USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 1 of 16
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-1638
MEGAN HEDGEPETH,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
NASH COUNTY; NATALIE WEBB, in her individual capacity; MARY REEVES, in her individual capacity,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (4:21-cv-00144-FL)
Submitted: March 5, 2025 Decided: May 6, 2025
Before QUATTLEBAUM and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Sharika M. Robinson, THE LAW OFFICE OF SHARIKA M. ROBINSON, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Nikole M. Crow, Atlanta, Georgia, Sonny S. Haynes, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 2 of 16
PER CURIAM:
Megan Hedgepeth filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Nash County,
North Carolina, and two county employees asserting numerous causes of action, including
malicious prosecution and procedural Due Process claims. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Hedgepeth appeals. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
I.
This case involves benefits—colloquially referred to as food stamps—under the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. The food stamps program is administered by
the states and provides benefits to qualified recipients under a formula that considers the
number of people living in the household and the total income available to the household.
See generally 7 U.S.C. § 2014; 7 C.F.R. § 273.10. Benefits are paid for a specified period
of time, known as a “certification period.” 7 U.S.C. § 2012(f). The certification period
generally may not exceed 12 months, and benefits terminate automatically at the end of the
certification period. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.14(a) (“No household may participate beyond the
expiration of the certification period assigned in accordance with § 273.10(f) without a
determination of eligibility for a new period.”). As the end of the certification period
approaches, the state agency notifies recipients that their benefits are expiring and informs
them they must submit an application with certain required information to be recertified
for benefits. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(4); 7 C.F.R. § 273.14(b).
Prior to the events giving rise to this case, Hedgepeth and her three minor children
lived on Womble Road in Nashville, North Carolina. Tawaildo Brown is the father of two
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of Hedgepeth’s children. Hedgepeth received food stamps, which were administered
through the Department of Social Services for Nash County (“DSS”). Hedgepeth
subsequently moved to Hollister, North Carolina. Because Hollister is in Halifax County,
Hedgepeth should have notified DSS when she moved. She did not do so.
In Hollister, Hedgepeth rented a trailer owned by her aunt and located on property
owned by her father on Medoc Mountain Road. The Medoc Mountain Road property
appears to be family homestead land, with multiple homes on it and multiple mailing
addresses associated with it. The physical address of Hedgepeth’s trailer is 8163 Medoc
Mountain Road, but Hedgepeth does not have a mailbox, so she receives her mail at her
father’s address—8185 Medoc Mountain Road.
In April 2018, DSS received an anonymous tip that Hedgepeth had been living in
Halifax County with Brown for the last five years. Hedgepeth had never included Brown
as a member of her household in the information she provided when applying or being
recertified for food stamps. The tip was referred to Defendant/Appellee Natalie Webb, a
DSS fraud investigator in the Program Integrity department. Webb opened a file and sent
Hedgepeth a notice requesting information about where she lived and who lived with her.
Hedgepeth responded, informing Webb that she and her children now lived in Halifax
County in a house owned by her aunt and providing a copy of her lease. After Webb spoke
to Hedgepeth’s parents, who both confirmed that she was living with her children only,
Webb closed the fraud investigation.
Even though Hedgepeth by then lived in Halifax County, Nash County was required
to first re-certify Hedgepeth’s eligibility for food stamps before transferring her case to
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Halifax County. The County began the process of re-certifying Hedgepeth’s eligibility for
Food Stamps sometime in June 2018. Not long after, the County received another tip that
Hedgepeth was living in Halifax County with Brown. The tip was from the original
anonymous tipper, but this time he identified himself as Jimmy Silver, a retired Highway
patrol officer and Hedgepeth’s uncle by marriage. Silver also reported that people in the
community might not cooperate with the investigation because Hedgepeth had falsely told
others that DSS was trying to take her children from her. After talking to Hedgepeth’s uncle
Calvin Hedgepeth, who confirmed that Hedgepeth was living in Halifax County and that
Brown was living with her and had been for at least five years, Webb reopened the fraud
investigation, and Hedgepeth’s recertification was subsequently put on hold.
After reopening the investigation, Webb found additional information suggesting
that Hedgepeth and Brown lived together. Nash County school records indicated that
Hedgepeth and Brown lived at the Womble Road address in Nashville before the move to
Hollister. Brown bought a Mercedes in June 2018; when registering the car, he gave his
address as 8185 Medoc Mountain Road—the address Hedgepeth uses as her mailing
address. The Hollister Post Office confirmed to Webb that both Hedgepeth and Brown
received mail at 8185 Medoc Mountain Road. Brown also provided a different Medoc
Mountain Road address—8201 Medoc Mountain Road—for his driver’s license. And
when Webb interviewed Brown, he claimed that he lived with his sister in Greenville,
North Carolina. Webb learned that Brown’s sister receives food stamps but has never listed
Brown as being a member of her household.
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Webb had other reasons to question the truthfulness of the information she was
getting from Hedgepeth and her relatives. For example, Hedgepeth asserted that she was
paying her aunt $500 per month for rent, but Hedgepeth was not employed and her only
apparent source of income was a $750 monthly Supplemental Security Income benefit
received by one of her children, who is disabled. In addition, as part of her attempt to show
that Brown did not live with her, Hedgepeth provided DSS with an envelope from a
Greenville, North Carolina, branch of State Employees’ Credit Union that was addressed
to Brown at his claimed address in Greenville. Hedgepeth’s cousin worked at that particular
branch, and the envelope was machine-stamped by a postage machine at that branch.
Because neither Brown nor Hedgepeth had accounts at the credit union, Webb believed
that Hedgepeth and her cousin created the envelope to provide further proof that Brown
lived in Greenville. Webb also believed at the time that what purported to be a letter from
GEICO confirming insurance for Brown at the same Greenville address was a forgery. 1
After considering the information uncovered by Webb, DSS concluded that Brown
was a member of Hedgepeth’s household and that his income had to be considered when
calculating the amount of food stamps Hedgpeth was entitled to receive. Hedgepeth was
therefore recertified as eligible to receive food stamps but at a lower amount--$94 per
month less than her previous benefit. DSS mailed Hedgpeth notice of her recertification at
the lower benefit amount on July 10, 2018.
1 As we will explain, subsequent events called into doubt Webb’s view that the GEICO letter was a forgery.
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Hedgepeth appealed the reduction of her benefits, and a hearing was held on August
30, 2018, before a Department of Health and Human Services hearing officer. The hearing
was handled by employees from the DSS department responsible for Food Stamps
eligibility; Webb, who worked in Program Integrity—a different DSS department—was
not present for or otherwise involved in the hearing. At the hearing, Hedgepeth, her father,
and her aunt testified that Hedgepeth lived in Hollister and that Brown did not live with
her. While the County presented evidence showing several different addresses used by
Brown, the employees handling the hearing were uncertain of their ability to use the
information gathered by Webb. Accordingly, none of that evidence was presented at the
hearing. See Hearing Officer’s Order, J.A. 199 (“The County felt they had enough
information to support the fact that Mr. Brown lived in the house during the period in
question. However, at the hearing they did not present any information. The County
representative simply stated that the Fraud Investigator gathered information and made the
decision [to reduce benefits]. No information gathered by the investigator was
submitted.”).
The hearing officer concluded that DSS failed to prove that Brown lived with
Hedgepeth, and that her benefits, therefore, were improperly reduced. DSS appealed the
hearing officer’s order. DSS noted in its appeal that the Food Stamps division had been
“waiting for clarification from Program Integrity at the state level to see what
documentation and verification could be provided to the Hearing Officer due to [the] open
on-going investigation. We never heard back from Program Integrity . . . .” J.A. 450. On
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September 28, 2018, the appeals officer issued an order upholding the decision below. The
County restored Hedgepeth’s benefits on October 3, 2018.
The next day, Webb compiled the information from her investigation and presented
it to a magistrate for issuance of a warrant to arrest Hedgepeth for fraud. Although the
actual warrant application is not in the record, there is no dispute that Webb did not include
in it any information about the administrative hearing and determination that DSS failed to
prove that Hedgepeth and Brown lived together. The magistrate found probable cause and
issued the warrant. Hedgepeth was arrested in her home and held in custody for a couple
of hours before being released.
The county prosecutor subsequently asked Webb to prepare a summary of her
investigation and the evidence she had collected. Her report to the prosecutor, which she
called the “Superior Court Summary,” J.A. 410, included a narrative of her investigation
and conclusions and listed 28 items of documentary evidence supporting her belief that
Brown lived with Hedgepeth.
In April 2019, the prosecutor dismissed the charges against Hedgepeth. In a letter
to DSS explaining his decision, the prosecutor noted that Hedgepeth claimed the GEICO
letter was generated through its website, which she could demonstrate to a jury, and that
the administrative ruling in favor of Hedgepeth would “be an impediment to the State in a
criminal trial.” J.A. 454. The prosecutor explained that he had “concluded that the State
would not prevail in a jury trial in this case and [was] therefore dismissing the charge.” He
also noted, however, that “[t]his is not the same as saying Ms. Hedgepeth is innocent of
any wrongdoing, and I am sorry I could not achieve a better result.” J.A 454.
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Hedgepeth subsequently filed this action on October 1, 2021, against Nash County,
Webb, and Mary Reeves, who was Nash County’s Food Stamps Supervisor during the
relevant time. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on all counts. Hedgepeth appeals.
II.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same standards as the district court.” Wannamaker-Amos v. Purem Novi, Inc., 126 F.4th
244, 254 (4th Cir. 2025). “Thus, we construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and ask whether genuine disputes of material fact
preclude judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (cleaned up).
Hedgepeth’s complaint asserts nine overlapping causes of action under state and
federal law. The claims can generally be categorized into three groups: those relating to
Hedgepeth’s arrest (claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process); those relating
to the process by which her benefits were reduced (claims of violations of her procedural
due process rights); and those relating to the manner in which she was personally treated
by Nash County employees (claims of equal protection violations, sex- and race-based
discrimination, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress). She asserts
all claims against all three defendants.
A. Arrest-based Claims
Hedgepeth’s causes of action for malicious-prosecution and abuse-of-process are
premised on her view that she never should have been arrested because the administrative
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proceedings had already established that Brown did not live with her and that fact was not
provided to the magistrate who issued the arrest warrant.
“When a person seeks to challenge a warrant-backed arrest under the Fourth
Amendment as lacking probable cause, that challenge at most can be pursued through a
cause of action for malicious prosecution.” Thurston v. Frye, 99 F.4th 665, 673 (4th Cir.
2024) (cleaned up). To succeed on a Fourth-Amendment based malicious-prosecution
claim, the plaintiff must establish that the defendants “(1) caused (2) a seizure of the
plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal
proceedings terminated in plaintiff’s favor.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th
Cir. 2012). Unless the warrant applicant deliberately or recklessly made false material
statements or omitted material information intending to make the application misleading,
a determination by a neutral magistrate that probable cause exists is conclusive and thus
fatal to a malicious prosecution claim. See English v. Clarke, 90 F.4th 636, 648 (4th Cir.
2024) (“Warrants and indictments usually conclusively determine the existence of probable
cause, but not when an officer deliberately supplied misleading information that influenced
the judge’s or grand jury’s decision.”) (cleaned up); Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore City, 866 F.3d 546, 556 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A party challenging the veracity of a
warrant application must show that the officer(s) deliberately or with a reckless disregard
for the truth made material false statements in the warrant application, or omitted from that
application material facts with the intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether
they thereby made, the application misleading.”) (cleaned up).
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The district court concluded that there was no evidence showing Webb deliberately
made material false statements or omitted material facts to make the warrant application
misleading. The court pointed to Webb’s explanation in her deposition that she did not
include information about the administrative proceedings because those proceedings
involved Hedgepeth’s eligibility for food stamps and thus fell on the Food Stamps side of
the department, while Webb was on the Program Integrity side investigating possible fraud.
See J.A. 348 (Webb deposition explaining her view that the hearings “had nothing to do
with the program integrity investigation. The food stamp hearing and program integrity are
two different things.”); id. (“[T]he food stamp hearing was not to determine whether she
had committed fraud or not. The food stamp hearing was to determine eligibility . . . .”). In
the district court’s view, “[t]his testimony does not give rise to a plausible inference of a
deliberate omission of facts she knew would negate probable cause, in light of Webb’s
stated position that the two prior hearings had nothing to do with the program integrity
investigation.” J.A. 537 (cleaned up). The district court alternatively held that the
malicious-prosecution claim “fails as a matter of proof because the warrant application
itself is not in the record. Accordingly, the court is unable to undertake the necessary
inquiry . . . .” J.A. 539.
Because we may affirm for any reason appearing in the record, see, e.g., McMahan
v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 964 F.2d 1462, 1467 (4th
Cir. 1992), we need not consider Hedgepeth’s specific challenges to the district court’s
analysis. Even if the district court’s analysis was erroneous, reversal would not be required.
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As we will explain, the information about the administrative proceedings was not material,
and summary judgment in favor of the defendants was therefore proper.
To prevail on a malicious-prosecution claim, the plaintiff must show that the false
statement or omission was material—that is, “necessary to the neutral and disinterested
magistrate’s finding of probable cause.” Humbert, 866 F.3d at 556 (cleaned up). “To
determine materiality, the Court must excise the offending inaccuracies and insert the facts
recklessly omitted, and then determine whether or not the corrected warrant affidavit would
establish probable cause.” Id.; see English, 90 F.4th at 648.
As to probable cause, there is little question that the information actually presented
to the magistrate was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Hedgepeth
committed fraud by lying about living with Brown. “Probable cause to justify an arrest
means facts and circumstances within the [applicant’s] knowledge that are sufficient to
warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances
shown, that the suspect has committed an offense.” Humbert, 866 F.3d at 555 (cleaned up).
“While probable cause requires more than bare suspicion, it requires less than that evidence
necessary to convict.” Id. at 556 (cleaned up).
Here, Webb had two witnesses in a position to have direct knowledge tell her that
Brown had been living with Hedgepeth for years. The witnesses were not anonymous, and
they were related to Hedgepeth. Moreover, Webb’s evidence showed that Brown was listed
as a member of Hedgepeth’s household on school records, and Brown used Hedgepeth’s
mailing address as his address when registering his car with the DMV. Whether or not this
evidence would have been enough to convince a jury, particularly in the face of contrary
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claims by other relatives, it is more than enough to establish probable cause. The question,
then, is whether the information about the administrative proceedings would undermine
the evidence gathered by Webb in a way that negates probable cause. See id. at 556
(“Omissions are made with reckless disregard when the evidence demonstrates that [the
applicant] failed to inform the judicial officer of facts he knew would negate probable
cause.”) (cleaned up).
As previously discussed, the evidence Webb gathered after reopening the
investigation was not presented to the hearing officer. A “corrected” warrant application
would therefore include all the information gathered by Webb, along with a statement
explaining that although recently concluded administrative proceedings had determined
that DSS had not proven Brown lived with Hedgepeth, none of the evidence being
presented to the magistrate was presented in the administrative hearing. Adding that
statement does not negate probable cause or change the probable-cause analysis in any
way. Because Webb’s evidence was sufficient to establish probable cause, it is irrelevant
that a different judge considering different evidence reached a different conclusion.
Accordingly, because the information that was presented was sufficient to establish
probable cause and the omitted information was not material, there was no constitutional
violation and Hedgepeth’s arrest-based claims fail. 2 We therefore affirm the grant of
summary judgment to the defendants as to these claims.
2 Because there was no constitutional violation, we need not consider whether the defendants would otherwise have been entitled to qualified immunity or whether Hedgepeth could have satisfied the other elements of her claim against Nash County under (Continued) 12 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 13 of 16
B. Due Process Claims
Although Hedgepeth was provided a hearing—and prevailed at that hearing—after
her benefits were reduced, she contends that the Due Process clause required the County
to provide a hearing before her benefits were reduced. Hedgepeth thus contends the district
court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on these claims. We
disagree.
To establish a procedural due process violation, Hedgepeth must show that she had
a property interest in her food-stamp benefits and was deprived of that interest without due
process of law. See Tri Cnty. Paving, Inc. v. Ashe Cnty., 281 F.3d 430, 436 (4th Cir. 2002);
Banks v. Block, 700 F.2d 292, 295 (6th Cir. 1983) (“To trigger the application of due
process concepts, there must be both governmental action and the deprivation of a life,
liberty, or property interest to warrant constitutional protection.”) (cleaned up).
The district court relied on our opinion in Holman v. Block, 823 F.2d 56 (4th Cir.
1987), when rejecting these claims. In Holman, we adopted the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in
Banks v. Block and held that food-stamp recipients have “no protected interest in the
continuous receipt of food stamps.” Holman, 823 F.2d at 59; Banks, 700 F.2d at 297
(“Under the Food Stamp Program . . . the certification period of eligibility . . . establishes
no property interest beyond the term of the assigned period.”). Hedgepeth, however, insists
that Holman is inapplicable because the County reduced her benefits after she had been
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See, e.g., Balogh v. Virginia, 120 F.4th 127, 138 (4th Cir. 2024) (“[Plaintiff’s] Monell claim fares no better. Like qualified immunity, it too requires an underlying constitutional violation.”), cert. denied sub nom. Balogh v. Thomas, No. 24-891, 2025 WL 1020379 (U.S. Apr. 7, 2025). 13 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 14 of 16
recertified, and she contends that due process requires a hearing before food stamps can be
reduced during the certification period. The record does not support Hedgepeth’s assertion.
The evidence in the record shows that the County began the recertification process
in June 2018, after learning that Hedgepeth had moved to Halifax County. As Webb’s re-
opened fraud investigation progressed and additional information was uncovered, the
recertification process was then placed “on hold” because of “questionable information
that has to be resolved prior to the case being certified.” J.A. 304. After considering Webb’s
information, DSS ultimately concluded that Brown lived with Hedgepeth and that his
income must be considered when calculating Hedgepeth’s benefit amount. By letter mailed
on July 10, 2018, DSS informed Hedgepeth that she had been recertified for food stamps
for the period of July 1, 2018, through December 31, 2018, at a lower benefit amount of
$364 per month. Thus, contrary to Hedgpeth’s assertion, her benefits were not lowered
after she was certified. Instead, Hedgepeth was certified for a new six-month period at a
benefit amount lower than she had received during the prior certification period.
We recognize that, as Hedgepeth points out, the hearing officer’s decision states that
Hedgepeth “was recertified in June 2018.” J.A. 198. The decision also states, however, that
Hedgepeth “was recertified in June and early July 2018 with the decision notice being
mailed July 10, 2018.” Id. (emphasis added). And, though not relied on by Hedgepeth, a
timeline prepared by a DSS employee likewise indicates that Hedgepeth was recertified in
June and that recertification was put on hold after the investigation restarted, see J.A. 397-
98. These imprecise statements—which do not even give a specific date in June—do not
support Hedgepeth’s assertion that her benefits were lowered in the middle of a
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certification period. As discussed above, the DSS records make it clear that the
recertification process started in June and was put on hold after Webb reopened the
investigation, and that Hedgepeth was recertified for a new period of benefits at a lower
amount. Indeed, the hearing officer’s decision sends the case back to Nash County DSS
with directions to “issue a new recertification determination decision.” J.A. 200. If, as
Hedgepeth contends, her benefits had been reduced after she had been recertified at a
higher benefit amount, the hearing officer would not have ordered a new recertification but
would instead have directed the County to reinstate the full benefit amount. Accordingly,
Hedgepeth’s focus on a snippet of information stripped of all context is insufficient to show
a genuine issue of fact that would preclude summary judgment. See, e.g., St. Louis N. Joint
Venture v. P&L Enters., Inc., 116 F.3d 262, 265 n.2 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Although the non-
movant is entitled on a motion for summary judgment to have all reasonable inferences
drawn in its favor, the court is not required to draw unreasonable inferences from the
evidence.”) (cleaned up).
Because Hedgepeth’s benefits were reduced when she was recertified for a new
period of benefits, this case is directly controlled by Holman, as the district court
concluded. Under Holman, Hedgepeth had “no protected interest in the continuous receipt
of food stamps,” 823 F.2d at 59, and no constitutional right to a hearing before the new
certification period. The district court therefore properly granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants on Hedgepeth’s Due Process claims.
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C. Remaining Claims
Hedgepeth’s remaining federal claims of race- and sex-based discrimination under
§ 1981 and § 1983, and her state-law claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress
may be summarily rejected. While Hedgepeth’s brief mentions these claims in passing, the
statement of the issues on appeal does not include a challenge to these rulings, and the brief
does not include any substantive argument addressing those claims. Hedgepeth has thus
abandoned any appellate challenge to the district court’s rejection of these claims. See
Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A party waives an
argument by failing to present it in its opening brief or by failing to develop its argument—
even if its brief takes a passing shot at the issue.”) (cleaned up). And even if the issues were
not abandoned, Hedgepeth presented no evidence showing she was discriminated against
or treated differently because of her race or sex, and her state-law claims are foreclosed by
our conclusions that her arrest was supported by probable cause and the information
omitted by Webb was not material.
III.
Accordingly, because we find no reversible error, we hereby affirm the decision of
the district court.
AFFIRMED