McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc.

749 F. Supp. 582, 1989 WL 225605
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedJune 7, 1989
DocketCiv. A. 83-1340
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 749 F. Supp. 582 (McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 582, 1989 WL 225605 (D.N.J. 1989).

Opinion

AMENDED OPINION

SAROKIN, District Judge.

This is an action brought pursuant to Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982). Section 510 provides, in pertinent part:

It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, ... or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan....

Plaintiffs claim that defendants, through the implementation of a nation-wide scheme to avoid pension liabilities, prevented them from obtaining benefits under the pension plan in violation of § 510.

Introduction

The defendants 1 in this case found themselves in a declining market because of substantial changes in the can making industry. They further recognized that they faced substantial layoffs and huge potential unfunded pension liabilities as a result. They concluded that continued employment would permit large numbers of employees to qualify for those benefits unless action was taken to prevent them from doing so.

Accordingly, defendants developed a sophisticated computer program which enabled them to identify those employees who had not yet qualified and who therefore, should be and were targeted for dismissal. The same computer system kept track of the employees so laid off in order to prevent the resurrection of their rights through inadvertent recall.

The plan was shrouded in secrecy and executed company-wide at the specific direction of the highest levels of corporate management. It was intended to save hundreds of millions of dollars in unfunded pension liabilities. The evidence of the plan, its secrecy, and its execution comes from the files of the defendants themselves. The documents are more than a smoking gun; they are a fusillade.

*584 The evidence in support of plaintiffs’ claims has been known to and possessed by the defendants since the inception of this case. Nonetheless, defendants have denied the existence of the plan and its implementation. For a corporation of this magnitude to engage in a complex, secret and deliberate scheme to deny its workers bargained-for pension benefits raises questions of corporate morality, ethics and decency which far transcend the factual and legal issues posed by this matter.

The issues to be decided in this portion of the case arise from Continental’s claim “that the illicit objective of the Liability Avoidance Program was not a determinative factor or that, if it arguably was, other factors clearly predominated and would have resulted in the same layoffs in any event”. (Defendant's Trial Brief, p. 4). The Gavalik case, which this court has utilized to establish the guidelines for this matter, provides as follows:

Continental must then be afforded the opportunity to present evidence that as to any particular individual class member’s request for relief, that individual is not so entitled because in the absence of Continental’s illegal plan that individual would have been without work at the same time in any event. We do not foreclose an opportunity for Continental to submit its proofs collectively as to all of the plaintiffs. That is, if the proof as to each individual is the same, there is no requirement that Continental repeat the same evidence for each claimant. Continental must establish either collectively or individually that class members would have suffered the same loss of work even in the absence of the illegal plan. Continental’s burden on this issue will be one of persuasion.

Gavalik v. Continental Can. Co., 812 F.2d 834, 866 (3d Cir.1987).

In view of the foregoing, this court concluded that it would be appropriate in the interests of efficiency and economy to determine the issues outlined above at a test trial involving one of the plants, since such determinations would dispose of other issues or render them moot. In addressing the factual matters presented, the court at the outset wishes to outline its view of the respective burdens upon the parties. Plaintiffs, of course, have the ultimate burden of proving that Continental acted with the specific intent to interfere with the attainment of Magic Number pension benefits in connection with layoff decisions. Plaintiffs must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the avoidance of such pension benefits was a determinative factor in the layoffs by Continental. Defendants concede that they have the burden of both production and persuasion as to the alleged “same loss defense”. If Continental were to prove that plaintiffs would have sustained the same loss in any event, plaintiffs would be unable to succeed, and thus the focus on this issue initially. The court proceeds on the basis that the respective burdens are subject to a preponderance of the evidence standard.

The court’s factual findings are as follows:

Industry Background

Before the 1960’s, almost all cans were three-piece tin-plated steel. A typical three-piece line for the making of such cans cost between $750,000 to $1,000,000. Additional equipment for end-making and lithography substantially increased that cost. Two-piece lines were much more expensive but required no separate lithography equipment, and because they needed only one end, certain expenses involved in three-piece equipment could be avoided. It was essential, because of the large capital investment, to maintain high levels of line utilization. It is undisputed that two-piece lines, while more expensive initially, were less labor intensive in actual operation.

In the 1960’s, development of two-piece aluminum cans occurred, and the process permitted standard sized can bodies and bottoms to be formed at high speeds. It also eliminated the lithography, coating and coil departments required for three-piece can making. Plants which had been *585 designed for three-piece production did not easily convert to two-piece aluminum can equipment, although such conversion was feasible depending upon specific conditions.

There were three primary markets for can makers: food, general packaging and beverage. In the 1950’s food cans were the largest segment of the domestic can business, but the beverage demand grew significantly because of beer and soft drinks. In the 1960’s, the beverage market was the largest of the three and continued to be so through the relevant time period of this litigation.

One of the reasons that the food can business declined was because food can-ners began to self-manufacture their own cans. The Campbell’s Soup Company, which was one of the nation’s largest users of food cans, became one of the market’s largest self-manufacturing companies.

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Bluebook (online)
749 F. Supp. 582, 1989 WL 225605, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mclendon-v-continental-group-inc-njd-1989.