McLean v. Clark

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 31, 2020
Docket1:19-cv-10967
StatusUnknown

This text of McLean v. Clark (McLean v. Clark) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McLean v. Clark, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK BAHSID McLEAN, Plaintiff, -against- 19-CV-10967 (CM) DARCEL CLARK, District Attorney; ORDER TO AMEND BRONX SUPREME COURTHOUSE; RIKERS ISLAND, Detention Center, Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Attica Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights. By order dated January 7, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing

the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges that, on May 20, 2015, he was arraigned in Bronx Supreme Court for possessing and knowingly making dangerous contraband in prison – charges that Plaintiff claims were ultimately dismissed. Plaintiff alleges that the charges were dismissed “only . . . due to the fact that the courts did not pay attention to all the facts of the charges being brought against” him. (ECF No. 1, at 4.) Plaintiff sues Bronx District Attorney Darcel Clark, the Bronx Supreme Courthouse, and Rikers Island Detention Facility. He seeks money damages. DISCUSSION

A. Claims against Darcel Clark Prosecutors are immune from civil suits for damages for acts committed within the scope of their official duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature but, rather, are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (holding that absolute immunity is analyzed under “functional approach” that “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it”). In addition, prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for acts that may be administrative obligations but are “directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009). Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Bronx District Attorney Darcel Clark are based on actions

within the scope of Defendant’s official duties and associated with the conduct of a trial. The Court therefore dismisses these claims because they seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from suit and as frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(i), (iii); see Collazo v. Pagano, 656 F. 3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that claim against prosecutor is frivolous if it arises from conduct that is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process”). B. Claims against the Bronx Supreme Court “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity . . ..” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to

state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. New York State Courts are arms of the state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 368. New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the Bronx Supreme Court as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and as frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(i), (iii); Montero v.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Imbler v. Pachtman
424 U.S. 409 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons
509 U.S. 259 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein
555 U.S. 335 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)
Collazo v. Pagano
656 F.3d 131 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Simon v. City of New York
727 F.3d 167 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Gollomp v. Spitzer
568 F.3d 355 (Second Circuit, 2009)

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Bluebook (online)
McLean v. Clark, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mclean-v-clark-nysd-2020.