Mendelsohn v. Maurice

241 B.R. 503, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23661, 1997 WL 1169974
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedOctober 14, 1997
DocketCV 97-3989
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 241 B.R. 503 (Mendelsohn v. Maurice) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mendelsohn v. Maurice, 241 B.R. 503, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23661, 1997 WL 1169974 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

Opinion

Memorandum of Decision and Order

MISHLER, District Judge.

Allan B. Mendelsohn, as the Chapter 7 Trustee, appeals from an order of the Bankruptcy Court, Dorothy Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Judge, denying his motion to reopen the ease pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350(b).

The Debtors’ Schedules of Assets and Liabilities in the petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, filed on December 13, 1993, listed “personal injury lawsuit.”

In a memorandum of decision dated May 23, 1997, (“Bankruptcy Court’s memorandum of decision”), Judge Eisenberg held:

Based on the facts of the case as initially recited by the Trustee, the Court finds that the Trustee lacks standing to make a motion to reopen the case, and there is insufficient cause to grant the extraordinary relief requested by the Trustee.

In re Ozer, 208 B.R. 630, 631 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1997).

BACKGROUND

At a meeting of creditors held on January 27, 1994, and concluded on April 19, 1994, the Debtors were examined, inter alia, on the personal injury claim set forth in the Debtors’ Schedules of Assets and Liabilities. Judge Eisenberg noted in the Bankruptcy Court’s memorandum of decision:

The Personal Injury Claim arises out of an automobile accident in which Maurice Ozer was seriously injured on December 22, 1990. As a result of the accident, Mr. Ozer had been left with permanent injuries, including nerve damage. The Debtors are counting on a fresh start that the filing of a petition promises, and are attempting to return to a life of normalcy almost seven years after the catastrophic accident occurred.

In re Ozer, 208 B.R. at 631.

Allan B. Mendelsohn (“an experienced practitioner [who] has been a Chapter 7 Trustee for a number of years”) was appointed interim trustee on February 2, 1994, and thereafter became the permanent Trustee. Id. The Trustee, with the Court’s approval by order dated August 18, 1994, retained Frank W. Zito, Esq. to serve as the estate’s special State Court litigation counsel to pursue the personal injury claim pursuant to the terms of a retainer agreement entered into between Mr. Zito and the Debtors. Id.

The Trustee filed his Report of No Distribution on August 11, 1995. The report states, in pertinent part:

I have made diligent inquiry into the financial affairs of the debtor(s) and the location of property belonging to the estate; and there is no property available for distribution from the estate over and above that exempted by law.

The Court entered a final decree on September 27,1995, ordering that:

Allan B. Mendelsohn (Trustee) is discharged as trustee of the estate of the above-named debtor(s), and the bond is canceled;
The Chapter 7 case of the above-named debtor(s) is closed.

Id. at 632.

On October 2, 1995, after the case was closed, the law firm of Giuffre & Kaplan, P.C. mailed a letter to the Trustee seeking substitution for Mr. Zito in the prosecution of the personal injury claim in the State Court. The court issued an order dated October 19, 1995, granting the Trustee’s petition approving the substitution of counsel. 1

*505 The Trustee states that the “no asset” report dated August 11, 1995, was inadvertently filed with the Bankruptcy Court. He further states that he had .no knowledge that the case was closed by the Bankruptcy Judge on the issuance of a final decree on September 27, 1995, and he was in communication with special State Court counsel relating to settlement of the claim subsequent to the issuance of the final decree; that in February 1997, he was advised by State Court counsel that an offer of settlement of the personal injury action was made by the defendant in the amount of $210,000.00; it was when he attempted to file a motion in the Bankruptcy-Court, seeking approval of the proposed compromise of the personal injury claim, that he learned for the first time that the case was closed. 2

Debtors move to dismiss the appeal for failure to file “a designation of the items to be included in the record on appeal and a statement of the issues to be presented” within ten days after filing the notice of appeal required pursuant to Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 8006. The Trustee filed the statement on July 18, 1997, approximately 22 days late. The Debtors were not prejudiced late filing. The motion is denied. Resolution Trust Corp. v. SPR Corp. (In re SPR Corp), 45 F.3d 70 (4th Cir.1995). The court will hear the further application for costs and expenses incurred by the Debtors resulting from the late filing, at an appropriate time.

The Debtors state that the proceeds of the settlement have been distributed. They complain of the repeated failure of the Trustee to abide by the time limitations fixed by statute, i.e., Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 8006, and the Bankruptcy Court. They point to the failure of the Trustee to seek an order staying the distribution of the proceeds from the personal injury claim!

THE ISSUES

The issues presented for review are:

1. Does the Trustee have standing to move to reopen the case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350(b)?
2. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in determining that by filing a Report of No Restitution, the Trustee made a conscious decision to abandon the Debtors’ personal injury action?

DISCUSSION

11 U.S.C. § 350 provides:

(a) After an estate is fully administered and the court has discharged the trustee, the court shall close the case.
(b) A case may be reopened in the court in which such case was closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.

11 U.S.C. § 554(c) provides:

Unless the court orders otherwise, any property scheduled under section 521(1) of this title not otherwise administered at the time of the closing of a case is abandoned to the debtor and administered for purposes of section 350 of this title.

Standing

We review de novo the proper interpretation of a statute. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valen *506 ti),

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
241 B.R. 503, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23661, 1997 WL 1169974, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mendelsohn-v-maurice-nyed-1997.