Melville v. Shinn

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMay 11, 2021
Docket2:18-cv-01703
StatusUnknown

This text of Melville v. Shinn (Melville v. Shinn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Melville v. Shinn, (D. Ariz. 2021).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Paul Melville, Jr., No. CV-18-01703-PHX-JGZ

10 Petitioner, ORDER

11 v.

12 Charles L Ryan, et al.,

13 Respondents. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Magistrate Judge Bruce G. Macdonald’s Report and 16 Recommendation (R&R) recommending that the District Court deny and dismiss 17 Petitioner Paul Melville, Jr.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as untimely. (Doc. 22.) 18 Melville filed an Objection, and the State filed a Response. (Docs. 23, 24.) 19 After an independent review of the parties’ briefing and the record, the Court will 20 overrule Petitioner’s objection and adopt Magistrate Judge Macdonald’s 21 recommendation. 22 STANDARD OF REVIEW 23 When reviewing a magistrate judge’s R&R, this Court “may accept, reject, or 24 modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate 25 judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “[T]he district judge must review the magistrate judge’s 26 findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United 27 States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in 28 original). District courts are not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue 1 that is not the subject of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); see also 2 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Further, a party is not entitled as of right to de 3 novo review of evidence or arguments which are raised for the first time in an objection 4 to the report and recommendation, and the Court’s decision to consider newly-raised 5 arguments is discretionary. Brown v. Roe, 279 F.3d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); United 6 States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2000). 7 DISCUSSION 8 I. Background1 9 Following a jury trial, Melville was convicted of two counts of armed robbery and 10 four counts of aggravated assault. (Id. at 4.)2 He was sentenced to terms of imprisonment 11 totaling 18 years. (Id.) On direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed 12 Melville’s conviction and sentence by order dated July 29, 2014. (Id. at 5.) On October 13 17, 2014, the Court of Appeals issued its mandate, stating Melville had not filed a motion 14 for reconsideration or sought review with the Arizona Supreme Court. (Id. at 6.) 15 On October 1, 2014, Melville timely filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Id.) On 16 March 28, 2015, the PCR court denied Melville’s petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (Id. 17 at 7.) Melville timely sought appellate review of the denial. (Id.) By Order dated April 18 18, 2017, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. (Id. at 8.) On 19 June 7, 2017, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate. (Id.) 20 On June 4, 2018, Melville filed the pending Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a 21 Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. (Doc. 1.) The State filed a limited 22 1 The R&R sets forth the complete factual background. Neither Melville nor the 23 State object to the facts relied upon in the R&R. The Court restates the facts necessary to address Melville’s objection. 24 2 According to the Arizona Court of Appeals, in early November 2012, Melville, 25 along with his father, burst through the front door of an apartment with guns drawn. (Doc. 22, p. 2). Three people were inside the apartment; Melville ordered them to the 26 ground at gunpoint and bound their hands with zip-ties. (Id.) The Melvilles searched the victims’ pockets, taking keys, cash, and cell phones, before leaving the apartment. (Id.) In 27 the parking lot, the Melvilles encountered a fourth victim about to enter his car. (Id.) Melville’s father threatened the victim with his gun and searched the car and the victim’s 28 briefcase. (Id.) Melville and his father then returned to their own car and drove away. (Id.) 1 Answer to the Petition, seeking dismissal on the ground of untimeliness. 2 II. Discussion 3 A. Statute of Limitations 4 The Magistrate Judge recommends denying Melville’s petition as untimely. (Doc. 5 22, pp. 9-13.) In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge explained: 6 Petitioner must have filed his habeas petition within one year from ‘the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or 7 the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). On July 29, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed 8 Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on direct review. As such, Petitioner’s judgment became final on September 2, 2014, after the 9 expiration of the thirty-five (35) day period to seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. 10 11 (Doc. 22, p. 10 (internal citation omitted.).) As the limitations period was triggered on 12 September 2, 2014, the Magistrate Judge concluded that 29 days of the limitations period 13 ran between September 2, 2014 and October 1, 2014, when Melville filed his PCR 14 petition, statutorily tolling the limitations period. (Id., p. 11.) The remaining limitations 15 period began on June 7, 2017, and expired on May 9, 2018, 336 days after the appeals 16 court issued its mandate finalizing its order denying PCR relief.3 (Id., p. 12.) The 17 Magistrate Judge found no apparent basis for equitable tolling on the record. (Id., p. 13) 18 In his objection to the R&R, Melville challenges only the Magistrate Judge’s 19 conclusion that his convictions became final on September 2, 2014.4 Melville argues that 20 his convictions did not become final until October 17, 2014, when the Arizona Court of 21 Appeals issued the mandate denying his direct appeal. Melville asserts Rule 31.22(a), 22 Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, compels this result because that rule states: “An 23 appellate court retains jurisdiction of an appeal until it issues the mandate.” (Doc. 23, p. 24 1.) Melville reasons that the order affirming his convictions could not be final if the

25 3 The Magistrate Judge determined that the PCR proceedings terminated on June 7, 2017, when the appeals court issued its mandate. (Doc. 22, p. 12.) The Magistrate 26 Judge found that a judgment is not final under Arizona law until the mandate has issued. (Id.) 27 4 If the time period between September 2, 2014, and October 1, is not counted in 28 the limitations period, Melville’s habeas petition would be timely filed. 1 court of appeals retained jurisdiction. (Id.) 2 Melville’s reliance on state law is misplaced. When a judgment of conviction is 3 final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is determined exclusively by federal law. 4 Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Slack v. McDaniel
529 U.S. 473 (Supreme Court, 2000)
United States v. Sean Howell
231 F.3d 615 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Larry Wixom v. State of Washington
264 F.3d 894 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Donyel v. Brown v. Ernie Roe, Warden
279 F.3d 742 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)
Jackery B. White v. Robert Klitzkie
281 F.3d 920 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Melville v. Shinn, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/melville-v-shinn-azd-2021.