Mendez v. Moonridge Neighborhood Association Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Idaho
DecidedJanuary 28, 2020
Docket1:19-cv-00507
StatusUnknown

This text of Mendez v. Moonridge Neighborhood Association Inc. (Mendez v. Moonridge Neighborhood Association Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Idaho primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mendez v. Moonridge Neighborhood Association Inc., (D. Idaho 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

RAUL MENDEZ, Case No. 1:19-cv-00507-DCN Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND v. ORDER

MOONRIDGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.; DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, INC.; SHELLI DAYLONG; STEPHANIE CHAMBERLAIN; SHURI URQUIDI, and any other agencies and employees of DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, INC.; JOHN HOXSEY, as an individual and any other past and present board members of the MOONRIDGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Raul Mendez’s Complaint (Dkt. 2) and Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Dkt. 1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915, the Court must review Mendez’s request to determine whether he is entitled to proceed in forma pauperis—which permits civil litigants to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee or to pay the filing fee over time. Rice v. City of Boise City, No. 1:13-CV-00441-CWD, 2013 WL 6385657, at *1 (D. Idaho Dec. 6, 2013). Because he is filing to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must also undertake an initial review of Mendez’s Complaint to ensure it meets the minimum required standards. For the reasons explained below, the Court will GRANT Mendez’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and will allow him to pay the filing fee over time. Further, the Court finds Mendez’s Complaint legally sufficient to survive initial review.

II. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS “[A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, . . . without prepayment of fees or security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In order to qualify for in forma pauperis status, a plaintiff must submit an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets she

possesses and indicates that he is unable to pay the fee required. The affidavit is sufficient if it states that the plaintiff, because of his poverty, cannot “pay or give security for the costs” and still be able to provide for himself and dependents “with necessities of life.” Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Numours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). The affidavit must “state the facts as to affiant’s poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.”

United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court has examined Mendez’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and finds it does not conclusively establish his indigence. Mendez lists his bi-weekly income as $230.87, assumedly resulting in approximately $461.74 monthly. Mendez submitted a

paystub running from December 1, 2019, to December 15, 2019, as evidence of his indigence. Dkt. 1-1. Mendez reports his monthly expenses are $450 and he is the primary caregiver of his disabled mother stating he provides “as much [support] as possible.” Dkt. 1, at 5. Mendez concludes that his support of his disabled mother and his income places him in the poverty guidelines. Mendez did not submit other documentation of his income, his mother’s dependence on his income, or any other personal financial statements

corroborating his claims. While it appears that Mendez spends approximately what he earns and does not have substantial discretionary income, he is not completely despondent. Accordingly, the Court will not waive the fee entirely, but will, nonetheless, lessen the financial burden by allowing Mendez to pay the fee over time.

For these reasons, the Court finds Mendez has sufficiently proved his indigence under 28 U.S.C. §1915.Mendez must pay the fee in $50 monthly installments. III. SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT The Court is required to screen complaints that are brought by litigants who seek in forma pauperis status. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must dismiss a plaintiff’s

complaint, or any portion thereof, if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i–iii). To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a plaintiff’s complaint must include facts sufficient to show a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009).

During this initial review, courts generally construe pro se pleadings liberally, giving pro se plaintiffs the benefit of any doubt. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,447 (9th Cir. 2000). Even so, plaintiffs—whether represented or not—have the burden of articulating their claims clearly and alleging facts sufficient to support review of each claim. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). Additionally, if amending the complaint would remedy the deficiencies, plaintiffs should be notified and provided an opportunity to amend. See Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 2003).

This Court is a Court of limited jurisdiction and as such, can only hear cases and controversies that involve a federal question (28 U.S.C. § 1331) or satisfy federal diversity jurisdiction requirements (28 U.S.C. § 1332). The Court will have original jurisdiction “of all civil action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. Additionally, the Court will have supplemental jurisdiction “…over all other claims that

are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Here, Mendez accuses Defendants of violating provisions of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692—1692p. Dkt. 1, at 11. Additionally, Mendez brings state law claims for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good

Faith and Fair Dealing, Breach of Contract, Unjust Enrichment, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Id., at 12-16. At face value, Mendez’s complaint contains issues all arising from violations of the FDCPA—a federal statute—which provides this Court with jurisdiction under § 1331. The FDCPA outlines that “any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision

of this subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a).

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