Meksida Mnatsakanyan v. Pamela Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 10, 2026
Docket15-73232
StatusUnpublished

This text of Meksida Mnatsakanyan v. Pamela Bondi (Meksida Mnatsakanyan v. Pamela Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Meksida Mnatsakanyan v. Pamela Bondi, (9th Cir. 2026).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 10 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MEKSIDA MNATSAKANYAN, No. 15-73232

Petitioner, Agency No. A078-539-208

v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 6, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, BRESS, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Meksida Mnatsakanyan, a native and citizen of Armenia, petitions for

review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her

second motion to reopen proceedings. The BIA determined that the motion was

untimely and numerically barred, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(C)(i), and that

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Mnatsakanyan had not met her burden of showing materially changed country

conditions, see id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252 and review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.

Rodriguez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2021). We deny in part and

dismiss in part the petition for review.

1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Mnatsakanyan

failed to establish that changed country conditions in Armenia warranted reopening

her removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(c)(ii). The BIA reasonably

concluded that Mnatsakanyan’s participation in a 2015 protest outside the

Armenian consulate in the United States is a change in her personal circumstances,

not a change in conditions in Armenia. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983,

990–91 (9th Cir. 2010). The BIA also reasonably concluded that evidence of the

Armenian authorities’ continued inquiries about Mnatsakanyan do not constitute a

material “change” in conditions. See Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th

Cir. 2016). Lastly, the BIA reasonably concluded that the country conditions

reports and news articles describing corruption and political instability in Armenia

do not show that conditions have materially changed or that those conditions relate

to Armenians who have engaged in political activity abroad. See Toufighi v.

Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996–97 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding country conditions

evidence was immaterial to petitioner’s claim where petitioner failed to show how

2 15-73232 he would be affected by the changed conditions described in the evidence).

2. We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of sua sponte

reopening. The BIA’s exercise of discretion to reopen sua sponte is unreviewable

unless the decision was based on a “legal or constitutional error.” Lona v. Barr,

958 F.3d 1225, 1237 (9th Cir. 2020). The BIA appeared to construe

Mnatsakanyan’s request as one for humanitarian relief as a matter of prosecutorial

discretion, which only the Department of Homeland Security may consider.1 See

Matter of Quintero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 348, 350 (BIA 1982) (explaining that “neither

the immigration judge nor the Board” have jurisdiction over the DHS’s exercise of

“prosecutorial discretion”). Because the BIA’s decision was legally sound, we lack

jurisdiction to review that determination. See Lona, 958 F.3d at 1237.

PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.2

1 In her petition before this court, Mnatsakanyan characterizes her request for reopening sua sponte as a claim for humanitarian asylum under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B). Because she did not assert that claim before the BIA, it is unexhausted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 417–19 (2023). 2 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

3 15-73232

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Related

Najmabadi v. Holder
597 F.3d 983 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Toufighi v. Mukasey
538 F.3d 988 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Mr. Budiono v. Loretta E. Lynch
837 F.3d 1042 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Elizabeth Lona v. William Barr
958 F.3d 1225 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
Jaime Alonso Rodriguez v. Merrick Garland
990 F.3d 1205 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)
QUINTERO
18 I. & N. Dec. 348 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 1982)
Santos-Zacaria v. Garland
598 U.S. 411 (Supreme Court, 2023)

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