Medina v. Murphy

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: July 3, 2024
• Docket: 24-1029
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-1029 Document: 010111074591 Date Filed: 07/03/2024 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 3, 2024 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court DELANO MEDINA,

Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 24-1029 v. (D.C. No. 1:23-CV-02241-LTB-SBP) (D. Colo.) JENNIFER MURPHY; REBEKAH RYAN; JR HALL,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, MATHESON, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Delano Medina appeals the district court’s dismissal of his pro se complaint

filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. Exercising

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we hold that Mr. Medina improperly brought his

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-1029 Document: 010111074591 Date Filed: 07/03/2024 Page: 2

claim under § 1983 when it was cognizable only in a habeas corpus action. We

remand to the district court to vacate its judgment and dismiss without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Medina is a prisoner in the custody of the Colorado Department of

Corrections (“CDOC”). His amended complaint against three Colorado state

officials asserted a procedural due process violation under § 1983. He alleged that

CDOC inaccurately computed his parole eligibility date (“PED”) and therefore

denied him timely consideration for parole. He further alleged that a Colorado

statute creates a presumption that parole would be granted in his case.

A magistrate judge dismissed Mr. Medina’s complaint as frivolous or for

failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) or (ii), holding that

Mr. Medina failed to plead deprivation of a due process liberty or property interest.

The magistrate judge said Mr. Medina had no liberty interest in a specific PED

because parole is discretionary under Colorado law. She also noted that, to the extent

Mr. Medina’s claim could be construed as seeking immediate or speedier release, it

must be brought in a habeas corpus action rather than under § 1983.

Mr. Medina objected to the magistrate judge’s Recommendation, contending

he had pled a due process liberty interest in an accurate PED and consideration for

parole. He argued that, although parole is discretionary in Colorado, consideration

for parole is not. He further contended that, with the correct PED, Colorado law

affords him both parole consideration and a statutory presumption of parole, and thus

the granting of parole in his case is not discretionary. Finally, Mr. Medina argued he

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could sue under § 1983 because he was seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to

invalidate state procedures used to deny parole eligibility.

The district court summarily overruled Mr. Medina’s objections, accepted and

adopted the Recommendation, and entered judgment dismissing his complaint.

II. DISCUSSION

We generally review the dismissal of a complaint as frivolous under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for an abuse of discretion. Milligan v. Archuleta, 659 F.3d 1294,

1296 (10th Cir. 2011). “However, where the frivolousness determination turns on an

issue of law, we review the determination de novo.” Id. (quotations omitted). We

review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). Because

Mr. Medina proceeds pro se, we construe his filings liberally but we do not act as his

advocate. See James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).

We need not decide whether Mr. Medina sufficiently pled a due process liberty

interest because we construe his complaint as seeking immediate or speedier release

from confinement. His claim is therefore cognizable only in a habeas corpus action,

as the district court alternatively held.1

1 We note, however, that this court has rejected in unpublished decisions Colorado prisoners’ assertions of a protectible liberty interest in a correctly calculated PED. See Fetzer v. Raemisch, 803 F. App’x 181, 185 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (“[A]bsent an overarching right to parole, the mere fact that the process used to determine a PED is (allegedly) nondiscretionary is insufficient to create a liberty interest that the Due Process clause protects.”); Baars v. Raemisch, 814 F. App’x 376, 377-78 (10th Cir. 2020) (continued) 3 Appellate Case: 24-1029 Document: 010111074591 Date Filed: 07/03/2024 Page: 4

A state prisoner may challenge the conditions of his confinement in a § 1983

civil rights action. See Boutwell v. Keating, 399 F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th Cir. 2005).

A prisoner may challenge the execution of his sentence in a habeas corpus petition

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Brace v. United States, 634 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir.

2011); Boutwell, 399 F.3d at 1210 n.2. A state prisoner’s “sole federal remedy is a

writ of habeas corpus” when he “is challenging the very fact or duration of his

physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to

immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment.” Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d

809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997).

Thus, courts must “ensure that state prisoners use only habeas corpus (or

similar state) remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration of their

confinement—either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or

indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness

of the State’s custody.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005). A prisoner

may not bring a § 1983 claim that seeks “‘core’ habeas corpus relief, i.e., where a

state prisoner requests present or future release.” Id. He must instead seek habeas

relief after fully exhausting state remedies. See id. at 79 (“[H]abeas corpus actions

require a petitioner fully to exhaust state remedies, which § 1983 does not.”).

(unpublished) (same). See 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A) (“Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but may be cited for their persuasive value.”); see also Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.

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In Duncan v. Gunter, 15 F.3d 989, 990 (10th Cir. 1994), for example, the

plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action claiming that they were wrongfully denied

earned-time credits that would have entitled them to release. Although the plaintiffs

did not seek an injunction explicitly ordering their release, we held their request “for

an injunction requiring the Colorado Attorney General to inform DOC of the changes

in the state law, and advise DOC to conform to the statutes which govern” could be

brought only in a habeas action because “the requested order would be tantamount to

a decision on the plaintiffs’ entitlement to a speedier release.” Id. at 991 (brackets

and quotations omitted).

In contrast, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs’ parole-related claims in

Wilkinson were cognizable under § 1983 because they “would not necessarily spell

immediate or speedier release.” 544 U.S. at 81. These plaintiffs sought to “render

invalid the state procedures used to deny parole eligibility . . . and parole suitability.”

Id. at 82. But success on their claims would mean, at most, either speedier

consideration for parole or a new parole hearing where release remained

discretionary. See id. Thus, these prisoners could pursue § 1983 claims because the

connection between the constitutionality of their parole proceedings and their release

from confinement was “too tenuous” for habeas to be their sole avenue of relief. Id.

at 78.

In this case, the connection between Mr. Medina’s constitutional claim

regarding calculation of his PED and his release from confinement is not so tenuous.

In his amended complaint, he sought a corrected PED and an order to schedule a

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parole hearing. ROA at 53. Although he acknowledged that parole is discretionary

under Colorado law, id., he also alleged that a Colorado statute created a presumption

of parole in his case, id. at 56, 61. Based on this statutory presumption, his parole

will not be discretionary. See ROA at 81 (arguing in objections to Recommendation

that parole is not discretionary in his case due to the statutory presumption of parole);

Aplt. Br. at 10 (referencing “a statutory right to release from prison”); id. at 12

(arguing there is mandatory statutory language and an absence of parole discretion in

his case); id. at 14 (arguing he has “a legitimate expectation of parole”); id. at 16

(asserting that “defendants[] are now wrongfully detaining him”); id. at 17 (arguing

that, if his PED had been corrected, he “would have been paroled”).

Thus, according to Mr. Medina’s description of his claim, he attacks not only

“wrong procedures” but also “the wrong result”—the denial of parole. Wilkinson,

544 U.S. at 80 (quotations omitted). As in Duncan, granting his requested relief

“would be tantamount to a decision on [his] entitlement to a speedier release.”

15 F.3d at 991 (quotations omitted). As such, Mr. Medina must use habeas corpus

rather than § 1983, where, as here, he “seek[s] to invalidate the duration of [his]

confinement . . . indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies

the unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81. The district

court should have dismissed Mr. Medina’s complaint without prejudice rather than

reaching the merits. Cf. Boyce v. Ashcroft, 251 F.3d 911, 913, 918 (10th Cir.)

(affirming dismissal without prejudice of prisoner’s § 2241 petition challenging a

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condition of confinement that could not be raised in a habeas petition), vacated as

moot, 268 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2001).

III. CONCLUSION

We remand to the district court to vacate its judgment and dismiss, without

prejudice, Mr. Medina’s complaint as incorrectly filed under § 1983. We grant

Mr. Medina’s motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs and fees.

Entered for the Court

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge