Meadows v. Bicrodyne Corp.

573 F. Supp. 1030, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12085
District Court, N.D. California·Decided November 1, 1983·No. C-82-4975-WWS·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

SCHWARZER, District Judge.

The parties to this appraisal action have submitted for decision the issue whether nine of the named plaintiffs are qualified to exercise their appraisal rights as dissenting *1031 shareholders of Bicrodyne Corporation. They agree that this question may be decided by the Court on the present record without a hearing. Based on a review of the record and the controlling California statutes, the Court concludes that the nine plaintiffs whose right to appraisal is in issue have not qualified for appraisal rights.

The Controlling Law

Under section 1300(a) of the California Corporations Code, a shareholder of a “disappearing corporation” in a short-form merger “may, by complying with [the statute], require the corporation ... to purchase for cash at their fair market value the shares owned by the shareholder.” The statutory requirements are set forth in sections 1301 and 1302. None of the nine plaintiffs whose appraisal rights have been challenged by defendant complied with those requirements; their noncompliance is undisputed. These plaintiffs contend that they were unable to comply with the statutory provisions governing perfection of their appraisal rights because they did not receive the statutory notice in time or, in some instances, at all. The issue here, which is one of first impression, is whether failure to receive timely notice excuses a shareholder’s failure to comply with the statute.

Bicrodyne was merged into Carpenter Technology Corporation pursuant to section 1110 of the California Corporations Code, which sets forth the procedures required to effect a short-form merger. Section 1110(i) provides that where, as was true of Bicrodyne, not all of the outstanding shares of the subsidiary domestic corporation party to a short-form merger are owned by the parent corporation immediately prior to the merger, the parent corporation “shall at least 10 days before the effective date of the merger, give notice to each shareholder of [the] subsidiary corporation” of the effective date of the merger. It further states that “[t]he notice shall be sent by mail addressed to the shareholder at the address of such shareholder as it appears on the records of the corporation.” Cal. Corp. Code § 1110(i) (West 1983) Defendant contends that it discharged its statutory obligation to give notice of the merger to shareholders by depositing the notices of merger in the mail. It argues that once the corporation has discharged its statutory obligation, the shareholders’ failure to receive the notice does not excuse their non-compliance with sections 1301 and 1302, which outline the procedures shareholders must follow to perfect their appraisal rights. The assumption implicit in defendant’s argument is that only a failure on the part of the corporation to fulfill its statutory obligation to give proper notice relieves the shareholder from the obligation to comply with sections 1301 and 1302. Defendant relies on section 601 of the Corporations Code, and the language of sections 1301 and 1302 to support its position.

Section 601 of the Corporations Code outlines the procedures a corporation must follow to give notice of a shareholders’ meeting:

[n]otice of a shareholders’ meeting or any report shall be given either personally or by first class mail____addressed to the address of such shareholder appearing on the books of the corporation or given by the shareholder to the corporation for the purpose of notice____[t]he notice or report shall be deemed to have been given at the time when delivered personally or deposited in the mail or sent by other means of written communication. An affidavit of mailing of any notice or report in accordance with the provisions of this division, executed by ... any transfer agent, shall be prima facie evidence of the giving of the notice or report. (Emphasis added).

This section establishes that a corporation has discharged its obligation to give notice of a shareholders’ meeting or report when it deposits into the mail the appropriate, properly addressed notice. Although the section on its face is limited to notices of meetings and reports, there is no reason not to apply its underlying rationale to notices of merger. There is no other or different provision in the sections relating *1032 to mergers. The purpose of the notice of merger is similar to the purpose of giving notice of a shareholders’ meeting: to allow each shareholder to evaluate his or her response to actions which the corporation may take. And the same policy applies to both notice of shareholder meetings and notice of mergers, i.e., to lay down an objective rule which establishes the relevant time periods with certainty, thereby eliminating disputes such as that now before the Court.

Sections 1301 and 1302 are consistent with that analysis. Section 1301 provides that any shareholder who has a right to require the corporation to purchase his or her shares “shall make written demand upon the corporation for the purchase of such shares____the demand is not effective for any purpose unless it is received by the corporation or any transfer agent thereof ... within 30 days after the date on which the notice pursuant to subdivision (i) of section 1110 was mailed to the shareholder (emphasis added).” Section 1302 also provides that in order to perfect appraisal rights the shareholder’s certificates must be submitted to the corporation or to its transfer agent within SO days of the mailing of the merger notice (emphasis added). Both sections require communication of dissent within 30 days of mailing, not receipt of notice. If the date of receipt of notice had been considered material by the legislature, the language used in the statute would presumably not have been chosen. By adopting this language, the legislature appears to have balanced the interests of majority and minority shareholders: imposing a duty promptly to notify shareholders while protecting the majority against late claims asserted after the merger has been consummated.

Defendant has cited case authority to support this position; plaintiffs have cited none to contradict the defendant’s theory. However, the cases cited by defendant involve the insufficiency of the shareholders’ communication of dissent, not the sufficiency of the steps taken by the corporation to provide shareholders with adequate notice. See National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Jr. University, 134 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773, 64 S.Ct. 77, 88 L.Ed. 462 (1943); Raab v. Villager Industries, Inc., 355 A.2d 888 (Del.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853, 97 S.Ct. 147, 50 L.Ed.2d 129 (1976); Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 43 Del.Ch. 206, 222 A.2d 789 (1966). Although their focus is on the sufficiency of the shareholder’s communication, these cases, which involve statutes similar to the one at issue here, reflect strict adherence to the time provisions for receipt of communications.

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Meadows v. Bicrodyne Corp., 573 F. Supp. 1030, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12085 (N.D. Cal. 1983).

573 F. Supp. 1030 (Meadows v. Bicrodyne Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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