Mendez v. Johnson

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 22, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-06811
StatusUnknown

This text of Mendez v. Johnson (Mendez v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mendez v. Johnson, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK HIRAM NOEL MENDEZ, Plaintiff, -against- 22-CV-6811 (LTS) REGINALD J. JOHNSON; STEPHEN A. ORDER TO AMEND RONCO; SPENCER GUERRERO; TINA CARDINALE; BELLE BOWEN; OFFICER DYCKTRA; OFFICER SANTOS, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, invokes the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated his civil rights. The Court construes the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Named as Defendants are City of Peekskill Judge Reginald J. Johnson; Assistant District Attorney (ADA) Stephen A. Ronco; City of Peekskill Clerk of Court Spenser Guerrero; City of Peekskill Chief Clerk Belle Bowen;1 Tina Cardinale; and Officers Dycktra and Santos. By order dated August 10, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Johnson, Clerk of Court Guerrero, and Chief Clerk Bowen, and grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint with respect to the remaining defendants within 60 days of the date of this order.

1 Plaintiff sometimes lists this defendant’s last name as “Bowmen.” STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

BACKGROUND The complaint alleges that Plaintiff’s claims arose on January 12, 2020, in Peekskill, New York. The “facts” section of the complaint states in its entirety:2 I bealieve and do believe that I have concerning fiduciary relationships in the matter of HIRAM NOEL MENDEZ Estate Peekskill City Court claimed to be fiduciary’s trustees over one’s estate and they’re also claiming to be beneficiaries so they’re collecting on the estate I’m standing in there courts venue being auctioned off without my knowledge or concent or authorization and at the same time they’re collecting. They want me to pay whether it’s in my physical being or

2 Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization when quoting from the complaint. The Court otherwise quotes from the complaint verbatim and all grammar, spelling and punctuation are as in the original. FRN what have you [F]ederal Reserve Notes. I do not wish to bring liability issues upon that court however my life has been place in jeopardy. I am being targeted and I require an advocate and the underline subject here is I don’t want to be a party of any tax fraud. Nunc pro tunc. (ECF 2, at 5.) Plaintiff describes his injuries as the following: “I had to go to the hospital because my handcuff I mean there had cuffs hurt me so bad I was bleading I needed to get professional help.” (Id. at 6.) In the section of the complaint form to state the relief he is seeking, Plaintiff writes, I demand compensation from the state in the amount of $240,000.00 for the commercial injuries I have sustained from the loss of my property, loss of time from work and cost certify mailings and affidavit notice of man’s and parties involved the cost of filing and according as well the expensive and curve traveling as resolved to being deprived of use my private property automobile. (Id.) DISCUSSION Because Plaintiff states that Defendants violated his civil rights, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Immunity The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Johnson, Clerk of Court Guerrero, and Chief Clerk Bowen. Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id. (citations omitted). This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation . . . .” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). In addition, Section 1983, as amended in 1996, provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes action “outside” his judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). This immunity also applies to government officials, including clerks of court and other court employees, for their acts that assist a judge in the performance of his or her judicial duties.

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Bliven v. Hunt
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Bluebook (online)
Mendez v. Johnson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mendez-v-johnson-nysd-2022.