Mendoza v. Movement Mortgage, LLC

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: June 11, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-03479
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BENTURA MENDOZA, No. 2:24-cv-03479-DAD-CSK 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND THIS ACTION TO THE 14 MOVEMENT MORTGAGE, LLC, SACRAMENTO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S 15 Defendant. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AS MOOT 16 (Doc. Nos. 9, 14) 17

18 19 This matter is before the court on defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and plaintiff’s 20 motion to remand this action to the Sacramento County Superior Court. (Doc. Nos. 9, 14.) On 21 January 2, 2025, the pending motions were taken under submission on the papers. (Doc. No. 15.) 22 For the reasons explained below, the pending motion to remand will be granted. Defendant’s 23 motion to compel arbitration will be denied as moot in light of this order. 24 BACKGROUND 25 On October 28, 2024, plaintiff filed a complaint in Sacramento County Superior Court 26 initiating this action, asserting two claims against defendant for civil penalties pursuant to 27 California Labor Code § 2699 (“the California Private Attorneys General Act” or “PAGA”). 28 ///// 1 (Doc. No. 1-4 at 1, 6–10.) Plaintiff also seeks the award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to California 2 Labor Code § 2699(g). (Id. at 9.) 3 Defendant removed this action to this federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction on 4 December 13, 2024 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441(b). (Doc. No. 1.) In its notice of 5 removal, defendant calculated the PAGA penalties attributable to plaintiff to be $121,808.75. (Id. 6 at ¶¶ 24, 26.) Defendant argues that “[a]ssuming plaintiff’s counsel seeks fees in the 7 neighborhood of 25% of the civil penalties at issue (at least $121,808.75),” the “addition of 8 attorneys’ fees would place an amount of $30,452.19 in controversy.” (Id. at ¶ 35.) Additionally, 9 defendant estimates that there are 179 other aggrieved employees besides plaintiff and that the 10 PAGA penalties attributable to these other aggrieved employees total $378,900. (Id. at ¶¶ 31, 11 32.) 12 On December 20, 2024, defendant filed its motion to compel arbitration. (Doc. No. 9.) 13 Plaintiff filed his motion to remand on December 31, 2024. (Doc. No. 14.) Each party filed its 14 respective opposition on January 14, 2025 and respective reply thereto on January 21, 2025 15 pursuant to the briefing schedule on the pending motions set by the court’s January 2, 2025 16 minute order (Doc. No. 15). (Doc. Nos. 17, 18, 19, 20.) The pending motions were taken under 17 submission on the papers. 18 LEGAL STANDARD 19 A suit filed in state court may be removed to federal court if the federal court would have 20 had original jurisdiction over the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Removal is proper when a case 21 originally filed in state court presents a federal question or where there is diversity of citizenship 22 among the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 23 1332(a). 24 “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 25 jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “The removal statute is strictly 26 construed against removal jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction falls to 27 the party invoking the statute.” Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 28 2004) (citation omitted); see also Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is 2 proper.”). If there is any doubt as to the right of removal, a federal court must reject jurisdiction 3 and remand the case to state court. Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 4 1090 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2004). 5 A party’s notice of removal must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for 6 removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). “By design, § 1446(a) tracks the general pleading requirement 7 stated in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” and a “statement ‘short and plain’ 8 need not contain evidentiary submissions.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 9 U.S. 81, 83–84 (2014); see also Ramirez-Duenas v. VF Outdoor, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-00161-AWI- 10 SAB, 2017 WL 1437595, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2017) (“The notice of removal may rely on the 11 allegations of the complaint and need not be accompanied by any extrinsic evidence.”). 12 The party asserting diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of proving by a preponderance 13 of the evidence—that is, that it is “more likely than not”—that the amount in controversy exceeds 14 $75,000. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007); Sanchez v. 15 Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). The amount in controversy “is 16 simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute, not a prospective assessment of [the] 17 defendant’s liability.” Lewis v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010). 18 “[T]he amount in controversy is determined by the complaint operative at the time of removal and 19 encompasses all relief a court may grant on that complaint if the plaintiff is victorious.” Chavez 20 v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 414–15 (9th Cir. 2018). “In calculating the amount in 21 controversy, a court must assume that the allegations in the complaint are true and that a jury will 22 return a verdict for plaintiffs on all claims alleged.” Page v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., No. 2:13- 23 cv-01333-MCE-KJN, 2015 WL 966201, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015); accord Campbell v. 24 Vitran Express, Inc., 471 F. App’x 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2012).1 Moreover, “a court must include 25 [actual and] future attorneys’ fees recoverable by statute or contract when assessing whether the 26 ///// 27 1 Citation to the unpublished Ninth Circuit opinions cited throughout this order is appropriate 28 pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(b). 1 amount-in-controversy requirement is met.” Fritsch v. Swift Trans. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 2 785, 794 (9th Cir. 2018). 3 ANALYSIS 4 The court first considers plaintiff’s motion to remand and, specifically, whether the 5 amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction is met here. Because the court will 6 conclude it is not, and because plaintiff’s motion to remand this action will be granted on that 7 basis, the court does not consider plaintiff’s arguments regarding the purported lack of complete 8 diversity in this action.2 9 As an initial matter, it appears that the parties now agree that the amount in controversy is 10 determined using only the PAGA penalties attributable to plaintiff and not the PAGA penalties 11 attributable to other aggrieved employees. In its notice of removal, defendant initially argued that 12 the PAGA penalties attributable to other aggrieved employees amounted to at least $378,900 and 13 that this figure satisfied the amount in controversy requirement. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 33–34.) In his 14 motion to remand, plaintiff only advances arguments regarding the PAGA penalties attributable 15 to him and does not discuss whether the PAGA penalties attributable to other aggrieved 16 employees may satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. (See Doc. No. 14.) Nor does 17 defendant argue in its opposition that the aggrieved employees’ penalties suffice for diversity 18 jurisdiction. (See Doc. No. 17.) In reply, plaintiff notes that defendant “appears to have 19 abandoned its argument” in this regard. (Doc. No. 20 at 3.) Indeed, the court notes that the Ninth 20 Circuit has squarely held that only the PAGA penalties attributable to plaintiff may be considered 21 in calculating the amount in controversy. See Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., 726 F.3d 1118, 22 1122 (9th Cir. 2013) (“There is no dispute that Urbino’s individual potential recovery would not 23 meet the $75,000 threshold. Rather, the issue is whether the penalties recoverable on behalf of all 24 aggrieved employees may be considered . . . . [Here,] diversity jurisdiction does not lie because 25 their claims cannot be aggregated.”). 26 ///// 27 2 Because plaintiff’s motion to remand will be granted, defendant’s motion to compel arbitration 28 will be denied as moot in light of this order. 1 A. Whether to Consider Plaintiff’s Claims Asserted in Another Action 2 Defendant argues in opposition to the pending motion that the court may consider 3 plaintiff’s claims asserted against defendant in another action pending before the undersigned. 4 (Doc. No. 18 at 7–10.) Specifically, on October 3, 2024, plaintiff filed a complaint initiating an 5 action in Placer County Superior Court, asserting various individual wage and hour claims on his 6 own behalf against defendant. See Mendoza v. Movement Mortg., LLC (“Mendoza I”), No. 2:24- 7 cv-03371-DAD-CSK, Compl., Doc. No. 1-3 (E.D. Cal.). Defendant argues that plaintiff’s 8 individual claims asserted in Mendoza I are “nearly identical” to his PAGA claims asserted in this 9 action and that plaintiff’s conduct violates the claim splitting doctrine. (Doc. No. 18 at 8–9.) 10 Consequently, defendant argues, “it is appropriate to consider plaintiff’s individual claims alleged 11 in Mendoza I in determining the amount plaintiff has placed in controversy.” (Id. at 9.) In reply, 12 plaintiff points out that “this is a PAGA action for civil penalties only,” that he asserts no claims 13 for damages in this action unlike in Mendoza I, and that defendant “has not presented a single 14 case where a court has done what defendant asks the court to do here” and considered claims in a 15 separate action to determine the amount in controversy in this case. (Doc. No. 20 at 8–9.) 16 The court finds defendant’s arguments on this point to be unpersuasive. The claim- 17 splitting doctrine bars duplicative actions under certain circumstances. See Adams v. Cal. Dep’t 18 of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007), overruled in part on other grounds by Taylor 19 v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (“[T]he district court may exercise its discretion to dismiss a 20 duplicative later-filed action, to stay that action pending resolution of the previously filed action, 21 to enjoin the parties from proceeding with it, or to consolidate both actions.”); Pollok v. Vanguard 22 Fiduciary Tr. Co., 803 F. App’x 67, 68 (9th Cir. 2020) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of 23 the later-filed diversity action on the basis of “improper claim splitting”). Defendant has not cited 24 any authority suggesting that the claim-splitting doctrine is relevant to the calculation of the 25 amount in controversy for the purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction, nor has the court 26 located any such authority. 27 To the contrary, the only authority that is even somewhat relevant undercuts the argument 28 advanced by defendant here. See Madison v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 14-cv-04934-EMC, 2015 WL 1 355984, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015) (“USBI argues that because Madison’s PAGA claims 2 are predicated on alleged violations of [the California Labor Code] . . . the amount in controversy 3 requirement is met. USBI is mistaken. . . . Madison’s complaint pleads only two causes of 4 action, both brought under PAGA, and both requesting only civil penalties. . . . [R]egardless of 5 the merits of Defendants’ claim splitting argument, one thing remains certain—even if Madison 6 can recover $100,000 in unpaid wages in a separate action, she cannot recover those wages here. 7 Thus, any amount of unpaid wages owed Madison is irrelevant when determining whether the 8 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.”); cf. Coffin v. Magellan HRSC, Inc., No. 19-cv-02047- 9 BAS-NLS, 2020 WL 773255, at *2–6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020) (refusing to consider whether to 10 consolidate the plaintiff’s Labor Code claims in a separate action with the plaintiff’s PAGA 11 action before first determining whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the 12 plaintiff’s PAGA action, then determining the amount in controversy by reference to the 13 plaintiff’s claims in the PAGA action, and finally remanding that action to state court). The court 14 will therefore consider only plaintiff’s claims brought in this action in determining the amount in 15 controversy. 16 B. The Appropriate Share of PAGA Penalties 17 “[C]ivil penalties recovered by aggrieved employees shall be distributed as follows: 65 18 percent to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency [(“LWDA”)] . . . and 35 percent to the 19 aggrieved employees.” Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(m). Plaintiff argues that, even if defendant’s 20 calculation of $121,808.75 in PAGA penalties is correct,3 plaintiff’s 35% share of those penalties 21 is only $42,633.06. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 5–6.) Plaintiff urges the court to follow the “growing 22 number of courts that have held the LWDA’s share cannot be aggregated with the aggrieved 23 employee’s share for purposes of determining the amount in controversy.” (Doc. No. 14-1 at 5) 24 (quoting Hesselink v. Am. Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus, No. 20-cv-02051-CJC-DFM, 25

3 Plaintiff argues that defendant erred in several ways in computing the figure above. (See Doc. 26 No. 14-1 at 6–8.) Because the court concludes that the amount in controversy in this action is 27 below $75,000 even if defendant’s calculations are correct, and that plaintiff’s motion to remand must be granted on that basis, the court will assume for the purposes of the pending motions that 28 the figure of $121,808.75 referenced above is correct. 1 2020 WL 7768711, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2020)). Defendant “recognizes the split in authority 2 among the California district courts” on this issue and requests that the court join the “numerous 3 courts that have concluded that [the full amount of PAGA penalties] form part of the amount in 4 controversy.” (Doc. No. 18 at 11.) Plaintiff notes in reply that many courts in this district have 5 concluded that the LWDA’s share of penalties should not be included in the amount in 6 controversy. (Doc. No. 20 at 5) (citing Moberly v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:18-cv-00393-KJM-AC, 7 2019 WL 927295, at *2–3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2019); Escobar v. Capstone Logistics, LLC, 8 No. 2:20-cv-02501-WBS-JDP, 2021 WL 913174, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2021); Willis v. Xerox 9 Bus. Servs., LLC, No. 1:13-cv-01353-LJO-JLT, 2013 WL 6053831, at *8–9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 10 2013)). 11 As acknowledged above, the Ninth Circuit in its decision in Urbino determined that the 12 claims of all aggrieved employees could not be aggregated to meet the amount in controversy 13 requirement. 726 F.3d at 1122. In so finding, the court noted the following: 14 The traditional rule is that multiple plaintiffs who assert separate and distinct claims are precluded from aggregating them to satisfy the 15 amount in controversy requirement. In Snyder v. Harris, the Supreme Court applied that rule to representative actions, holding 16 that the claims of class members can be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement only when they “unite to enforce 17 a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest.” To determine the character of that interest, courts look to 18 “the source of plaintiffs’ claims. If the claims are derived from rights that they hold in group status, then the claims are common and 19 undivided. If not, the claims are separate and distinct.” But simply because claims may have “questions of fact and law common to the 20 group” does not mean they have a common and undivided interest. Only where . . . the defendant “owes an obligation to the group of 21 plaintiffs as a group and not to the individuals severally,” will a common and undivided interest exist. 22 23 Id. (internal citations omitted). “Federal courts have had some difficulty determining how a 24 PAGA suit fits within this typology.” Patel v. Nike Retail Servs., Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1044 25 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 26 The court concludes in line with the majority of courts in this district and in the Ninth 27 Circuit that only plaintiff’s share of the PAGA penalties is to be considered in calculating the 28 amount in controversy. In its decision in Urbino, the Ninth Circuit noted the importance of the 1 presence of “an injury that can be redressed without the involvement of other employees. Troy 2 Bank [v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 41 (1911)] (explaining that an interest is common 3 and undivided when ‘neither [party] can enforce [the claim] in the absence of the other’).” Id. 4 (second and third alterations in original). As other courts have noted, “PAGA ‘permits either the 5 LWDA or the aggrieved employees to act independently to enforce the Labor Code.’” Ogaz v. 6 Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 21-cv-00740-JFW-KK, 2021 WL 2822400, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 7 2021) (quoting Patel, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1048). This weighs against a finding that plaintiff and the 8 LWDA hold a common and undivided interest in the PAGA penalties. Moreover, many courts 9 have concluded that language in Ninth Circuit decisions suggests that, because the state of 10 California should not be considered for purposes of diversity of citizenship, “[t]he LWDA’s share 11 of the PAGA penalties associated with plaintiff’s claims should therefore not be included in 12 calculating the amount in controversy.” Butt v. 9W Halo W. Opco, L.P., No. 2:22-cv-02012- 13 WBS-AC, 2023 WL 196472, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2023); see also Urbino, 726 F.3d at 1122– 14 23 (“To the extent Plaintiff can—and does—assert anything but his individual interest, however, 15 we are unpersuaded that such a suit, the primary benefit of which will inure to the state, satisfies 16 the requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction. The state, as the real party in interest, is not a 17 ‘citizen’ for diversity purposes.”); Canela v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 971 F.3d 845, 849 n.1 (9th 18 Cir. 2020) (“We were also unpersuaded [in Urbino] that the PAGA action could satisfy the 19 complete diversity element because the State of California was the real party in interest and was 20 not a citizen.”); Sloan v. IHG Mgmt. (Md.) LLC, No. 19-cv-00021-DMG-JC, 2019 WL 1111191, 21 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2019) (“Including LWDA’s share in the calculation would come into 22 tension with Urbino’s language that California is not a ‘citizen’ for diversity purposes.”). Finally, 23 because “[t]he removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction,” Dynegy, 375 24 F.3d at 838, the court finds that defendant has failed to meet its burden here. See Evers v. La-Z- 25 Boy Inc., No. 22-cv-00578-LL-BLM, 2022 WL 4379311, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2022) 26 (“Moreover, the strong presumption against removal jurisdiction weighs in favor of remand. The 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 Court will therefore only consider Plaintiff’s 25% portion[4] of the PAGA claims for the amount 2 in controversy.”) (internal citations omitted); Coffin, 2020 WL 773255, at *6 (“[A]s one court 3 pointed out, ‘since the matter is unclear, the Court finds that the presumption against diversity 4 jurisdiction also weighs in favor of remand.’ The Court agrees and therefore will only consider 5 Plaintiff’s portion of the 25% that aggrieved employees may recover.”). 6 Consequently, the court includes in calculating the amount in controversy here only 35% 7 of the $121,808.75 in PAGA penalties proposed by defendant, which amounts to $42,633.06. See 8 Martinez v. Sunnova Energy Corp., Nos. 2:24-cv-06346-MRA-MAR, 2:24-cv-09960-MRA- 9 MAR, 2025 WL 732350, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2025) (“Thus, the Court considers only 10 Plaintiff’s 35 percent pro-rata share of penalties under the reformed PAGA.”); Clark v. QG 11 Printing II, LLC, No. 1:18-cv-00899-AWI-EPG, 2021 WL 38180, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2021) 12 (“[S]ince Urbino, numerous district courts have held that California’s share of PAGA penalties 13 should be excluded from the jurisdictional amount in controversy calculations because: 14 (i) California, as the real party in interest on PAGA claims, is not a ‘citizen’ for diversity 15 purposes; and (ii) because the state’s interest in a PAGA claim is distinct from an employee’s 16 interest in a PAGA claim. The Court agrees with the reasoning in these cases.”) (internal 17 citations omitted). 18 C. Attorneys’ Fees 19 Because plaintiff’s share of the PAGA penalties amounts to $42,633.06, remand is 20 necessary unless the remainder of the required amount in controversy—i.e., $32,366.94—can be 21 supported by an award of attorneys’ fees. 22 Defendant argues in its notice of removal that applying a benchmark figure of 25% of the 23 total civil penalties at issue in this case—$121,808.75—results in $30,452.19 in attorneys’ fees to 24 /////

25 4 For PAGA actions brought prior to June 19, 2024, plaintiffs received 25% of the penalties and the LWDA received 75%. See Stewart v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Lab’ys, Inc., No. 19-cv- 26 02043-AGS-DDL, 2025 WL 1456922, at *6 (S.D. Cal. May 21, 2025) (“[T]he 2024 amendments, 27 including the new 65%-35% apportionment requirement, apply only to ‘civil action[s] brought on or after June 19, 2024’ . . . .”) (quoting Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(v)(1)). Because this action was 28 commenced after June 19, 2024, the 35% apportionment applies. 1 be included in the amount in controversy.5 (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 35.) However, even if the court 2 accepts this figure proposed by defendant, the amount in controversy would remain under 3 $75,000 and remand would still be required.6 See Coffin, 2020 WL 773255, at *6 (“Even 4 assuming, as some district courts have, a benchmark fee award of 25%, and even using 25% of 5 Defendant’s highest calculation [of the total PAGA penalties] ($42,100), this would only double 6 the amount in controversy from $10,525 to $21,050. This falls far below the diversity jurisdiction 7 threshold.”). The court further notes that many district courts have applied the 25% benchmark 8 for attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs’ share of the PAGA penalties, rather than including the LWDA 9 share as defendant proposes. See, e.g., Evers, 2022 WL 4379311, at *3–4 (“The Court will 10 therefore only consider Plaintiff’s 25% portion of the PAGA claims for the amount in 11 controversy. As such, even accepting Defendants’ highest calculation, which combines penalties 12 for all alleged Labor Code violations ($63,250.00), Defendants’ maximum PAGA exposure 13 would be $15,812.50. . . . [I]n adding together the amount in controversy calculated above 14 ($15,812.50), and the benchmark attorneys’ fees of 25% ($3,953.13), the total amount in 15 controversy is $19,765.63.”); Martinez, 2025 WL 732350, at *6 (calculating the plaintiff’s “Pro- 16 Rata Share (35%)” of PAGA penalties to be $61,188.75 and then calculating the “Attorneys’ Fees 17 (25%)” to be $15,297.12). Applying this method, the amount in controversy here falls even 18 further below the $75,000 threshold.7 Because the amount in controversy is insufficient in either 19 case, the court need not determine which method is appropriately applied here. 20 ///// 21 5 Defendant also argues in its opposition that the court should consider the attorneys’ fees that 22 plaintiff may be awarded on his individual claims in Mendoza I in calculating the amount in 23 controversy for this action. (See Doc. No. 18 at 13) (“Individual wage and hour cases that reach verdict routinely garner over $100,000 in attorneys’ fees.”). The court declines to consider any 24 potential award of attorneys’ fees in the separate Mendoza I action for the same reasons fully discussed above. 25

6 Plaintiff’s 35% share of the PAGA penalties ($42,633.06) plus defendant’s proposed attorneys’ 26 fees ($30,452.19) equals $73,085.25. 27 7 The amount in controversy would be plaintiff’s 35% share of the PAGA penalties ($42,633.06), 28 plus attorneys’ fees in the amount of 25% of that share ($10,658.27), and would total $53,291.33. 1 Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to remand this action to state court will be granted. See 2 | Higginbotham vy. S. E. Emp. Leasing Servs., Inc, No. 2:20-cv-00575-KJM-DB, 2020 WL 3 | 5535421, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2020) (“As discussed above, the LWDA’s 75 percent share of 4 | this is not included in the ultimate amount in controversy calculation, so the amount is reduced to 5 || the 25 percent pro rata share of the plaintiffs, or $2,012.50. ... [A]ttorneys’ fees are reduced to 6 || the pro-rata share attributable to the named plaintiffs .... With this proportion, plaintiffs’ share 7 | of attorneys’ fees could not reasonably combine with their share of the civil penalties to reach the 8 | amount in controversy requirement. ... [T]he court grants plaintiff's motion to remand.”). 9 CONCLUSION 10 For the reasons discussed above: 11 1. Plaintiff's motion to remand this action to the Sacramento County Superior Court 12 (Doc. No. 14) is GRANTED; 13 2. Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration (Doc. No. 9) is DENIED as moot in light 14 of this order; and 15 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 'T | Dated: _ June 10, 2025 Da A. 2, eyel 18 DALE A. DROZD 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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