Mednansky v. Dept. of Rev.

Oregon Tax Court·Decided November 18, 2025·No. TC 5465·Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT

REGULAR DIVISION

Property Tax

DAVID JOHN MEDNANSKY, )

)

Plaintiff, ) TC 5465 v. )

)

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ) State of Oregon, )

)

Defendant, )

) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTand ) INTERVENOR’S MOTION FOR ) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND CURRY COUNTY ASSESSOR, ) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION ) FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD Defendant-Intervenor. ) AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff challenges the values shown on the tax year 2022-23 roll for the land and residential structure in Defendant-Intervenor’s (the county’s) account No. R11007. Plaintiff has, with leave of the court, amended his complaint twice, as shown in the table appended to this order. The county has moved for summary judgment as to one issue in Plaintiff’s second amended complaint; 1 Plaintiff has moved for leave to file a third amended complaint.

1 Although styled as a motion for summary judgment, the court treats the county’s motion as one for partial summary judgment because it appears to overlook what the court liberally construes as an allegation that would support a reduction of the subject property’s real market value (RMV) for tax year 2022-23 based on the “inability to rebuild” the structure if it were to be destroyed. (See Ptf’s 2d Am Compl at 1, ¶ 3.) This RMV allegation is not defeated or otherwise affected by the legal argument in the county’s motion. However, because the court will grant ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT TC 5465 Page 1 of 9

I. DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT The county’s motion requires little analysis, as the court finds that Plaintiff, who is not represented by an attorney, has conceded the county’s legal argument. In paragraphs four to six of his second amended complaint, Plaintiff seeks a redetermination of the subject property’s original maximum assessed value (MAV) as assigned for tax year 1997. (See Ptf’s 2d Am Compl at 2 (“Plaintiff asks this court for a judgment declaring that Assessor must recalculate the original RMV used to establish the original MAV for the subject property.”).) The county correctly argues in its opening brief that well-settled caselaw dating to shortly after the passage of Measure 50 squarely defeats Plaintiff’s “original MAV” argument. See Ellis v. Lorati, 14 OTR 525, 534 (1999) (“Based upon the above analysis, the court concludes that taxpayers appealing their July 1, 1997, MAV may not challenge the real market value shown on the tax roll for July 1, 1995.”). Plaintiff acknowledges that the county’s legal argument must prevail. (See Ptf’s Mot Leave to File 3d Am Compl and Decl at 1 (“Plaintiff discovered that his request for relief in his Second Amended Complaint is barred by Oregon Statute and Case Law.”); see also Ptf’s Opp at 3 (“Plaintiff concedes, after reading Defendant’s citation of case law, that the remedy requested for this wrong is not allowed by law * * *.”).)

The court will grant the county’s motion.

II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT Turning to Plaintiff’s motion, the court agrees with the county that Plaintiff has no right to amend at this stage absent consent of opposing counsel or leave of the court, and that whether the court will grant leave is within the court’s discretion. See Tax Court Rule (TCR) 23 A (“A

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his complaint to reframe his RMV allegation, the overall course of the litigation is not affected by whether the county’s motion is for full or partial summary judgment.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT TC 5465 Page 2 of 9 pleading may be amended by a party once as a matter of course any time before a responsive pleading is served * * * Otherwise, a party may amend the pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party, and leave will be freely given when justice so requires.”); Deep Photonics Corp. v. LaChapelle, 368 Or 274, 300, 491 P3d 60 (2021) (“When consent of the court is required, the court retains discretion to deny the motion.”).

The court also agrees with the county that the principal inquiry is whether the amendment would prejudice the county. (See Inv’s Opp at 4); C.O. Homes, LLC v. Cleveland, 366 Or 207, 216, 460 P3d 494 (2020) (“the gravamen of the inquiry is whether allowing a pretrial amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party.”). As discussed below, the court concludes, after carefully considering the proposed amendments and the procedural posture of the case, that the county has not established that it would be prejudiced by allowing Plaintiff to amend his complaint, even for the third time, and even though trial is set to begin in less than three months, on February 4, 2026.

Caselaw on prejudice directs the court to consider a number of factors. As relevant here, the factors generally fall into the categories of timing and merit:

• Timing-related factors o Whether the opposing party had a reasonable opportunity to research appropriate law, move against the pleading, and avail itself of discovery procedures. See C.O. Homes, 366 Or at 216.

o Whether the amendment comes too late to allow the opposing party to incorporate it into trial preparation and trial strategy. See Deep Photonics, 368 Or at 301-02.

o Whether the proposed amendment would change the claim for relief. See C.O.

Homes, 366 Or at 216-17.

• Merit-related factors o Whether the amendment would raise “a futile claim,” i.e., “one that could not prevail on the merits due to some failing in the pleadings or some unavoidable bar or obstacle.” Eklof v. Persson, 369 Or 531, 543-44, 508 P3d 468 (2022).

o Whether the proposed amendment has “colorable merit.” See Sanford v. Hampton Resources Inc., 298 Or App 555, 577, 447 P3d 1192, rev den, 366 Or 64 (2019).

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT TC 5465 Page 3 of 9

A. Timing-related Factors The court first notes that the timing of the amendment at issue here, an interval of approximately two-and-one-half months before trial begins, is far longer than the intervals in most of the cases cited by the county. In those cases, leave to amend was sought from one month before trial to during trial. See Sanford, 298 Or App at 559 (denying plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint one month before trial); C.O. Homes, 366 Or at 212 (plaintiff sought leave to amend complaint two days before trial); Humbird v. McClendon, 281 Or 83, 86, 573 P2d 1240 (1978) (defendants sought to file an amended answer midtrial); Deep Photonics, 368 Or at 297 (defendants sought to amend answer to add an affirmative defense midtrial).

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Mednansky v. Dept. of Rev., (Or. Super. Ct. 2025).

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Related

King v. Department of Revenue
12 Or. Tax 491 (Oregon Tax Court, 1993)
Ellis v. Lorati
14 Or. Tax 525 (Oregon Tax Court, 1999)
Freitag v. Dept. of Rev.
19 Or. Tax 37 (Oregon Tax Court, 2006)
Woods v. Department of Revenue
16 Or. Tax 56 (Oregon Tax Court, 2002)
Sanford v. Hampton Res., Inc.
447 P.3d 1192 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2019)
Humbird v. McClendon
573 P.2d 1240 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1978)
Covington v. Dept. of Rev.
24 Or. Tax 77 (Oregon Tax Court, 2020)
C.O. Homes, LLC v. Cleveland
460 P.3d 494 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2020)
Deep Photonics Corp. v. LaChapelle
491 P.3d 60 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2021)
Eklof v. Persson
508 P.3d 468 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2022)