Melkonyan v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 19, 2025
• Docket: 24-1019
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 19 2025 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GAYANE RAFAEL No. 24-1019 MELKONYAN; ERIK Agency Nos. KIRAKOSYAN; YOURI KIRAKOSYAN, A220-249-415 A220-249-422 Petitioners, A220-250-050 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted February 12, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: TALLMAN, IKUTA, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Gayane Rafael Melkonyan and her two sons, natives and citizens of Armenia

and citizens of France, petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (BIA) affirming the decision of an immigration judge (IJ) denying their

applications for asylum as to Armenia and France, statutory withholding of

removal as to France, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) as to

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. France. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for

review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the French

government was not unwilling or unable to control the individuals who attacked

Melkonyan and her sons, which is dispositive for both asylum and withholding of

removal. See Aden v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2021); Doe v.

Holder, 736 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2013). The record contained evidence that the

French police made multiple efforts to follow up and investigate in response to

police reports made by Melkonyan and her son, and that the French police were

limited in their investigation because Melkonyan and her sons did not provide

them with complete information. Accordingly, the evidence does not compel us to

conclude that the French government was unwilling or unable to control the

attackers. See Truong v. Holder, 613 F.3d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam);

Doe, 736 F.3d at 877–78.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Melkonyan

and her sons were barred from seeking asylum from Armenia because they were

firmly resettled in France and did not meet an exception to the firm-resettlement

bar. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi). Because Melkonyan and her sons failed to

demonstrate that the French authorities were or would be unwilling to control the

2 unknown private actors who harmed them, they do not qualify for the restrictive

residence exception to the firm-resettlement bar. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15; Aden, 989

F.3d at 1081–82.

Likewise, substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the

attacks on the petitioners did not occur with the acquiescence or willful blindness

of the French government and that the French government would not acquiesce in

or turn a blind eye to future attacks. See Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d

743, 754 (9th Cir. 2021); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). Therefore, substantial

evidence supports the agency’s determination that petitioners have failed to

establish the state action needed for CAT relief.

PETITION DENIED.