McQuarters v. Borgna

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: July 18, 2023
• Docket: 3:22-cv-03679
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ORLANDO MCQUARTERS, Case No. 22-cv-03679-TSH

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 9 v. DENYING IN PART: MOTIONS TO DISMISS 10 GIOVANNA BORGNA, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 48, 61 11 Defendants.

12 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Pending before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 15 Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), one filed by Defendant Alexander Molina (ECF No. 48), and one 16 filed by Defendants City of Oakland and James Yamashita (ECF No. 61). Plaintiff filed an 17 Opposition to each Motion (ECF Nos. 52, 65) and Defendants filed Replies (ECF Nos. 53, 66). 18 The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and VACATES the July 19 20, 2023 hearing. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN 20 PART AND DENIES IN PART the motions.1 21 II. BACKGROUND 22 A. Factual Background 23 Plaintiff Orlando McQuarters is a resident of Oakland. ECF No. 24 ¶ 1. Defendants 24 Borgna, Lamphiear, Yamashita, and Molina are Oakland Police Officers employed by the City of 25 Oakland (“the City”) at the time of the incident. Id. ¶¶ 3-6. 26 On December 26, 2019, at 3:30 p.m. McQuarters was sitting across the street from the 27 1 West Oakland Health Center. Id. ¶ 11. Officers Borgna and Lamphiear drove alongside 2 McQuarters, deciding if he fit the description of man who had a warrant for his arrest. Id. ¶ 12. 3 Plaintiff got on his bike, at which point Officer Lamphiear got out of the vehicle and began 4 chasing after McQuarters on foot. Id. ¶ 13. Officer Borgna pursued McQuarters in the police 5 vehicle. Id. 6 Officer Borgna caught up to McQuarters and intentionally steered her vehicle toward him 7 to close off his path, channeling McQuarters in the direction of parked cars. Id. ¶ 14. Borgna’s 8 vehicle collided with McQuarters, causing him to ride his bike into a parked car and for his body 9 to flip over the bicycle handlebars, severely injuring his back. Id. ¶ 15. 10 Officer Borgna searched McQuarters’ pocket and obtained McQuarters’ wallet containing 11 his California identification. Id. ¶ 18. Officer Lamphiear took the wallet and immediately 12 observed McQuarters did not possess the name, date of birth, height, weight, or address of the man 13 who was wanted for arrest. Id. The officers still placed the handcuffed McQuarters in the back of 14 Officer Borgna’s police vehicle. Id. 15 McQuarters remained handcuffed in the back of the police vehicle for approximately 20 16 minutes. Id. ¶ 19. While McQuarters was inside the vehicle, Defendants Officers Yamashita and 17 Molina observed McQuarters’ identification and that McQuarters did not possess the name, date 18 of birth, height, weight, or address of the man wanted for arrest. Id. ¶¶ 20, 21. 19 After approximately 20 minutes, Defendants realized they made a mistake, removed 20 McQuarters’ handcuffs, and released him. Id. ¶¶ 19, 23. McQuarters was then transported to 21 Highland Hospital for his injuries. Id. ¶ 23. 22 The City of Oakland Community Police Review Agency investigated McQuarters’ 23 allegations of excessive force, and a recommendation was made to the City to create a policy 24 outlining when police officers can use their police vehicle to “channel” or alter the path of subjects 25 on bicycles. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. A recommendation was also made to create a policy that designates 26 “channeling” as a use of force any time the bicyclist is injured or the bicycle makes contact with 27 any other object. Id. ¶ 26. 1 B. Procedural Background 2 On June 22, 2022 Plaintiff filed the instant action against Giovanna Borgna and Does 1-25. 3 ECF No. 1. On December 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File a First Amended 4 Complaint, which the Court granted on December 29, 2022. ECF Nos. 19, 24. Plaintiff’s First 5 Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges the following: 1) Violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment 6 Rights (against Defendant Borgna); 2) False Arrest (against Defendants Borgna, Lamphier, 7 Yamashita, and Molina); and 3) Monell2 Claim (against City of Oakland). ECF No. 24. 8 On January 12, 2023, Defendants City of Oakland and James Yamashita filed a Motion to 9 Dismiss the FAC. ECF No. 25. On January 20, 2023, the case was reassigned from the 10 undersigned to Judge Chhabria. ECF No. 30. Defendant Alexander Molina filed a Motion to 11 Dismiss the FAC on April 28, 2023. ECF No. 48. On May 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Opposition 12 to Molina’s Motion and an Amendment to the Opposition. ECF Nos. 51, 52. Molina filed a 13 Reply on May 11, 2023. ECF No. 53. On May 26, 2023, the case was reassigned again for all 14 further proceedings to May 26, 2023. ECF No. 56. The undersigned issued an Order to Show 15 Cause on June 13, 2023 for Plaintiff to show cause why his claims should not be dismissed after 16 Plaintiff failed to file an opposition to Defendants City of Oakland and Yamashita’s Motion to 17 Dismiss. ECF No. 58. On June 13, 2023, Defendants City of Oakland and Yamashita filed a new 18 Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 61. The Court then directed the Clerk of Court to terminate 19 Defendants’ January 12, 2023 Motion to Dismiss, as Defendants had re-filed their Motion to 20 Dismiss. ECF No. 62. On June 15, 2023 Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants Yamashita 21 and City of Oakland’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 65. Defendants Yamashita and City of 22 Oakland filed a Reply. ECF No. 66. 23 III. LEGAL STANDARD 24 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal 25 sufficiency of a claim. A claim may be dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 26 can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Cook v. 27 1 Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Rule 8 2 provides that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 3 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, a complaint must plead “enough facts 4 to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 5 570 (2007). Plausibility does not mean probability, but it requires “more than a sheer possibility 6 that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009). A complaint 7 must therefore provide a defendant with “fair notice” of the claims against it and the grounds for 8 relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotations and citation omitted). 9 In considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts factual allegations in the complaint as 10 true and construes the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Manzarek v. 11 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 12 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007). However, “the tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s allegations as 13 true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere 14 conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 15 If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the “court should grant leave to amend even if no 16 request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 17 be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 18 banc) (citations and quotations omitted). A court “may exercise its discretion to deny leave to 19 amend due to ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on part of the movant, repeated failure to 20 cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party . . ., 21 [and] futility of amendment.’” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892–93 (9th 22 Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). 23 IV. DISCUSSION 24 A. Officers Yamashita and Molina’s Motions to Dismiss3 25 1. Integral Participation 26 Both Yamashita and Molina argue that the FAC fails to plausibly state a claim against 27 1 them based on false arrest because there are no allegations that they integrally participated in the 2 unconstitutional false arrest of McQuarters. ECF Nos. 48 at 5; 61 at 5. The FAC alleges that both 3 Yamashita and Molina observed McQuarters’ identification, and that it contained a different name, 4 date of birth, height, weight, or address than that of the man wanted for arrest. Id.; ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 5 20-21. McQuarters argues that these allegations support a false arrest claim based on integral 6 participation because Yamashita and Molina knew or had reason to know there was no probable 7 cause to arrest or detain McQuarters, but they failed to advocate for his release. ECF Nos. 52 at 5; 8 65 at 5. 9 “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that 10 each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the 11 Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. “[A]n official whose ‘individual actions’ do ‘not 12 themselves rise to the level of a constitutional violation’ may be held liable under section 1983 13 only if the official is an ‘integral participant’ in the unlawful act.” Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 14 889 (9th Cir. 2022). “[A]n actor may be deemed . . . to be an integral participant in the 15 [constitutional] violation, only if (1) the defendant knew about and acquiesced in the 16 constitutionally defective conduct as part of a common plan with those whose conduct constituted 17 the violation, or (2) the defendant set in motion a series of acts by others which the defendant 18 knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Id. 19 at 891. 20 This Court finds that McQuarters has not alleged conduct by Molina or Yamashita to 21 constitute “integral participation” in his alleged unlawful arrest under either Peck prong. As to the 22 first category of participation, there are no allegations supporting a “common plan” to unlawfully 23 arrest McQuarters. Compare Boyd v. Benton Cty., 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[E]very 24 25 observed the Plaintiff’s I.D. and observed that the Plaintiff did not possess the same name, date of birth, height, weight or address of the man who was wanted for arrest.”), with id. ¶ 21 (“While the 26 Plaintiff was inside the police vehicle handcuffed, Defendant Molina observed the Plaintiff’s I.D. and observed that the Plaintiff did not possess the same name, date of birth, height, weight or 27 address of the man who was wanted for arrest.”). The parties’ respective arguments in favor of, 1 officer was aware of the decision to use the flash-bang, did not object to it, and participated in the 2 search operation knowing the flash-bang was to be deployed.”); see also Peck, 51 F.4th at 889 3 (noting this “category of liability is fairly narrow.”). Nor can it be plausibly said under the second 4 category of cases that either Defendant “set in motion a series of acts” causing others to falsely 5 arrest McQuarters. Compare Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 n.12 (9th Cir. 6 2007) (finding officer who helped handcuff the prone plaintiff integrally participated where 7 handcuffing was instrumental in gaining control of plaintiff and engaging in excessive force). 8 Without pleading facts comporting with one of the Peck prongs, Plaintiff cannot maintain a false 9 arrest cause of action against Yamashita or Molina based on a theory of integral participation. 10 Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff alleges a false arrest claim against Defendant 11 Yamashita based on an integral participation theory, the Court GRANTS Yamashita’s Motion to 12 Dismiss. To the extent Plaintiff alleges a false arrest claim against Defendant Molina based on an 13 integral participation theory, the Court GRANTS Molina’s Motion to Dismiss. 14 2. Duty to Intercede 15 As an alternative to integral participation, McQuarters argues that he states a cause of 16 action against Yamashita and Molina for false arrest because each had a duty to interfere with 17 other Defendants’ unconstitutional arrest of McQuarters once they observed Plaintiff’s 18 information did not match the man wanted for arrest. ECF Nos. 52 at 5-6; 65 at 5-6. 19 “[I]n general, one does not ‘subject’ someone to a deprivation of a constitutional right—or 20 ‘cause [someone] to be subjected’ to such a deprivation—simply by watching others violate the 21 Constitution. To be liable under section 1983, a defendant official ‘must be more than a “mere 22 bystander.”’” Peck, 51 F.4th at 889 (quoting Reynaga Hernandez v. Skinner, 969 F.3d 930, 941 23 (9th Cir. 2020) (brackets omitted)). However, “[i]n some situations, the Constitution may impose 24 on an officer a duty to intervene to prevent an ongoing constitutional violation.” Id. “[P]olice 25 officers have a duty to intercede when their fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a 26 suspect or other citizen.” U.S. v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 n.25 (9th Cir. 1994), aff’d in part, 27 rev’d in part, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). “If an officer fails to intercede, ‘the constitutional right violated 1 performed the offending action.” Tobias v. Arteaga, 996 F.3d 571, 584 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 2 Koon, 34 F.3d at 1447 n.25). “[O]fficers can be held liable for failing to intercede only if they had 3 an opportunity to intercede.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000), as 4 amended (Oct. 31, 2000). 5 Molina and Yamashita argue that the FAC does not plead a theory of liability based on a 6 duty to intercede and McQuarters may not do so for the first time in an opposition. ECF Nos. 53 7 at 4-5; 65 at 5-6. “Rule 8’s liberal notice pleading standard . . . requires that the allegations in the 8 complaint ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon 9 which it rests.’” Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 10 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)). “A party need not plead specific legal 11 theories in the complaint, so long as the other side receives notice as to what is at issue in the 12 case.” Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Associations v. Glaser, 945 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 13 2019) (quoting Am. Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of Oregon, 690 F.2d 781, 786 (9th 14 Cir. 1982)). 15 The Court finds that the FAC sufficiently puts Defendants Yamashita and Molina on notice 16 of their alleged conduct and of the cause of action against them. Defendants’ own arguments in 17 favor of dismissal evidence that they are aware of Plaintiff’s claims – that the Defendants saw 18 McQuarters’ identification, knew he was not the person wanted for arrest, but did not act to stop 19 his arrest. ECF Nos. 48 at 5, 61 at 5-6. Defendants argue that they were not sufficiently aware of 20 the basis for Plaintiff’s arrest. ECF Nos. 48 at 5, 61 at 5-6. While a defendant must have had 21 knowledge and an opportunity to intercede, the Court finds the FAC allegations, that Defendants 22 became aware of Plaintiff’s personal information while he remained in handcuffs in the back of 23 the police car, sufficient at this stage to defeat dismissal. See Adams v. Kraft, No. 10-CV-00602- 24 LHK, 2011 WL 846065, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011) (“Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as 25 true, Sipes, Stone, and Bockman all had the opportunity to intercede and stop Hauck and Kraft 26 from allegedly arresting Plaintiff without probable cause. Therefore, Plaintiff has stated a Fourth 27 Amendment unlawful arrest claim against Sipes, Stone, and Bockman.”); compare Ramirez v. 1 Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (finding no failure to intercede where the officer had no reason to 2 know the search warrant was defective until after the search). The Court does not consider it 3 dispositive to Plaintiff’s claims against Molina and Yamashita that they were not present when 4 McQuarters was initially placed in handcuffs and in the police vehicle. See Nicholson v. City of 5 Los Angeles, 935 F.3d 685, 691 (9th Cir. 2019) (“A reasonable officer would know that 6 participation in an ongoing seizure after any probable cause had dissipated violates the Fourth 7 Amendment.”). 8 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant Molina’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s cause 9 of action against him for false arrest based on failure to intercede. The Court DENIES Defendant 10 Yamashita’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s cause of action against him for false arrest based on 11 failure to intercede. 12 B. The City of Oakland’s Motion to Dismiss 13 The City of Oakland moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim based on failure to train. 14 ECF No. 61 at 6-7. The City argues that Plaintiff fails to allege that a policy, custom, or training 15 was the in-fact and proximate cause of the Officer Borgna’s driving decisions, or that the City 16 disregarded the known consequence of a failure to train officers to use police vehicles to 17 “channel” or alter the path of individuals on bicycles. ECF No. 61 at 6-7. McQuarters argues that 18 he has plausibly alleged a failure to train officers on use of patrol vehicles in this regard, that such 19 training is necessary because using a vehicle to alter the path of a bicyclist may endanger the 20 bicyclist or other citizens, and that the City acted with deliberate indifference in failing to train 21 officers or adopt policies to prevent the use of excessive force against McQuarters. ECF No. 65 at 22 6-7. 23 The Civil Rights Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides in relevant part:

24 Every person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of 25 any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 26 or other proper proceeding for redress. 27 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides 1 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A municipality may 2 face 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability if it “‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a 3 person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) 4 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92). However, the municipality may be held liable “only for 5 ‘[its] own illegal acts.’” Id. (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)). It 6 cannot be held vicariously liable for its employees’ actions. Id. (citations omitted). 7 To establish municipal liability, plaintiffs “must prove that ‘action pursuant to official 8 municipal policy’ caused their injury.” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). “The ‘official 9 policy’ requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of 10 the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the 11 municipality is actually responsible.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 479-80 (emphasis in original). 12 Official municipal policy includes “the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its 13 policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force 14 of law.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (citations omitted). Such policy or practice must be a “moving 15 force behind a violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 16 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). An official municipal policy may be either 17 formal or informal. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 131 (1988) (acknowledging that 18 a plaintiff could show that “a municipality’s actual policies were different from the ones that had 19 been announced.”). 20 In the Ninth Circuit, a municipality may be liable under section 1983 under three possible 21 theories. Rodriguez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 802 (9th Cir. 2018). The first is where 22 “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose 23 edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflict[ed] the injury.” Id. (quoting 24 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Second, “a local government can fail to train employees in a manner 25 that amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to a constitutional right, such that ‘the need for more or 26 different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of 27 constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been 1 378, 390 (1989)). Third, a municipality may be liable under section 1983 if “the individual who 2 committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority or such an 3 official ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Id. at 802- 4 03 (quoting Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 5 marks and citation omitted)). 6 McQuarters argues that he has stated a claim based on the City’s failure to train its officers 7 on how or when to use patrol vehicles to “channel” the path of subjects on bicycles. ECF No. 65 8 at 7. “A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim 9 turns on a failure to train.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. A plaintiff alleging a failure to train claim 10 under Monell must show: (1) she was deprived of a constitutional right, (2) the municipality had a 11 training policy that amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the persons 12 with whom its police officers are likely to come into contact, and (3) her constitutional injury 13 would have been avoided had the municipality properly trained those officers. See Young v. City 14 of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citations and internal quotations 15 omitted). “‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a 16 municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.’” Connick, 563 U.S. 17 at 61 (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)). 18 The Court finds that FAC fails to plausibly state a Monell claim based on a failure to train 19 amounting to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of individuals. “[T]o demonstrate 20 that the municipality was on notice of a constitutionally significant gap in its training, it is 21 ‘ordinarily necessary’ for a plaintiff to demonstrate a ‘pattern of similar constitutional violations 22 by untrained employees.’” Kirkpatrick v. Cty. of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 794 (9th Cir. 2016) 23 (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 61). The FAC alleges that the City fails to train and supervise its 24 officers regarding when, and under what circumstances, officers can use patrol vehicles to 25 “channel” or alter the path of subject on bicycles. ECF No. 24 ¶ 50. However, the FAC does not 26 include any allegations supporting that there is a pattern of police officers “channeling” 27 individuals’ bike paths in a manner constituting unconstitutional excessive force. Compare Heard 1 plaintiff sufficiently alleged municipality was on notice of constitutional deficiencies and there 2 was a pattern of unconstitutional violations based on prior court case in which municipality was 3 found liable for similar unconstitutional conduct); Hernandez v. Contra Costa Cty., No. 20-CV- 4 01183-AGT, 2020 WL 3078119, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2020) (holding that plaintiff’s 5 allegations that for over 10 years the county “has known that its deputies are assaulting 6 unconscious individuals after using carotid holds on them” were sufficient for a Monell claim at 7 the pleading stage even though plaintiff did not provide specific factual allegations about other 8 incidents and what exactly happened). While the FAC alleges that policy recommendations 9 regarding “channeling” were made after the incident involving Plaintiff, there is no suggestion of 10 prior incidents to infer the City was on notice of similar unconstitutional conduct. 11 Allegations of a pattern are not always required for a failure-to-train claim, as “‘in a 12 narrow range of circumstances’ a particular ‘showing of “obviousness” can substitute for the 13 pattern of violations ordinarily necessary to establish municipal culpability.’” Kirkpatrick, 843 14 F.3d at 794 (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 61). However, McQuarters does not plead facts 15 suggesting that the failure to train regarding “channeling” is “patently obvious,” particularly where 16 it is unclear that “channeling” is a method commonly employed by Oakland police officers or that 17 such a method will be required of officers. Compare City of Canton, Ohio, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10 18 (“[C]ity policymakers know to a moral certainty that their police officers will be required to arrest 19 fleeing felons. The city has armed its officers with firearms, in part to allow them to accomplish 20 this task. Thus, the need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly 21 force, . . . can be said to be ‘so obvious,’ that failure to do so could properly be characterized as 22 ‘deliberate indifference’ to constitutional rights.”) (citation omitted); Williams v. Cty. of Alameda, 23 26 F. Supp. 3d 925, 947-48 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding allegations that the County defendant had no 24 policy nor training in place for officers to know when and how to make a warrantless entry into a 25 residence, search a residence, seize, or arrest occupants, could plausibly be so obviously deficient 26 to establish municipal liability without a pattern of violations). It is not clear from the FAC that 27 channeling itself is a common practice such that “‘a violation of federal rights may be a highly 1 handle recurring situations.’” Sommers v. City of Santa Clara, 516 F. Supp. 3d 967, 988 (N.D. 2 Cal. 2021) (quoting Zuegel v. Mountain View Police Dep ’t, No. 17-CV-03249-BLF, 2020 WL 3 5076628, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2020)); see Sanchez v. City of Atherton, No. 22-CV-03106- 4 JSW, 2023 WL 137475, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2023) (“Plaintiff appears to suggest that the 5 protests were one such recurring situation that Defendants were not equipped to manage based on 6 their failed training. This argument fails because Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that the 7 Oakland protests were a recurring situation.”). As such, McQuarters has not plausibly alleged 8 deliberate indifference and, in turn, a Monell claim based on a failure to train. 9 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS dismissal of the City of Oakland’s Motion to Dismiss. 10 The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend. 11 Vv. CONCLUSION 12 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants Yamashita and Molina’s 13 Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's false arrest claim against them to the extent Plaintiff is alleging 14 integral participation. The Court DENIES Defendants Yamashita and Molina’s Motions to 3 15 Dismiss Plaintiff's false arrest claim against them to the extent Plaintiff is failure to intercede. 16 The Court GRANTS Defendant City of Oakland’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Monell claim 5 17 against the City of Oakland. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend all claims by August |) 17,2023. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 21 Dated: July 18, 2023 22 LU \ - THOMAS S. HIXSON 23 United States Magistrate Judge 24 25 26 27 28