Mendez-Neira v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 22, 2025
• Docket: 24-4220
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 22 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JORGE LEONARDO MENDEZ-NEIRA, No. 24-4220 Agency No. Petitioner, A241-811-731 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 20, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Jorge Leonardo Mendez-Neira, a native of Colombia, petitions for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming an immigration judge’s

(IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention

Against Torture (CAT). We deny the petition.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Adverse Credibility. We review the agency’s “factual findings, including

adverse credibility determinations, for substantial evidence.” Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d

1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020). Under this standard, the agency’s “findings of fact are

conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary.” Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 8

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). In the adverse-credibility context, “only the most

extraordinary circumstances will justify overturning [the agency’s] determination.”

Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Jibril v. Gonzales,

423 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005)). And “in assessing an adverse credibility

finding,” we examine the “totality of the circumstances[] and all relevant factors.”

Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (alteration in

original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)).

The IJ’s adverse-credibility determination relied on Mendez-Neira’s

statements in his reasonable-fear interview with an asylum officer (AO) and the oral

and written statements he offered during his subsequent removal proceedings. The

IJ concluded that Mendez-Neira had testified inconsistently as to whether (and, if

so, when) he had paid an extortion fee and the identity of the extorting group. The

IJ also identified two significant omissions from Mendez-Neira’s reasonable-fear

interview regarding his occupation as a moneylender and the extorting group’s

handwritten threats.

2 24-4220 Although Mendez-Neira argues that the agency could not rely on content from

his reasonable-fear interview, an IJ may consider testimony from a prior interview,

including a reasonable-fear interview, where “there [a]re sufficient indicia of

reliability.” Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 2020). We have held

that an interview has sufficient indicia of reliability where it is “conducted under

oath, with contemporaneous notes containing the questions asked, and

transcribed . . . with the aid of an interpreter.” Id. Here, Mendez-Neira’s reasonable-

fear interview bears every indication of reliability: he was placed under oath, the AO

wrote contemporaneous notes, Mendez-Neira confirmed that the summary produced

from those notes was correct, and the interview was transcribed with the assistance

of a Spanish-speaking officer who Mendez-Neira confirmed he understood and felt

comfortable using.

Mendez-Neira also insists that the inconsistencies and omissions noted are

minor and that he otherwise offered reasonable explanations. But “when an

inconsistency is at the heart of the claim it doubtless is of great weight.” Shrestha,

590 F.3d at 1047. And an inconsistency goes to the heart of a claim where it “form[s]

the crux of [an] application for relief.” Id. We have held that “omissions are

probative of credibility to the extent that later disclosures, if credited, would bolster

an earlier, and typically weaker, asylum application.” Iman, 972 F.3d at 1068.

Because they relate to the events that gave rise to his fear, Mendez-Neira’s

3 24-4220 inconsistencies as to whether he paid the extortionists and the identity of the

extorting group both go to the heart of his claim. And Mendez-Neira’s later

disclosures that he was a moneylender and that he received threatening handwritten

notes are not trivial since they bolster his application to his claimed social group and

involve a more compelling story about the harm he suffered. Mendez-Neira was

given opportunities to and did proffer a variety of explanations for these

inconsistencies and omissions, all of which the IJ reasonably rejected. See

Barseghyan v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2022). Substantial evidence

supports the agency’s adverse-credibility determination.

Asylum and Withholding of Removal. Mendez-Neira did not argue before the

BIA that his nontestimonial evidence was sufficient to satisfy his applications for

asylum and withholding of removal such that the agency was “sufficiently on

notice.” Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2020)). We agree that Mendez-Neira

waived review of his nontestimonial evidence and do not consider it here.

CAT Relief. For relief under CAT, Mendez-Neira must demonstrate that he

“personally will face torture if he returns” to Colombia. Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at

928. In evaluating eligibility for CAT protection, an IJ need not consider testimony

found not credible in the asylum context. See id. at 927–28. And, without more,

generalized evidence of violence and corruption (like that provided in a country-

4 24-4220 conditions report) is typically insufficient to establish a particular likelihood of

torture. See Flores-Vega v. Barr, 932 F.3d 878, 887 (9th Cir. 2019). Because

Mendez-Neira has failed to produce relevant nontestimonial evidence outside of his

country-conditions report, we conclude that substantial evidence also supports the

agency’s determination that Mendez-Neira is ineligible for CAT relief.

PETITION DENIED.

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