MEMORANDUM OPINION
CARL B. JONES, Presiding Judge:
Appellant sued Appellee municipality alleging the city’s “agents, servants, and employees have engaged in intentional and willful conduct towards the Plaintiff with the intent of causing her emotional distress.” After taking Appellant’s deposition, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that its employees, whatever they had done, had not been acting within the scope of their employment. The trial court granted the motion and this appeal followed.
The undisputed “facts” recited in Appel-lee’s motion for summary judgment were (1) that Appellant’s claim was one for intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) that Appellant had admitted in her pre-trial discovery deposition that the city’s employees were not acting in good faith; and (3) that Appellant had testified that the city’s employees did not act negligently or mistakenly. The evidentiary materials submitted with Appel-lee’s summary judgment motion consisted only of excerpts from Appellant’s discovery deposition in which she agreed with suggestions by defense counsel that Appellee’s employees had not acted in good faith.
Appellant responded to the motion with several more excerpts from her deposition describing the affronts she said she had suffered, and an affidavit from the attorney who
first represented her. Those evidentiary materials reveal that Appellant was involved in a traffic accident, and was cited by a Del City police officer for driving on the wrong side of the road. The accident report was amended, said Appellant, to change the point of impact to the opposing lane of traffic. The Appellant contested the citation. When the municipal traffic court upheld the citation, a city police officer in attendance stood up and shouted, ‘Tea we won, we’re having a pizza party, and I am buying the pizza.” The traffic court judge admonished the officer that his behavior was inappropriate. Appellant later videotaped two Del City police officers eating pizza in front of her house. (Appellant attached a copy of the videotape to her response to the summary judgment motion, but it was not included in the appellate record.) Appellant also testified in her deposition about being identified by the police (she said wrongly) as complaining to the police that one of her neighbors harbored a barking dog, and about being listed (again, she asserted, wrongly) as a witness on a traffic citation issued to another person.
There is also some indication that Appellant was fearful of one or more city police officers, and that at least one of them had made threatening gestures or remarks to her.
The rule governing summary judgment practice places upon a moving party the initial burden to show that it is entitled to summary judgment.
Hargrave v. Canadian Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc.,
792 P.2d 50, 55 (Okla.1990);
Loper v. Austin
596 P.2d 544, 545 (Okla.1979). If, and only if, the movant satisfies this initial burden must the motion opponent demonstrate the existence of a substantial dispute as to some material fact, or some reasonable inference in its favor from the uneontroverted facts.
Spirgis v. Circle K Stores, Inc.,
743 P.2d 682, 684 (Okla.App.1987),
cert, denied, approved for publication.
It is often said that the facts shown by the summary judgment record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,
see, e.g., Hargrave v. Canadian Valley Elec. Co-op, Inc.,
792 P.2d 50, 55 (Okla.1990), but the “most favorable light” standard is merely another way of expressing the principle that summary judgment, whether for the movant or against, should be granted only when there is no reasonable factual inference or legal conclusion which favors a well-pleaded theory of the non-moving party.
See Buckner v. General Motors Corp.,
760 P.2d 803, 812 (Okla.1988);
Runyon v. Reid,
510 P.2d 943, 946 (Okla.1973).
In
Parker v. City of Midwest City,
850 P.2d 1065. (Okla.1993), the court described a conundrum facing anyone who sues a municipality in Oklahoma for malicious prosecution, which
must
put an end to any such claim pressed against a governmental entity covered by the Governmental Tort Claims Act. To sue any statutory governmental entity in tort, the plaintiff must prove he was harmed by an employee acting within the scope of his employment. To prove a claim for malicious prosecution, one would have to show that the tortfeasor acted maliciously and without probable cause. But, as the court noted, a governmental employee only acts within the scope of his employment when he acts in good faith. Therefore, a plaintiff could not possibly hold a governmental entity hable for malicious prosecution, because the only way to prevail on such a claim would be to present evidence which necessarily took the bad actors outside the scope of their employment.
Recently the court in
Nail v. City of Henryetta,
911 P.2d 914 (Okla.1996), distinguished
Parker
precisely because the plaintiff pleaded
alternative
theories of intentional tort (assault and battery) and negligence. The tortfeasor in that case had pushed the plaintiff down while leading him from a police ear into the station. The court held that the evidentiary record revealed a substantial controversy of fact about whether the officer had acted intentionally to hurt the plaintiff or had merely manifested his disgust in a negligent manner, and reversed summary adjudi
cation of the scope of employment issue ⅛ the plaintiffs favor.
See id.,
911 P.2d at 917-18.
By contrast, in the case presently before this Court, Appellant pleaded only a claim for the intentional tort of outrage. In response to the motion for summary judgment, she conceded that outrage was the sole theory of her claim. One commits the tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, by extreme and outrageous conduct which, through the actor’s intent or recHessness, causes severe emotional distress to another.
Breeden v. League Services Corp.,
575 P.2d 1374, 1376-77 (Okla.1978);
see Munley v. ISC Financial House, Inc.,
584 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Okla.1978). Extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct which is “so outrageous in character, and extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as utterly atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, Comment
d
(1965), quoted in
Breeden,
575 P.2d at 1376. The trial court, in the first instance, must test the evidence as a matter of law and decide whether both outrageous conduct and severe emotional distress may be proved before submitting those issues to the trier of fact for final determination.
Eddy v. Brown,
715 P.2d 74, 76-77 (Okla.1986);
Breeden,
575 P.2d at 1377;
see
Restatement § 46, Comments
h
and
j.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
CARL B. JONES, Presiding Judge:
Appellant sued Appellee municipality alleging the city’s “agents, servants, and employees have engaged in intentional and willful conduct towards the Plaintiff with the intent of causing her emotional distress.” After taking Appellant’s deposition, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that its employees, whatever they had done, had not been acting within the scope of their employment. The trial court granted the motion and this appeal followed.
The undisputed “facts” recited in Appel-lee’s motion for summary judgment were (1) that Appellant’s claim was one for intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) that Appellant had admitted in her pre-trial discovery deposition that the city’s employees were not acting in good faith; and (3) that Appellant had testified that the city’s employees did not act negligently or mistakenly. The evidentiary materials submitted with Appel-lee’s summary judgment motion consisted only of excerpts from Appellant’s discovery deposition in which she agreed with suggestions by defense counsel that Appellee’s employees had not acted in good faith.
Appellant responded to the motion with several more excerpts from her deposition describing the affronts she said she had suffered, and an affidavit from the attorney who
first represented her. Those evidentiary materials reveal that Appellant was involved in a traffic accident, and was cited by a Del City police officer for driving on the wrong side of the road. The accident report was amended, said Appellant, to change the point of impact to the opposing lane of traffic. The Appellant contested the citation. When the municipal traffic court upheld the citation, a city police officer in attendance stood up and shouted, ‘Tea we won, we’re having a pizza party, and I am buying the pizza.” The traffic court judge admonished the officer that his behavior was inappropriate. Appellant later videotaped two Del City police officers eating pizza in front of her house. (Appellant attached a copy of the videotape to her response to the summary judgment motion, but it was not included in the appellate record.) Appellant also testified in her deposition about being identified by the police (she said wrongly) as complaining to the police that one of her neighbors harbored a barking dog, and about being listed (again, she asserted, wrongly) as a witness on a traffic citation issued to another person.
There is also some indication that Appellant was fearful of one or more city police officers, and that at least one of them had made threatening gestures or remarks to her.
The rule governing summary judgment practice places upon a moving party the initial burden to show that it is entitled to summary judgment.
Hargrave v. Canadian Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc.,
792 P.2d 50, 55 (Okla.1990);
Loper v. Austin
596 P.2d 544, 545 (Okla.1979). If, and only if, the movant satisfies this initial burden must the motion opponent demonstrate the existence of a substantial dispute as to some material fact, or some reasonable inference in its favor from the uneontroverted facts.
Spirgis v. Circle K Stores, Inc.,
743 P.2d 682, 684 (Okla.App.1987),
cert, denied, approved for publication.
It is often said that the facts shown by the summary judgment record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,
see, e.g., Hargrave v. Canadian Valley Elec. Co-op, Inc.,
792 P.2d 50, 55 (Okla.1990), but the “most favorable light” standard is merely another way of expressing the principle that summary judgment, whether for the movant or against, should be granted only when there is no reasonable factual inference or legal conclusion which favors a well-pleaded theory of the non-moving party.
See Buckner v. General Motors Corp.,
760 P.2d 803, 812 (Okla.1988);
Runyon v. Reid,
510 P.2d 943, 946 (Okla.1973).
In
Parker v. City of Midwest City,
850 P.2d 1065. (Okla.1993), the court described a conundrum facing anyone who sues a municipality in Oklahoma for malicious prosecution, which
must
put an end to any such claim pressed against a governmental entity covered by the Governmental Tort Claims Act. To sue any statutory governmental entity in tort, the plaintiff must prove he was harmed by an employee acting within the scope of his employment. To prove a claim for malicious prosecution, one would have to show that the tortfeasor acted maliciously and without probable cause. But, as the court noted, a governmental employee only acts within the scope of his employment when he acts in good faith. Therefore, a plaintiff could not possibly hold a governmental entity hable for malicious prosecution, because the only way to prevail on such a claim would be to present evidence which necessarily took the bad actors outside the scope of their employment.
Recently the court in
Nail v. City of Henryetta,
911 P.2d 914 (Okla.1996), distinguished
Parker
precisely because the plaintiff pleaded
alternative
theories of intentional tort (assault and battery) and negligence. The tortfeasor in that case had pushed the plaintiff down while leading him from a police ear into the station. The court held that the evidentiary record revealed a substantial controversy of fact about whether the officer had acted intentionally to hurt the plaintiff or had merely manifested his disgust in a negligent manner, and reversed summary adjudi
cation of the scope of employment issue ⅛ the plaintiffs favor.
See id.,
911 P.2d at 917-18.
By contrast, in the case presently before this Court, Appellant pleaded only a claim for the intentional tort of outrage. In response to the motion for summary judgment, she conceded that outrage was the sole theory of her claim. One commits the tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, by extreme and outrageous conduct which, through the actor’s intent or recHessness, causes severe emotional distress to another.
Breeden v. League Services Corp.,
575 P.2d 1374, 1376-77 (Okla.1978);
see Munley v. ISC Financial House, Inc.,
584 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Okla.1978). Extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct which is “so outrageous in character, and extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as utterly atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, Comment
d
(1965), quoted in
Breeden,
575 P.2d at 1376. The trial court, in the first instance, must test the evidence as a matter of law and decide whether both outrageous conduct and severe emotional distress may be proved before submitting those issues to the trier of fact for final determination.
Eddy v. Brown,
715 P.2d 74, 76-77 (Okla.1986);
Breeden,
575 P.2d at 1377;
see
Restatement § 46, Comments
h
and
j.
It appears that the Appellant here is confronted with the same conundrum as the plaintiff in
Parker
faced. There is no way to prove a claim for outrage if the defendant has acted in good faith.
Accord, Hawkins v. Greene,
311 S.C. 88, 427 S.E.2d 692, 693 (Ct.App.1993) (when undisputed evidence shows the defendant acted in good faith, his conduct cannot be characterized as outrageous). But, if, as Appellant has pleaded and asserted in her deposition, the officers of the Del City Police Department acted intentionally and willfully to cause her emotional distress, and never acted in good faith, then we have before us neither a legal nor an eviden-tiary basis for holding that the trial court ■ erred by entering summary judgment for. Appellee.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err by granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Del City. Its judgment is therefore affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
GARRETT and JOPLIN, JJ., concur.