Mehlman v. Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedAugust 11, 2021
Docket1:20-cv-00813
StatusUnknown

This text of Mehlman v. Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center (Mehlman v. Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mehlman v. Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center, (S.D. Ohio 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

Charles T. Mehlman, : : Case No. 1:20-cv-813 Plaintiff, : : Judge Susan J. Dlott v. : : Order Adopting Report and Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical : Recommendation and Granting in Part Center, : the Motion to Dismiss : Defendant. :

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) filed by Defendants Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center (“CCHMC”), Dr. Richard M. Ruddy, and Dr. Daniel von Allmen; the Order and Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 15) issued by Magistrate Karen L. Litkovitz; and the Objections (Doc. 18) to the R&R filed by Plaintiff Charles T. Mehlman. Dr. Mehlman filed an eight-count Complaint against CCHMC, his former employer, and two individual members of the Medical Executive Committee at CCHMC, alleging they took a series of retaliatory actions against him. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint. Following briefing, the Magistrate Judge recommended in the R&R that Counts I– IV, VII, and VIII be dismissed in full and that Count V be dismissed in part. Dr. Mehlman has objected only to the dismissal of Count I, retaliation in violation of the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), against CCHMC. For the reasons that follow, the Court ADOPTS the R&R as to all counts. I. BACKGROUND A. Facts Alleged These background facts are derived from the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint and are focused on the FCA retaliation allegations. Dr. Mehlman is a pediatric surgeon licensed to practice medicine in the State of Ohio. (Doc. 1 at PageID 4.) He began his employment at CCHMC in 1996 as an attending pediatric surgeon. (Id.) Dr. Mehlman’s employment at CCHMC overlapped with the time that Abubakar Atiq Durrani was employed and performed surgeries at CCHMC. (Id. at PageID 2, 5.)1 Durrani was known as the top producer—that is the

highest biller—in the surgery department at CCHMC. (Id.) His billing doubled from $1.5 million in 2005 to $3.6 million in 2008. (Id. at PageID 2, 5–6.) Durrani was sued for malpractice in numerous suits starting during his residency and continuing after he stopped performing surgeries at CCHMC in March 2009. (Id. at PageID 5.) Dr. Mehlman alleged generally that Defendants subjected him to an “insidious pattern of retaliatory actions” because he voiced concerns about “the dangerous and fraudulent practices of the now infamous” Durrani. (Id. at PageID 2.) Dr. Mehlman “grew increasingly concerned about the medical treatment and care provided by Durrani at CCHMC” beginning in 2006. (Id. at PageID 9.) Patients suffered serious

spinal cord complications following surgeries performed by Durrani. (Id. at PageID 9–10.) Dr. Mehlman raised the concern to multiple CCHMC administrators that “[t]hese complications had never been seen before at CCHMC.” (Id. at PageID 10.) More specifically, Dr. Mehlman alleged the following about the concerns and complaints he raised: 40. Dr. Mehlman repeatedly made his concerns about Durrani known to the Division Director for Orthopedics, as well as others in leadership positions at CCHMC. 41. For over a year, Dr. Mehlman raised concerns orally and in writing about Durrani’s practices with departmental leadership. Yet, Defendants ignored his concerns and continued to allow Durrani to treat patients, perform surgeries, use

1 Durrani’s medical licenses were suspended by the State Medical Boards of Ohio and Kentucky. See Ohio eLicense Ohio Professional Licensure, License Look-up, https://elicense.ohio.gov/oh_verifylicense (last viewed Aug. 4, 2021). The Court will refer to him as Durrani, and not as Dr. Durrani, for that reason. experimental surgical procedures on children, and even frequently book two operating rooms simultaneously. 42. Dr. Mehlman brought concerns about physician competency and unnecessary and/or dangerous and/or unapproved experimental procedures to CCHMC peer review meetings in order to ensure that the procedures, some of which resulted in additional surgeries and even spinal cord injury/paralysis be investigated. Defendants did not entertain Dr. Mehlman’s demands, nor did they welcome his questions. 43. To the contrary, Dr. Mehlman’s demands for accountability led to complaints about him from senior management at CCHMC who were backing Durrani due to his generation of revenue and led eventually to Dr. Mehlman’s being suspended. 44. Although Dr. Mehlman brought the issue of unnecessary, risky and/or unapproved procedures to the attention of CCHMC executives and Defendants in particular, they continued to submit claims to the Federal Government for reimbursement in violation of the fraud and abuse laws. 45. Dr. Mehlman repeatedly brought his concerns over the significant number of patient, physician and nurses complaints regarding deficient quality of care and overall negative customer service to the attention of CCHMC executives, and Defendants in particular, but his concerns were ignored. Instead, as a result of Dr. Mehlman’s continued efforts to alert CCHMC executives, and Defendants in particular, that these complaints were serious and had to be addressed, Defendants responded by systematically, retaliating against and, eventually suspending Dr. Mehlman. 46. Yet, again, no action was taken against Durrani. 47. Dr. Mehlman repeatedly voiced concerns about the routine low levels of competent support offered to surgeons at CCHMC as they performed various complicated surgical procedures. There is no more dramatic and tragic example of this than the August 21, 2010 high profile intraoperative death of 7-month-old Tressel Meinardi who died because of incompetent support by operating room personnel. 48. Dr. Mehlman (along with co-authors that included James J McCarthy, MD and Richard Falcone, MD, MPH) conducted internal research aimed at measuring the variation of CCHMC pediatric orthopedic surgical team composition (seeking to quantify how often high frequency team members supported surgical procedures). There were two studies, V.I.P.E.R. (variation in pediatric emergency resources) looking at 634 pediatric trauma surgeries and V.I.S.O.R. (variation in scoliosis operative resources) looking at 100 idiopathic scoliosis surgeries. Both of these studies found disturbingly low levels of high frequency team members supporting the surgeons’ cases: only 66% of the trauma cases had high frequency team members and a shocking 34% of scoliosis cases had high frequency team members. 49. The V.I.P.E.R. and V.I.S.O.R study results were shared with CCHMC senior leadership, including but not limited to August 7, 2013 communication with Frederick C Ryckman, MD (surgeon director of the CCHMC operating rooms) and August 26, 206 communication with Richard Ruddy, MD (at that time Chairman of PPEC). 50. Other specific instances of Dr. Mehlman alerting CCHMC leadership (and the reactions of the leadership) are as follows: (i) On or about June 19, 2006 after orally complaining about Durrani’s medical practices during a teaching conference, Dr. Eric Wall, who was Pediatric Orthopedic Surgery Division Director, passes a message from the leadership to Dr. Mehlman: “Chuck, you’ve been asked to be quiet.”. (ii) At around the same time, Dr. Junichi Tamai, (also Pediatric Orthopedic Surgeon attending the same teaching conference and sitting near Dr Mehlman), states to Dr. Mehlman: “Sometimes asking questions makes you a bad person.” (iii) On or around November 20, 2007, after Durrani performed a questionable experimental surgery, Dr. Mehlman emails Dr. Eric Wall suggesting a review of the institutional review board (“IRB”), also known as institutional review board (“IRB”). (iv) In a series of subsequent emails to leadership between December 2007 and February 2008, Dr.

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Mehlman v. Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mehlman-v-cincinnati-childrens-hospital-medical-center-ohsd-2021.