Mead v. Owens

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Mead v. Owens

254 S.E.2d 431, 149 Ga. App. 303, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 1826

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedMarch 2, 1979

Docket57135

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 254 S.E.2d 431 (Mead v. Owens) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Mead v. Owens, 254 S.E.2d 431, 149 Ga. App. 303, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 1826 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).

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Opinions

Deen, Chief Judge.

"Whenever any court in this State shall have before it any question concerning the custody of or guardianship of any minor child, the court may, in its discretion, grant reasonable visitation rights to the maternal and paternal grandparents of the child.” Ga. L. 1976, p. 247 (Code Ann. § 74-112).

Does this statute apply to an adoption proceeding? It is established that the court may consider such grant of visitation rights to the grandparents only in cases where it has before it a question "concerning the custody of or guardianship” of the minor (Rhodes v. Peacock, 142 Ga. App. 328 (235 SE2d 762) (1977)) or, otherwise stated, where there is "pending before it in any litigation any question concerning” such custody. Dyer v. Allen, 238 Ga. 516 (233 SE2d 772) (1977).

The case pending before the court here was an adoption proceeding by the husband of the natural mother to whom custody had been granted in a previous divorce case. The adoption proceeded without the consent of the natural father whose parental rights had been forfeited by failure to comply with a child support decree (Code § [304]*30474-403 (a) (2)). Under Code Ann. § 74-411 grandparents may file objections to petitions for adoption only if there is no father or mother living; otherwise, they have no standing to object. Hester v. Mathis, 147 Ga. App. 257 (2) (248 SE2d 538) (1978). And since under Code § 74-112 these appellants may seek visiting privileges under proper circumstances only because of their relationship to the child, whereas one result of this adoption proceeding was to sever the relationship of the natural father and his bloodline "so that the adopted individual thereafter is a stranger to his former relatives for all purposes including inheritance” (Code Ann. § 74-413 (a) (1)), thereby severing the exact relationship under which these grandparents sought to proceed, it becomes obvious that an adoption proceeding in which all paternal rights are sought to be severed is not such a proceeding concerning custody or guardianship as will support an intervening petition by paternal grandparents for visitation privileges. See also Sachs v. Walzer, 242 Ga. 742 (251 SE2d 302) (1978).

Submitted January 10, 1979 — Decided March 2, 1979 — Rehearing denied March 13, 1979 — Moore & Chambliss, Timothy J. Warfel, for appellant. Twitty & Twitty, Frank S. Twitty, for appellees.

The trial court properly dismissed the appellant’s petition.

Judgment affirmed.

McMurray, J., concurs. Shulman, J., concurs specially.

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Deen, Chief Judge.

"Whenever any court in this State shall have before it any question concerning the custody of or guardianship of any minor child, the court may, in its discretion, grant reasonable visitation rights to the maternal and paternal grandparents of the child.” Ga. L. 1976, p. 247 (Code Ann. § 74-112).

Does this statute apply to an adoption proceeding? It is established that the court may consider such grant of visitation rights to the grandparents only in cases where it has before it a question "concerning the custody of or guardianship” of the minor (Rhodes v. Peacock, 142 Ga. App. 328 (235 SE2d 762) (1977)) or, otherwise stated, where there is "pending before it in any litigation any question concerning” such custody. Dyer v. Allen, 238 Ga. 516 (233 SE2d 772) (1977).

The case pending before the court here was an adoption proceeding by the husband of the natural mother to whom custody had been granted in a previous divorce case. The adoption proceeded without the consent of the natural father whose parental rights had been forfeited by failure to comply with a child support decree (Code § [304]*30474-403 (a) (2)). Under Code Ann. § 74-411 grandparents may file objections to petitions for adoption only if there is no father or mother living; otherwise, they have no standing to object. Hester v. Mathis, 147 Ga. App. 257 (2) (248 SE2d 538) (1978). And since under Code § 74-112 these appellants may seek visiting privileges under proper circumstances only because of their relationship to the child, whereas one result of this adoption proceeding was to sever the relationship of the natural father and his bloodline "so that the adopted individual thereafter is a stranger to his former relatives for all purposes including inheritance” (Code Ann. § 74-413 (a) (1)), thereby severing the exact relationship under which these grandparents sought to proceed, it becomes obvious that an adoption proceeding in which all paternal rights are sought to be severed is not such a proceeding concerning custody or guardianship as will support an intervening petition by paternal grandparents for visitation privileges. See also Sachs v. Walzer, 242 Ga. 742 (251 SE2d 302) (1978).

Submitted January 10, 1979 — Decided March 2, 1979 — Rehearing denied March 13, 1979 — Moore & Chambliss, Timothy J. Warfel, for appellant. Twitty & Twitty, Frank S. Twitty, for appellees.

The trial court properly dismissed the appellant’s petition.

Judgment affirmed.

McMurray, J., concurs. Shulman, J., concurs specially.

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254 S.E.2d 431, 149 Ga. App. 303, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 1826, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mead-v-owens-gactapp-1979.

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