McLean v. Morton

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 2, 2021
Docket1:20-cv-09925
StatusUnknown

This text of McLean v. Morton (McLean v. Morton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McLean v. Morton, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MARQUIN McLEAN, Plaintiff, -against- 20-CV-9925(LLS) ROBERT MORTON JR., SUPERINTENDENT, ORDERTO AMEND DOWNSTATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; JOHN DOE, M.D., Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in Bare Hill Correctional Facility,brings this pro se action invoking the Court’s federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331. He asserts that Defendants violated his rights when he was confined in Downstate Correctional Facility.By order datedMarch 1, 2021,the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceedIFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (2d Cir. 2007).The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude”in pro se cases,id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim,pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570(2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing

the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S.at 555.After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible –not merely possible –that the pleader is entitled to relief.Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action against Superintendent Robert Morton, Jr, of Downstate Correctional Facility, and “John Doe M.D.” He invokes federal-question jurisdiction and asserts violations of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The complaint contains the following allegations: in 2013, 2015, and 2020, upon his reception into the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Plaintiff was required to undergo a health assessment and physical examination at Downstate Correctional Facility. On each occasion, a correction officer directed Plaintiff to a “cubicle type examination room” with a “curtain door,” and instructed him to remove his

clothing down to his boxer shorts and socks. (ECF No. 1, at 5.) Although the curtains remained open and people were able to see into the examination room, Plaintiff was not provided a gown or drape. When the doctor arrived and questioned Plaintiff on his medical history and records, their conversationcould be heard in the adjoining room and by people passing by. After reviewing Plaintiff’s medical history, the doctor examined Plaintiff’s eyes, ears, and throat, and listened to hisheart, lungs, and chest. The doctor also had Plaintiff lie down on a tableand examined his abdomen andplaced his hands under his shorts to check for a hernia. Once the examination was complete, Plaintiff was directed to get dressed. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his right to privacy and subjected him to cruel

andunusual punishment during his medical assessment and physical examination. He claims that at no time was he ever informed of his right to refuse any part of or the full examination. He seeks monetary damages. DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 andPersonal Involvement The Court construes the complaint as asserting constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983. To state a §1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege both that:(1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). In a §1983action, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants’direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’ t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013)(“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under §1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).A defendant may not be held

liable under §1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff’s rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under §1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official.” Tangreti v. Bachmann,983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020).

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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal
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Matson v. BD. OF EDUC., CITY SCHOOL DIST. OF NY
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Abbas v. Dixon
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Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Reynolds v. Goord
103 F. Supp. 2d 316 (S.D. New York, 2000)
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Tangreti v. Bachmann
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Bluebook (online)
McLean v. Morton, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mclean-v-morton-nysd-2021.