Melchor Limpin v. Figueroa
This text of Melchor Limpin v. Figueroa (Melchor Limpin v. Figueroa) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 19 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MELCHOR KARL T. LIMPIN, No. 17-56378
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:16-cv-01438-AJB-BLM v.
FIGUEROA, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 12, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Melchor Karl T. Limpin, a native and citizen of the Philippines, appeals pro
se from the district court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his immigration detention without release on bond. Our
jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). In response to an order from this court, Limpin indicated he was released on
bond from immigration detention on September 12, 2016. Because Limpin’s
petition did not assert any collateral consequences from his detention, and
requested only release from detention, there is no longer any relief this court can
grant him. Therefore, his appeal is dismissed as moot. See Abdala v. INS, 488 F.3d
1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2007) (“For a habeas petition to continue to present a live
controversy after the petitioner’s release or deportation, however, there must be
some remaining ‘collateral consequence’ that may be redressed by success on the
petition.” (citation omitted)).
We are not persuaded by Limpin’s contention that his claim is not moot,
because it is capable of repetition, yet evading review, where it is based on a
misreading of Preap v. Johnson, 303 F.R.D. 566 (N.D. Cal. 2014), affirmed by
Preap v. Johnson, 831 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, Nielsen v. Preap,
138 S. Ct. 1279 (2018).
DISMISSED.
2 17-56378
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Melchor Limpin v. Figueroa, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/melchor-limpin-v-figueroa-ca9-2018.