[Cite as Meeker v. Nolt, 2026-Ohio-2644.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BROWN COUNTY
JIM B. MEEKER, : CASE NO. CA2026-02-005 Appellant, : OPINION AND vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY 7/13/2026 LAMAR NOLT, et al., :
Appellees. :
:
CIVIL APPEAL FROM BROWN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 2024-0355
Schroeder Law Group, and James E. Schroeder, for appellant.
Martin, Browne, Hull & Harper, P.L.L., and Gregory R. Flax, Benjamin D. Noll, and D. Alexander Niswonger, for appellees.
____________ OPINION
PIPER, J.
{¶ 1} Jim B. Meeker appeals the Brown County Court of Common Pleas' decision
granting summary judgment in favor of appellees Lamar, Lorraine, and Irwin Nolt Brown CA2026-02-005
(collectively, "the Nolts").1 Meeker contends that restrictive covenants remain in effect on
the Nolts' property that bar them from operating a commercial egg-production facility, and
questions of material fact remain as to whether the facility is an anticipated private
nuisance. We conclude that the covenants remain in effect, but do not prohibit operation
of an egg-production facility, and such a facility is not an anticipated nuisance. We
therefore affirm the trial court's judgment as modified.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} In early 2004, Hall Ring Farm Partnership (hereinafter "Hall Ring")
subdivided its 136-acre farm in the unincorporated territory of Jefferson Township, Brown
County, into three parcels of land: 45.214 acres, 71.427 acres, and 19.855 acres. On
February 12, 2004, Hall Ring conveyed the 45.214-acre parcel to Malcolm Lynn Truesdell
and Arlene F. Day with certain covenants restricting the use of the land:
• "No swine, commercial dog kennels or game chickens shall he permitted. Large domestic farm animals (including but not limited to horses, cattle, sheep, goats and llamas) are permitted."
• "No noxious or offensive trade shall be carried out on any lot, nor shall anything be done thereon which may become an annoyance or nuisance, or on an occasion which will or might disturb the peace, comfort or serenity of the neighborhood."
• "No nuisance or obnoxious conditions shall be maintained on the property, including but not limited to, junk, scrap, paper, or debris of any kind or other unsightly condition. No lot shall be used or maintained as a dumping ground for rubbish or trash. Garbage, trash or other waste shall be kept in sanitary containers and all incinerators or other devices for the storage or disposal of such materials shall be kept in a clean and sanitary condition. Storing unlicensed motor vehicles on the property at any time is prohibited."
1. Pursuant to Loc.R. 6(A), we have sua sponte removed this appeal from the accelerated calendar. In re M.D.D., 2010-Ohio-326, ¶ 1, fn. 1 (12th Dist.). -2- Brown CA2026-02-005
The recorded covenants attached to the 45.214-acre deed further specified that all
residences shall be "stick built" with a minimum 1500 sq. ft. of living space, trailer homes
are prohibited on the premises, and "[a]ll remaining tracts of land on this farm will have
the same deed restrictions when transferred."
{¶ 3} Hall Ring conveyed the remaining 71.427-acre parcel to Hall-Ring, LLC on
March 3, 2004, and the 19.855-acre parcel to Randy Meeker (Jim Meeker's brother) on
May 19, 2004. Both conveyances were recorded with substantially the same restrictive
covenants as the 45.214-acre deed and provided that "[t]hese restrictions shall be
deemed to run with the land." The parcels were then conveyed over the years to different
owners with the same covenants.
{¶ 4} In 2010, Jim Meeker purchased the 19.855-acre parcel. Since then, he has
used the parcel to farm corn and soybeans. In 2020, the Nolts purchased 71.3 acres of
land derived from the 71.427-acre parcel, with the same restrictive covenants in place. In
early 2024, the Nolts contracted with Granite Ridge Poultry LLC to develop a 64,000-layer
commercial egg-production facility and recorded a "Release of Protective Covenants and
Restrictions" signed solely by Hall Ring Farm Partnership. No construction or operation
has begun.
{¶ 5} In May 2024, Meeker filed a lawsuit against the Nolts seeking a declaratory
judgment that the "Release of Protective Covenants and Restrictions" was null and void
and should be removed from the Brown County Recorder's records. He also sought to
enjoin the Nolts from constructing or operating a commercial egg-production facility on
the property, alleging that such use would violate the restrictive covenants and constitute
a private nuisance.
{¶ 6} The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On December 16,
2025, the magistrate granted the Nolts' motion and denied Meeker's. In the same entry,
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the trial court journalized and approved the magistrate's decision, stating that it would
become the court's order in 14 days unless timely objections were filed. Meeker did not
object within that period. Instead, on January 5, 2026, he moved for an extension of time,
which the trial court granted, and he filed his objections on January 12, 2026. In response,
the Nolts argued that the trial court lacked authority to grant the extension because the
magistrate's decision became a final judgment on December 30, 2025, thereby
terminating the court's jurisdiction. On February 18, 2026, the trial court issued a decision
that considered Meeker's objections, overruled them, and adopted the magistrate's
decision.
{¶ 7} Meeker now appeals from this decision, raising four assignments of error
for our review.
II. Legal Analysis
Timeliness of Objections and Waiver
{¶ 8} Before addressing the merits, we first consider the Nolts' procedural
argument. They contend that Meeker failed to file timely objections to the magistrate's
decision and has therefore waived all but plain error on appeal. According to the Nolts,
the magistrate's decision became a final judgment on December 30, 2025, which divested
the trial court of jurisdiction to grant Meeker additional time to object and rendered the
court's February 18, 2026 decision on those objections void. We disagree.
{¶ 9} As this court has explained, "a trial court has the discretion to consider
objections filed after the 14-day time limit of Civ.R. 53(D) so long as the trial court has not
entered a final judgment." (Emphasis in original.) Learning Tree Academy, Ltd. v.
Holeyfield, 2014-Ohio-2006, ¶ 15, fn. 2. Once the trial court enters a final judgment, its
jurisdiction ends, and it may no longer consider untimely objections to a magistrate's
decision. Id. at ¶ 17.
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{¶ 10} A judgment generally is a pronouncement that determines the matters
submitted to the court. State ex rel. Curran v. Brookes, 142 Ohio St. 107 (1943). The
adoption or rejection of a magistrate's decision is not itself the matter submitted to the
court; rather, the magistrate's decision is an additional resource the court may use in
resolving the issues before it. In re Adoption of S.R.A., 2010-Ohio-4435, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.),
citing In re Cox, 2005-Ohio-3899, ¶ 31 (11th Dist.). A court adopting a magistrate's
decision must also enter judgment. In re P.L.H., 2020-Ohio-7029, ¶ 15, fn. 2 (2d Dist.)
("We caution that to be considered final, such a combined magistrate's decision and
judge's order must actually contain the court's required judgment language. Merely
appending the judge's signature onto a magistrate's decision, without judgment language,
is inadequate"); Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(a), (e). A "judgment" means "a written entry ordering or
declining to order a form of relief, signed by the judge, and journalized on the docket of
the court." Civ.R. 54(A).
{¶ 11} Here, on December 16, 2025, the trial court journalized the magistrate's
decision and stated the following: "It is hereby ordered that the attached Magistrate's
Decision filed in this matter is approved and shall be the Order of the Court effective
fourteen (14) days after the filing of the Decision of the Magistrate unless objections to
the Decision of the Magistrate are appropriately and timely filed." The trial court did not
subsequently order or decline to order relief before Meeker sought leave to file untimely
objections.
{¶ 12} We conclude that the December 16, 2025 entry was not a final judgment
because it was not a clear pronouncement of judgment ordering or declining to order a
form of relief. Instead, it merely "approved" the magistrate's decision and expressed a
future intent to adopt it as the court's order after 14 days. "[F]or a trial court's order to be
considered final . . . the court must still enter its own judgment resolving a case, rather
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than simply adopting a magistrate's decision, and the court must resolve the matter in a
way that allows the parties to understand their rights and obligations." P.L.H. at ¶ 12. The
December 16, 2025 entry did not resolve the substantive issues before the court—
whether the covenants applied to the Nolts' property, whether they prohibited egg
production, and whether the proposed facility would constitute a private nuisance.
{¶ 13} Accordingly, the trial court retained jurisdiction and acted within its
discretion in considering Meeker's untimely objections. Meeker therefore did not waive
his right to appeal, and we proceed to the merits.
Meeker's Arguments
{¶ 14} Meeker's four assignments of error collectively challenge the trial court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law in denying his motion for summary judgment and
granting summary judgment to the Nolts. Meeker argues that this court should (1) declare
the "Release of Protective Covenants and Restrictions" null and void because it was only
signed by the former owners of the property and not by the current beneficiaries of the
covenant, (2) find the covenant restricts the Nolts from operating a commercial egg-
production facility on their property, (3) enjoin the Nolts from constructing and operating
such a facility, and (4) remand the matter for further proceedings as there are genuine
issues of material fact whether the proposed egg facility will diminish the value and
enjoyment of Meeker's property.
{¶ 15} Upon reviewing Meeker’s arguments, we find that the restrictive covenants
remain in effect on the Nolts' property, however they do not prohibit the construction and
operation of a commercial egg-production facility, and this planned facility does not
constitute an anticipated private nuisance.
Standard of Review
{¶ 16} "An appellate court's examination of a trial court's decision to grant
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summary judgment is subject to de novo review." Auto Recyclers of Middletown, Inc. v.
Stein, LLC, 2025-Ohio-414, ¶ 24 (12th Dist.). De novo review means that this court uses
the same standard that the trial court should have used and we examine the evidence to
determine whether as a matter of law no genuine issues exist for trial. Id.
Release of Covenants
{¶ 17} "Restrictive covenants are covenants running with the land, intended to limit
the grantee's use of the land to specified purposes, with the object of protecting the
interests of all landowners in the same allotment or community." Fettro v. Rombach Ctr.,
LLC, 2013-Ohio-2279, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.). In determining who may enforce a restrictive
covenant, the Ohio Supreme Court held that:
[T]he answer to this question lies not in the ascertainment of artificial and arbitrary lines drawn upon a plat book but in the determination of the intention of the parties to be gained from the language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances. The question to be asked is: For whose benefit was the restriction imposed?
If the restrictive covenant was enacted for the benefit of the one seeking to enforce it, he may do so, but the burden is upon him to show that such covenant restricting the use of the lands of another was intended to be for his benefit, and that he has an equitable interest in the other person's adherence to the covenant.
Berger v. Van Sweringen Co., 6 Ohio St.2d 100, 102 (1966). Enforcement does not
depend upon the existence of a uniform general plan or building scheme, but courts will
consider these circumstances in determining the intent of the parties. Id. at 103.
{¶ 18} Here, Hall Ring subdivided its 136-acre farm into three parcels and imposed
substantially similar restrictive covenants on each parcel, governing permitted agricultural
activities, land use, and the types of residences that could be constructed. The covenants
recorded with the first conveyance on February 12, 2004, expressly provided that "[a]ll
remaining tracts of land on this farm will have the same deed restrictions when
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transferred." Consistent with that language, each subsequent conveyance of property
derived from the original 136-acre Hall Ring farm included the same restrictive covenants.
{¶ 19} From this language and the surrounding circumstances, we conclude that
the subsequent owners of the subdivided Hall Ring farm were intended beneficiaries of
the restrictive covenants. Meeker is one such owner and therefore may maintain an action
to prevent cancellation and enforce the covenants on the Nolts' property. See Berger, 6
Ohio St.2d at 100, paragraph one of the syllabus. Because the covenants were imposed
for the benefit of the current owners of the subdivided parcels, Hall Ring could not
unilaterally extinguish them.2 Rather, all current beneficiaries must agree to release the
restrictive covenants. See Id.; See also JDS So Cal, Ltd. v. Ohio Dept. of Natural
Resources, 2018-Ohio-1159, ¶ 45 (10th Dist.) ("Termination by release is based on
fundamental principles of contract law, as a person entitled to enforce a promise may
relieve the promisor of his or her obligation.").
Interpretation of Restrictive Covenants
{¶ 20} Restrictions on land use are disfavored in Ohio and are to be strictly
construed. Reinsmith v. Curtis, 2015-Ohio-573, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.). Ordinary rules of
contract construction are used to construe a restrictive covenant. Summit Pointe Home
Owners Assn., Inc. v. Neslen, 2013-Ohio-2643, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.). Thus, covenants should
be construed consistent with the parties' intent. Id. To determine such intent, courts must
look to the language of the covenant itself. Id.
{¶ 21} The language should be given its common, ordinary meaning in light of the
circumstances surrounding the creation of the covenant. Id. If the language is
unambiguous, the restriction must be enforced as written. Todd Dev. Co., Inc. v. Morgan,
2. We note that the Nolts have all but conceded the issue, having offered no argument in their brief as to why the Hall Ring release should have effectively extinguished the covenants. -8- Brown CA2026-02-005
2006-Ohio-4825, ¶ 32 (12th Dist.). While a court has the authority to interpret the
language of a restrictive covenant to determine the intent of the drafters, it cannot rewrite
a covenant to create new restrictions. Reinsmith at ¶ 15.
{¶ 22} Here, the restrictive covenants expressly prohibit keeping "swine,
commercial dog kennels or game chickens." They also broadly prohibit any "noxious or
offensive trade" that would "disturb the peace, comfort or serenity of the neighborhood,"
as well as any "nuisance or obnoxious condition." Meeker argues that a commercial egg-
production facility housing thousands of chickens is substantially similar to the prohibited
uses because it would produce comparable odors and noises. He further contends that
the restriction on "swine, commercial dog kennels or game chickens" was intended to bar
intensive commercial livestock operations and that the proposed egg-production facility
therefore qualifies as a noxious or offensive trade prohibited by the covenants. We
disagree.
{¶ 23} The specific restrictions on swine, commercial dog kennels, and game
chickens appear in a paragraph separate from the provisions addressing noxious or
offensive trades, nuisances, and obnoxious conditions. Nothing in the covenant language
suggests that these animal restrictions were intended as a nonexhaustive list of prohibited
animals, trades, or conditions. Moreover, while the covenants expressly permit "Large
domestic farm animals" and provide examples of such animals, they do not define,
restrict, or categorically prohibit small farm animals.
{¶ 24} The interpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius is instructive
here: the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others. As the trial court found,
the term "game chickens" refers to chickens raised for cockfighting. By expressly
prohibiting only "game chickens," and not chickens generally, the covenants indicate that
other types of chickens, including chickens kept for egg production, are not prohibited.
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{¶ 25} The nuisance and obnoxious-condition provisions appear primarily directed
at waste dumping, debris, and unsightly or unsanitary conditions. By contrast, the
restrictive covenants expressly contemplate agricultural use of the land and the keeping
of farm animals. Agriculture includes poultry husbandry and the production of poultry and
poultry products. See R.C. 519.01. We therefore decline to read the broad prohibitions
on "noxious or offensive trades" or "nuisances or obnoxious conditions" as barring a
commercial egg-production facility per se.
{¶ 26} It is doubtful that the original drafters intended to prohibit the keeping of egg-
laying chickens on this farmland, and we decline to infer that commercial-scale egg
production is prohibited by the covenants. Ultimately, this court may not rewrite the
covenants to impose additional restrictions barring the keeping of egg-production
chickens or the operation of a commercial egg-production facility. See Reinsmith, at ¶ 21.
Anticipatory Private Nuisance
{¶ 27} Although the restrictive covenants do not proscribe a commercial egg-
production facility, Meeker also brings a separate claim under the common law tort theory
of a private nuisance. We find his claim speculative and unsupported by the factual
evidence.
{¶ 28} A "private nuisance" is a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the
private use and enjoyment of land. Nithiananthan v. Toirac, 2015-Ohio-1416, ¶ 32 (12th
Dist.). In order for a private nuisance to be actionable, the invasion must be either (a)
intentional and unreasonable or (b) unintentional but caused by negligent, reckless, or
abnormally dangerous conduct. Id. A court may enjoin a threatened or anticipated
nuisance when it is presented with clear and convincing evidence that a nuisance will
necessarily result from a contemplated act. Brackett v. Moler Raceway Park, LLC, 2011-
Ohio-4469, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.). However, "if the act or thing sought to be enjoined may or
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may not become a nuisance, depending on the use or manner of its operation, or other
circumstances, equity will not interfere." Id.
{¶ 29} As discussed above, poultry husbandry and the production of poultry and
poultry products are ordinary agricultural activities. Like other forms of animal husbandry,
keeping poultry for egg production outside municipal limits is not a nuisance per se.
Rather, it becomes a nuisance only when operated in a manner that annoys or injures
private persons or injures property. See Weber v. Bd. of Health, 148 Ohio St. 389, 400
(1947) (a hog farm or piggery located outside municipal corporation limits is not a
nuisance per se); See also Park v. Langties, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 4903, at *3 (11th
Dist. Oct. 11, 1991) (holding cattle feedlot was not a nuisance where there was no
evidence that the defendants were not using acceptable agricultural practices, or that
there is any material change in the general agricultural nature of the area, even though it
"may have added to the odor in the area").
{¶ 30} The proposed egg-production facility has not yet been constructed and
would be located somewhere on the Nolts' 71.3-acre parcel. The present record does not
establish what odor, noise, or other environmental impact, if any, the facility would have
on surrounding parcels. Meeker conceded that the facility would not affect his current use
of his property for farming corn and soybeans, and neither Meeker nor his expert could
quantify any anticipated diminution in property value. In addition, the contract between
the Nolts and Granite Ridge Poultry requires the Nolts to follow generally accepted
agricultural practices. Although the facility may or may not become a nuisance in the
future, Meeker's anticipatory private nuisance claim fails because he has not presented
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clear and convincing evidence that a nuisance will necessarily result. Brackett, at ¶ 17.3
III. Conclusion
{¶ 31} Meeker's first assignment of error is sustained, and his remaining
assignments of error are overruled. The trial court's judgment is modified to reflect that
Hall Ring's unilateral "Release of Protective Covenants and Restrictions" was ineffective
and that the covenants and restrictions recorded in 2004 remain in effect on the Nolts'
land.4 Nevertheless, because those covenants and restrictions do not prohibit raising
chickens for egg production, and because Meeker failed to present clear and convincing
evidence that a nuisance will necessarily result from the operation of an egg-production
facility, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Nolts.
{¶ 32} Judgment affirmed as modified.
BYRNE, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.
3. We note that the magistrate's decision adopted by the trial court states that R.C. 3767.13(D) entitles the Nolts to operate their egg-production facility so long as they follow generally accepted agricultural practices, and conduct their activities in such a manner so as not to have a substantial, adverse effect on the public health, safety, or welfare. This is only true for statutory nuisance claims brought under R.C. Chapter 3767. See Moody v. Wiza, 2007-Ohio-5356, ¶ 68. R.C. 3767.13(D) does not shield the Nolts from common law nuisance claims.
4. We need not order Hall Ring's "Release of Protective Covenants and Restrictions" removed from the Brown County records. The release terminates Hall Ring's interest in the restrictive covenants and any right Hall Ring may have had to enforce them, even though the covenants remain on the Nolts' property unless and until the other affected landowners release them.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed as modified in the above Opinion.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Brown County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed 75% to appellant and 25% to appellee.
/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Presiding Judge
/s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Judge
/s/ Robin N. Piper, Judge
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