McLeod v. Alabama Therapeutic Education Facility(INMATE 2)
This text of McLeod v. Alabama Therapeutic Education Facility(INMATE 2) (McLeod v. Alabama Therapeutic Education Facility(INMATE 2)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION
ALEXANDER J. McLEOD, ) AIS 267645, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) CASE NO. 1:25-CV-62-WKW ) [WO] ALABAMA THERAPEUTIC ) EDUCATION FACILITY ) WARDEN OR DIRECTOR, ) ) Respondents. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case is before the court on pro se Petitioner Alexander McLeod’s amended petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons below, Mr. McLeod’s petition will be dismissed for failure to exhaust his claims in state court. Additionally, a certificate of appealability will not be issued. I. BACKGROUND Mr. McLeod challenges the sentences he received for convictions of first- degree assault, leaving the scene of an accident with injury or death, and reckless murder in the Circuit Court of Dale County. (Doc. # 8 at 1.) He asserts he was sentenced to a 10-year split and a 20-year sentence for the same charge and that the 20-year sentence is over the maximum punishment prescribed by law. (Id. at 8.) Mr. McLeod pleaded guilty to the above three charges on August 22, 2022, and was sentenced that same day.1 (Id. at 1–2.) In his petition, Mr. McLeod checked
the box indicating that he appealed his convictions, but he describes the appeal as filing a Rule 32 petition in the trial court, which was denied April 1, 2024, and filing a motion for reconsideration in the trial court, which was either filed or denied in
April or May of 2024.2 (Id. at 2, 4.) There is no indication that Mr. McLeod filed a direct appeal with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals or that he appealed the denial of his Rule 32 petition. In Alabama, a petitioner has 42 days from pronouncement of his sentence to
file a notice of a direct appeal. Ala. R. App. P. 4(b)(1). In the case of a conviction appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, a petitioner has one year after the issuance of a certificate of judgment by the Court of Criminal Appeals to file a Rule
32 petition. Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c). If a conviction is not appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, a petitioner has one year from the deadline for filing a direct appeal to file a Rule 32 petition. Id. A petitioner has 42 days to appeal the denial of a Rule 32 petition. Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.10(a); Ala. R. App. P. 4(b)(1). A petitioner
1 In his petition, Mr. McLeod states he was convicted on August 22, 2022, and sentenced on December 19, 2022. However, independent verification through Alacourt.com confirms that Mr. McLeod pleaded guilty and was sentenced on August 22, 2022. 2 Although not referenced in his petition, the state court records reflect that Mr. McLeod also filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence with the trial court on October 7, 2024, and that it was denied the same day. may also file a successive petition under Rule 32.1(f) to seek an out-of-time appeal from the dismissal or denial of a Rule 32 petition within six months from the date he
discovers the dismissal or denial if the failure to appeal was not the petitioner’s fault. See Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b) and 32.2(c). Mr. McLeod’s 42-day deadline to file an appeal after sentencing expired on
October 3, 2022. He did not file a direct appeal, so his one-year-after deadline expired on October 3, 2023. Mr. McLeod filed a timely Rule 32 petition in each of his three criminal cases on July 23, 2023. The trial court denied the petitions on April 1, 2024, and he had 42 days to appeal the denials. Additionally, he had six months
after learning of those denials to file a successive Rule 32.1(f) petition seeking an out-of-time appeal. There is no indication in the record that Mr. McLeod filed an appeal or a successive Rule 32.1(f) petition seeking an out-of-time appeal. Instead,
the record shows he filed a motion for reconsideration with the trial court on May 6, 2024, which was denied the same day, and a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct illegal sentence with the trial court on October 7, 2024, which was also denied the same day, see supra note 2. He then filed the instant action on October 21, 2024.
II. DISCUSSION A petitioner must exhaust state court remedies before seeking relief through a federal habeas corpus petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). This ensures the State has an
“‘opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)); see also Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989).
To meet the exhaustion requirement, the federal habeas petitioner must have “‘fairly presented’ to the state courts the ‘substance’ of his federal habeas claim.” Lucas v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs., 682 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)). In other words, he “must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). This one complete round can be satisfied either
through a direct appeal to the Alabama appellate courts or through a post-conviction petition for collateral review under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1156 (11th Cir. 2010); Pruitt v. Jones,
348 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 2003). In Alabama, a complete round of the established appellate review process includes an appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, an application for rehearing to that court, and a petition for discretionary review to the Alabama Supreme Court. See Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d
1135, 1140–41 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Dill v. Holt, 371 F.3d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A complete round of the state appellate process includes discretionary appellate review ‘when that review is part of the ordinary appellate review procedure
in the State.’”); Wrenn v. Toney, No. 21-13337-E, 2022 WL 966398, at *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2022) (finding claims procedurally barred because petitioner failed to exhaust claims, as he did not appeal denial of Rule 32 petition); see also Ala. R.
Crim. P. 32.1(f), 32.2(c); Ala. R. App. P. 39 & 40. Furthermore, “[f]ederal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254
Rule 4.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). The Eleventh Circuit has affirmed such sua sponte dismissals without prejudice for unexhausted habeas petitions. See, e.g., Esslinger v. Davis, 44 F. 3d 1515, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995). Based on a review of Mr. McLeod’s § 2254 petition and the state court
records, it is clear that he failed to exhaust his state court remedies regarding the claims in his petition. Mr.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
McLeod v. Alabama Therapeutic Education Facility(INMATE 2), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcleod-v-alabama-therapeutic-education-facilityinmate-2-almd-2025.