be subject to the penal laws of this State and tried in accordance with the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure as if the child were an adult." (Emphasis supplied.)1
In Foster v. State, 400 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Cr.App.1966), a portion of the amendment to § 6 was held unconstitutional.2
In 1967 § 6 of said Article 2338-1 was again amended (Acts 1967, 60th Leg., p. 1082, ch. 475). Said amendment provided as follows:
“Sec. 6. (a) When a child under the jurisdiction of a court moves from one county to another the court may transfer the case to the court in the county of the child’s residence if the transfer is in the child’s best interest. The transferring court shall forward transcripts of records in the case to the judge of the receiving court, who shall file them in the office of his clerk.
“(b) If a child is charged with the violation of a penal law of the grade of felony and was fifteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, the juvenile court may, within a reasonable time after the alleged offense, waive jurisdiction by following the requirements set out in Subsections (c) through (j) of this section, and transfer the child to the appropriate district court or criminal district court for criminal proceedings.
[826]*826“(c) The juvenile court shall conduct an informal hearing under Section 13 of this Act on the issue of waiver of jurisdiction.
“(d) Prior to the hearing, the juvenile court shall order and obtain a complete diagnostic study, social evaluation, and full investigation of the child, his circumstances, and the circumstances of the alleged offense.
“(e) The juvenile court shall appoint counsel for any child who does not have retained counsel, and shall allow counsel at least ten days to prepare for the hearing. The presence of counsel at the hearing may not be avoided or waived. Appointed counsel is entitled to a fee for each day actually spent in court in the amount and from the same source as specified in Article 26.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or any future amendment of that article.
“(f) The juvenile court shall give counsel access to all the records relating to the child including the report of the investigation that must precede the hearing in the possession of the court, its staff, or employees. The juvenile court may refuse to reveal the source of any information if it finds that revelation would be injurious to the child or would prejudice the future availability of similar information. If the court refuses to reveal the source of any information and the child or his counsel objects to the refusal, the court shall preserve the identity of the source and make it available to the district or criminal district court if the child is transferred for criminal proceedings.
“(g) After full investigation and hearing the juvenile court shall retain jurisdiction of the case unless it determines that, because of the seriousness of the offense or the background of the offender, the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings.
“(h) In making the determination under Subsection (g) of this section, the court shall consider, among other matters:
“(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater weight in favor of waiver given to offenses against the person;
“(2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner;
“(3) whether there is evidence upon which a grand jury may be expected to return an indictment;
“(4) the sophistication and maturity of the child;
“(5) the record and previous history of the child;
“(6) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.
“(i) If the juvenile court retains jurisdiction, the child is not subject to prosecution at any time for any offense alleged in the petition or for any offense within the knowledge of the juvenile judge as evidenced by anything in the record of the proceeding.
“(j) If the juvenile court waives jurisdiction it shall certify its action, including the written order and findings of the court and accompanied by a complaint against the child, and transfer the child to the appropriate district court or criminal district court for criminal proceedings. Upon transfer of the child for criminal proceedings he shall be dealt with as an adult and in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure. The transfer of custody is an arrest. However, the examining trial shall be conducted by the district court or criminal district court which may remand the child to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.3
“(k) If the child’s case is brought to the attention of the grand jury and the grand jury does not indict for the offense charged in the complaint forwarded by the juvenile court, the district court or criminal district court shall certify the [827]*827grand jury’s failure to indict to the juvenile court. Upon receipt of the certification the juvenile court may resume jurisdiction of the child.”
Article 2338-1, supra, was replaced by V.T.C.A., Family Code, § 54.02, which reads as follows:
“(a) The juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a child to the appropriate district court or criminal district court for criminal proceedings if:
“(1) the child is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of felony;
“(2) the child was 15 years of age or older at the time he is alleged to have committed the offense and no adjudication hearing has been conducted concerning that offense; and
“(3) after full investigation and hearing the juvenile court determines that because of the seriousness of the offense or the background of the child the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings.
“(b) The petition and notice requirements of Sections 53.04, 53.05, 53.06, and 53.07 of this code must be satisfied, and the summons must state that the hearing is for the purpose of considering discretionary transfer to criminal court.
“(c) The juvenile court shall conduct a hearing without a jury to consider transfer of the child for criminal proceedings.
“(d) Prior to the hearing, the juvenile court shall order and obtain a complete diagnostic study, social evaluation, and full investigation of the child, his circumstances, and the circumstances of the alleged offense.
“(e) At the transfer hearing the court may consider written reports from probation officers, professional court employees, or professional consultants in addition to the testimony of witnesses. At least one day prior to the transfer hearing, the court shall provide the attorney for the child with access to all written matter to be considered by the court in making the transfer decision. The court may order counsel not to reveal items to the child or his parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem if such disclosure would materially harm the treatment and rehabilitation of the child or would substantially decrease the likelihood of receiving information from the same or similar sources in the future.
“(f) In making the determination required by Subsection (a) of this section, the court shall consider, among other matters:
“(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person;
“(2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner;
“(3) whether there is evidence on which a grand jury may be expected to return an indictment;
“(4) the sophistication and maturity of the child;
“(5) the record and previous history of the child; and
“(6) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.
“(g) If the juvenile court retains jurisdiction, the child is not subject to criminal prosecution at any time for any offense alleged in the petition or for any offense within the knowledge of the juvenile court judge as evidenced by anything in the record of the proceedings.
“(h) If the juvenile court waives jurisdiction, it shall state specifically in the order its reasons for waiver and certify its action, including the written order and findings of the court, and transfer the child to the appropriate court for criminal proceedings. On transfer of the child for criminal proceedings, he shall be dealt with as an adult and in accordance with the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 1965. The transfer of custody is an arrest. The examining trial shall be con[828]*828ducted by the court to which the case was transferred, which may remand the child to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
“(i) If the child’s case is brought to the attention of the grand jury and the grand jury does not indict for the offense charged in the complaint forwarded by the juvenile court, the district court or criminal district court shall certify the grand jury’s failure to indict to the juvenile court. On receipt of the certification, the juvenile court may resume jurisdiction of the case.
“(j) The juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a person to the appropriate district court or criminal district court for criminal proceedings if:
“(1) the person is 18 years of age or older;
“(2) the person was 15 years of age or older and under 17 years of age at the time he is alleged to have committed a felony;
“(3) no adjudication concerning the alleged offense has been made or no adjudication hearing concerning the offense has been conducted; and
“(4) the juvenile court finds from a preponderance of the evidence that after due diligence of the state it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the person because:
“(A) the state did not have probable cause to proceed in juvenile court and new evidence has been found since the 18th birthday of the person; or
“(B) the person could not be found, “(k) The petition and notice requirements of Sections 53.04, 53.05, 53.06, and 53.07 of this code must be satisfied, and the summons must state that the hearing is for the purpose of considering waiver of jurisdiction under Subsection (j) of this section.
“(1) The juvenile court shall conduct a hearing without a jury to consider waiver of jurisdiction under Subsection (j) of this section.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from these enactments that the legislative intent has been that a three step procedure be followed before a juvenile, sixteen and later fifteen years old or older, is tried in district court as an adult. At each step safeguards were provided. If the juvenile court decides to retain jurisdiction at the hearing to determine if the court should waive jurisdiction and certify the juvenile for criminal proceedings, that ends the matter with regard to certification. The juvenile then will be handled as a juvenile. If there has been certification and the district court, following an examining trial, decides to remand the juvenile to juvenile court, then the juvenile will not be tried as an adult but will be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. If the juvenile, after an examining trial in district court, is bound over for action by the grand jury and the grand jury does not indict, the district court certifies such failure to indict to the juvenile court and the jurisdiction of the case is resumed by the juvenile court. Thus, at any of the three steps if there is a decision not to prosecute the juvenile as an adult, then the juvenile will not be so prosecuted.
While there have been changes in the language in the various enactments, the purpose and basic procedure has remained the same.
The question of whether an examining trial is absolutely essential to such procedure has never been ruled upon by this court. In Garza v. State, 469 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), the defendant contended that § 6(j) of Article 2338-1, Vernon’s Ann. C.S., then in effect, made mandatory an examining trial in the procedure described. The court noted the appellate record reflected that an examining trial had in fact been held and the contention advanced by the defendant was without merit. In Dillard v. State, 477 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), the defendant contended he had been denied an examining trial after certification from juvenile court, but the contention was without merit as the record reflected he had stipulated an examining trial was held prior to indictment.
[829]*829In Winegarner v. State, 505 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), the defendant contended the district court did not have jurisdiction to try him for murder as there had been no examining trial prior to indictment. There this court wrote:
“The record does not show that an examining trial was not held, hence nothing is presented to us for review.”
In Tatum v. State, 534 S.W.2d 678 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), the record reflected the examining trial was held in the 167th District Court of Travis County rather than in the 147th District Court of the same county to which the cause had been transferred from juvenile court. The opinion noted that Article 199, § 167(G), permitted cases to be transferred between district courts, and such transfer was not error and did not render the convictions void.
There are other cases which do not address the exact question before us but which indicate the holding of an examining trial is a part of the proper procedure to be followed. See Ellis v. State, 543 S.W.2d 135 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) (footnote # 2); Jackson v. State, 449 S.W.2d 242 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Jackson v. State, 449 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.Cr.App.1969).
The State argues in the instant case that V.T.C.A., Family Code, § 54.02(h), provides that upon transfer of the juvenile for criminal proceedings “he shall be dealt with as an adult and in accordance with the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 1965.” It then contends that Article 16.01, Vernon’s Ann. C.C.P., provides for an examining trial, but such right to an examining trial is terminated by the return of an indictment. See Harris v. State, 457 S.W.2d 903, 907 (Tex.Cr.App.1970), reversed on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947, 91 S.Ct. 2291, 29 L.Ed.2d 859 (1971), and cases there cited; Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); McDonald v. State, 513 S.W.2d 44 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). See also Gaither v. State, 479 S.W.2d 50 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); McCullough v. State, 461 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Wilhelm v. State, 426 S.W.2d 850 (Tex.Cr.App.1968); Gooden v. State, 425 S.W.2d 645 (Tex.Cr.App.1968). This rule has been adhered to even in situations where an examining trial has been requested but an indictment has been returned before a hearing could be held. Solomon v. State, 467 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Thumann v. State, 466 S.W.2d 738 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Ash v. State, 420 S.W.2d 703 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).
The State thus argues that if a certified and transferred juvenile is to be dealt with as an “adult” then the return of an indictment terminates the right to an examining trial even if one has been requested. This, of course, was the rationale of the Attorney General’s Opinion M-1151 (1972).
In Harris v. State, supra, it was noted in footnote # 1 that the traditional and statutory purposes of an examining trial are: (1) to determine whether there is sufficient evidence of guilt to warrant further proceedings and if not to discharge the accused (Article 16.17, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.), and (2) to determine if bail should be allowed, and if so, to fix the amount of bail (Article 16.01, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.), and (3) to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses (Article 16.09, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.).
There is, however, an additional feature to an examining trial for a juvenile who has been certified to district court for criminal proceedings. Said § 54.02(h) provides that after such examining trial the court may remand the juvenile to juvenile court, thus terminating criminal proceedings against the juvenile. While the same subsection (h) provides that the juvenile shall be dealt with as an adult, the district court in an examining trial for an adult has no authority to remand an adult to juvenile court. Thus, a juvenile in such situation has an additional right that other “adults” do not have. It is a valuable right, for it furnishes another opportunity to have the criminal proceedings against the juvenile terminated and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court resumed.
The examining trial before the district court clearly appears to be the second vital step in determining whether a juvenile should be tried as an adult. While various [830]*830enactments set out above indicate the language has. been changed from the 1965 enactment until the present statute, the essence of the three step procedure has remained the same.4
We conclude that the indictment, having been returned prior to an examining trial, is void, that this court has jurisdiction, that the indictment should be set aside, and the appellant accorded an examining trial.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
MOTION FOR REHEARING