Medley v. MacOmber

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 13, 2026
• Docket: 24-1908
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THEODORA MEDLEY, No. 24-1908 D.C. No. Petitioner - Appellant, 5:21-cv-00937-DOC-MAR v. MEMORANDUM* JEFF MACOMBER,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 18, 2026** El Centro, California

Before: TALLMAN and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and MONTENEGRO, District Judge.***

Petitioner Theodora Medley (“Medley”) appeals the district court’s denial of

her petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Ruth Bermudez Montenegro, United States District Judge for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation. jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). As the parties are familiar with the facts,

we do not recount them here. We review the district court’s findings of fact for

clear error. Frye v. Broomfield, 115 F.4th 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation

omitted). We review its denial of a habeas petition de novo, but with the

significant deference owed state court decisions under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) amendments to § 2254(d). Id. Habeas

relief may not be granted unless the state trial court (1) unreasonably applied

clearly established federal law or (2) unreasonably determined the facts. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1)–(2). Because Medley has not met either of these “highly deferential

standard[s],” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (citation omitted), we

affirm.

The issue presented is whether Medley impliedly waived her right to testify

in her own defense as described in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987). Even

assuming that Medley exhausted her Rock claim and that her petition was entitled

to equitable tolling, Medley cannot show that she is entitled to relief under

AEDPA.

As a preliminary matter, AEDPA deference applies because the state trial

court addressed the merits of Medley’s Rock claim. See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at

181. Where, as here, the California Supreme Court does not reach the merits, the

district court looks through to “the last reasoned decision issued by a state court . . .

2 24-1908 confronting the issue raised by the petitioner.” Hirschfield v. Payne, 420 F.3d 922,

925 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005). The last reasoned decision here was the state trial court’s

oral ruling during a colloquy between Medley and the judge. Although the

colloquy began as a discussion about ineffective assistance of counsel, it then

squarely covered Medley’s right to testify. The state trial court found that Medley

had waived her right to testify, and that it would be inappropriate to reopen

evidence after closing arguments. Therefore, the state trial court reached the

merits of Medley’s Rock claim, and the district court should have applied AEDPA

deference. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011) (“[I]t may be

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of

any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.”).

Further, Medley cannot show that she is entitled to relief under AEDPA.

First, the state trial court did not unreasonably determine facts. It did not “plainly

misapprehend or misstate the record,” “ignore[ ] evidence that supports [the]

petitioner’s claim,” or otherwise engage in a defective fact-finding process. Taylor

v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1038 (2004),

overruled on other grounds by Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 185.

Waiver of the right to testify may be implicit and “presumed from the

defendant’s failure to testify or notify the court of his desire to do so.” United

States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 177 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). A defendant

3 24-1908 who wishes to reject his counsel’s advice and testify may do so “by insisting on

testifying, speaking to the court, or discharging his lawyer.” Id. (citation omitted).

“When a defendant is silent in the face of his attorney’s decision not to call him as

a witness,” he impliedly waives his right to testify. United States v. Nohara, 3

F.3d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).

The state trial court reasonably found that Medley impliedly waived her

right to testify. During trial, as the State neared the end of its case, Medley’s

counsel indicated that he would confirm with Medley whether she was going to

testify. After a short recess, Medley’s counsel stated: “when the People rest, it’s

my intention to rest without calling any witnesses, Your Honor.” Shortly

thereafter, both sides rested, without calling Medley as a witness. At the close of

evidence, Medley did not insist on testifying, speak to the court, or discharge her

lawyer. It was only after closing arguments that Medley voiced her desire to

testify. It was not objectively unreasonable for the state trial court to find, based

on Medley’s silence through the close of evidence, that she had impliedly waived

her right to testify.

Second, the state trial court did not unreasonably apply clearly established

federal law. Clearly established federal law states that “the right to present

relevant testimony is not without limitation. The right ‘may, in appropriate cases,

bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.’ But

4 24-1908 restrictions of a defendant’s right to testify may not be arbitrary or disproportionate

to the purposes they are designed to serve.” Rock, 483 U.S. at 55–56 (quoting

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).

It was not unreasonable for the state trial court to refuse to reopen evidence

after closing arguments for Medley to testify. The “rule generally limiting

testimony to the evidence-taking phase of trial is not ‘arbitrary or disproportionate

to the purposes [it is] designed to serve.’” United States v. Pino-Noriega, 189 F.3d

1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Jones,

880 F.2d 55, 60 (8th Cir. 1989)). “‘While placing only a minor limitation on the

right [to testify], the rule promotes both fairness and order in trials, interests which

. . . are crucial to the legitimacy of the trial process.’” Id. (first alteration in

original). Therefore, the state trial court’s decision did not unreasonably apply

clearly established federal law. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103 (an unreasonable

application of law must be “so lacking in justification that there was an error well

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement”).

AFFIRMED.

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