McShane v. Murray

184 N.W. 147, 106 Neb. 512, 1921 Neb. LEXIS 246
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 7, 1921
DocketNo. 21682
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 184 N.W. 147 (McShane v. Murray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McShane v. Murray, 184 N.W. 147, 106 Neb. 512, 1921 Neb. LEXIS 246 (Neb. 1921).

Opinion

Troup, District Judge.

This is a suit for an injunction. Plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the southeast quarter of section 25, township 32, range 46, and defendant, Cornelius Murray, is the lessee and in possession of tlie north half of section 36, same township and range, and all in Sheridan county, Nebraska; the latter description being a part of the school land owned and leased by the state of Nebraska and coming to the defendants Murray in 3911 through mesne assignments of the lease, and lying immediately south of said section 25.

A dispute having arisen between the plaintiff and defendant Murray as to the location of the true boundary line between the two sections, and plaintiff claiming that the defendants were undertaking to enter upon and cultivate a portion of the land lying within the disputed tract, but which plaintiff alleges belongs to him, he instituted this action in April, 1917, to enjoin the defendants from so doing. Upon presenting plaintiff’s petition to the judge of the district court for Sheridan county, a restraining order was issued against the defendants ac[514]*514corclingly, and tlie same remained in force and effect until the final decree in June, 1920.

At the commencement of the action, Cornelius Murray and John Murray, only, were made defendants. A year thereafter, however, but without leave of court to make additional parties defendant or to issue summons therefor, a summons was issued against, and served upon the state of Nebraska, commanding it to answer it in the usual time thereafter.

None of (he defendants having answered, on February 5, 1920,- the court entered an order requiring all defendants to answer the petition of the plaintiff on or before March 8, 3920. Without interposing any objection to the action thus taken by the plaintiff in seeking to bring the state into the litigation, on February 20, 1920, the state filed its answer, setting out the fact that the state was the owner of the land referred to in section 3G; that it had leased the same to its codefendants herein and put them in possession thereof; that it had theretofore caused said land to be surveyed, and that the disputed tract falls within the boundaries of section 36, and asked that plaintiff’s action be dismissed. At about the same time the defendants Murray filed their joint answer, in which they set forth substantially the same facts as contained in the answer of the state. The plaintiff replying denied all new matters set forth in the respective answers.

A trial was had to the court, and on June 17, 1920, a final decree was rendered by the court, finding generally for the plaintiff and against all the defendants; found the boundary line between the two sections to be as claimed by the plaintiff; found the corner designated in the evidence as the “MeShane” corner to be the location of the original government quarter corner, and established the same as such by the decree, and made the restraining .order theretofore granted, a perpetual injunction. The defendants appeal.

The appellants first contend that the plaintiff has no lawful right or authority to sue the state in an action like [515]*515the present one and was without authority or legal right to make it a party to the litigation, and cites authorities in support thereof. We are constrained to hold that the position of the state on this point is well taken and must be sustained. Section 22, art. YI, of the Constitution of Nebraska, provides: “The state may sue and be sued, and the legislature shall provide by law in what manner and in what courts suits shall be brought.” Under this provision, of course, no action can be brought against the state unless and until the legislature has so provided. The legislature of the state has acted in pursuance of this provision of the Constitution and has specified certain classes of actions which may be brought against the state. Rev. St. 1913, sec. 1177. In the case of State v. Stout, 7 Neb. 89, this court held that the section of the statute above referred to “covers all the various claims and demands on which the state may be sued.” See, also, State v. Mortensen, 69 Neb. 376. It is quite evident that the action at bar is not one within any of the classes mentioned in said section of the statute, and we are not cited to, nor are we aware of, any other provision enacted by the legislature since, which would authorize the maintenance of an action in the nature of the one at bar against the state. Indeed, judging from the entire silence of plaintiff's brief on the subject, we assume that plaintiff is not resisting this claim made on the part of the state. Of course, if the plaintiff: had no authority or legal right to make the state a party to this action or maintain this suit against it, the voluntary appearance by the attorney general in behalf of the state and his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court over the state did not, and could not, in any wise bind the state so as to make the decree rendered against it of any validity. The exception of defendants in the particular stated is therefore sustained, and so much of the decree of the lower court as purports to adjudicate the matters in suit against the state is vacated'and set aside and the action as against the state dismissed.

[516]*516However, a dismissal of the state from the -litigation •does not affect the action as to the other defendants. The plaintiff would still have the right of action against them personally to restrain them from taking .possession of premises already in the possession of plaintiff. And this brings us to a consideration of the case upon' its merits.

In 1882 a government survey was made of the two sections involved in this controversy and adjacent sections, at which time the section corners and some, perhaps all, of the quarter section corners were located and marked. This dispute as to the location of the true boundary line having arisen, the defendants Murray, in the year 1914, applied to the state commissioner of public lands and buildings to have the correctness of the former survey of section 36 tested, in pursuance of the provisions of sections 5563, 5564, and 5566, Rev. St. 1913. In pursuance of the authority conferred by these provisions of the statute, the commissioner of public lands and buildings delegated one E. C. Simmons, then deputy state surveyor, to make a retracement survey of tlie.se lands with a view of definitely establishing the boundary line between the two sections. In March, 1914, Simmons made a retracement survey and filed his report thereof accompanied by a blue-print or diagram of the premises, a copy of which, with the various notations thereon, being attached to the record herein. The chief and about the only point of contention now is which one of the two points shown upon this plat is the original government quarter corner, that marked by the red letter “A" and designated in .the evidence as the “McShane” corner, or the one marked by the red letter “B” and designated in the evidence as the “Simmons” corner. As before stated, the court found the “McShane” corner to be the true one and so decreed. Deputy state surveyor Simmons in his retracement survey in 1914 rejected the McShane corner as not being an original government quarter corner, and established what he claimed should be the original government quarter corner [517]*517at “B” or Siiumons corner. The statute above referred to (section 5564) provides that, when such survey shall have been made and properly approved, filed and recorded, it “shall be prima facie evidence of the correctness- thereof." Is the

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Henderson v. Department of Correctional Services
589 N.W.2d 520 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1999)
Pointer v. State
363 N.W.2d 164 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1985)
Opinion No. (1979)
Nebraska Attorney General Reports, 1979
Stadler v. Curtis Gas, Inc.
151 N.W.2d 915 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1967)
Offutt Housing Company v. County of Sarpy
70 N.W.2d 382 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1955)
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance v. Nordhues
261 N.W. 687 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1935)
McNeel v. State
234 N.W. 786 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1931)
Eidenmiller v. State
233 N.W. 447 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1930)
O'CONNOR v. Slaker
22 F.2d 147 (Eighth Circuit, 1927)
Hampton v. State Board of Education
105 So. 323 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1925)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
184 N.W. 147, 106 Neb. 512, 1921 Neb. LEXIS 246, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcshane-v-murray-neb-1921.