Meisel v. Town of Greenburgh

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 1, 2019
Docket1:18-cv-07117
StatusUnknown

This text of Meisel v. Town of Greenburgh (Meisel v. Town of Greenburgh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Meisel v. Town of Greenburgh, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MATTHEW MEISEL; ALICE MEISEL, Plaintiffs, -against- TOWN OF GREENBURGH; GREENBURGH 18-CV-7117 (CM) POLICE CHIEF; SGT. WILLIAM LUGO; OFICERS JOHN AND JANE DOE(S) 1 – 15, ORDER TO AMEND INCLUSIVE, ALL IN BOTH THEIR OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES, ALL UNKNOWN ENTITIES, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently detained in the Westchester County Jail, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. By order dated May 2, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

The Court’s “special solicitude,” Ruotolo v. I.R.S., 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam), has its limits, however, because pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Id. But the Court need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). As set forth in Iqbal:

[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges that on May 17, 2018, he was sleeping in the home of Alice Meisel, located at 12 Darwood Place, Hartsdale, New York, when members of the Town of Greenburgh Police Department entered the home without a warrant, “using force, coercion, falsehoods, fraud, and an unlawful effort to claim probable cause.” (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he Greenburgh Police officers committed breaking and entering, trespass, assault & battery, unlawful seizure and used fraud, force and coercion in lieu of getting

a lawful warrant from a magistrate.” (Id. at 5.) He further asserts that he was “falsely unlawfully arrested” for violating an order of protection. (Id.) Plaintiff’s complaint includes a motion for summary judgment and he seeks monetary damages in the total amount of $15 million. Although Alice Meisel is listed as a Plaintiff in this action, she did not sign the complaint and she did not submit the filing fees or a signed and completed request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). DISCUSSION A. Claims on behalf of Alice Meisel Plaintiff may not raise claims on behalf of Alice Meisel. A person who is not an attorney may only represent himself in a pro se action; he may not represent another person. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own

cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”); United States ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Because [§ 1654] permits parties only to plead and conduct their own cases personally, we have held that an individual who is not licensed as an attorney may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause. That is, in order to proceed pro se, [a] person must be litigating an interest personal to him.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted, italics and second alteration in original)). It does not appear that Plaintiff is an attorney. He may not, therefore, raise claims on Alice Meisel’s behalf, and the claims Plaintiff seeks to raise on her behalf must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (ai). B. Claims stemming from Plaintiff’s arrest Because Plaintiff alleges that his federal constitutional rights were violated, the Court interprets Plaintiff’s allegations as raising claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). 1.

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Bluebook (online)
Meisel v. Town of Greenburgh, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/meisel-v-town-of-greenburgh-nysd-2019.