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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 8 ARTHUR McKINNON, 9 Plaintiff, Case No. C21-5097-BHS-MLP 10 v. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT DOC’S MOTION TO STAY 11 WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., 12 Defendants. 13
14 Plaintiff Arthur McKinnon is a state prisoner who is currently confined at the Stafford 15 Creek Corrections Center (“SCCC”) in Aberdeen, Washington. Plaintiff initiated this civil rights 16 action in Thurston County Superior Court in December 2020 alleging violations of state and 17 federal law relating to restrictions imposed by the Washington Department of Corrections and its 18 employees on Plaintiff’s visitation and communications with his wife and minor child. (See Dkt. 19 # 1-3.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights 20 when they denied his wife’s application seeking permission for him to visit with his son, when 21 they improperly rejected and/or confiscated photos and correspondence relating to his wife and 22 son, and when they retaliated against him and his family for challenging the restrictions 23 regarding visitation and communications. (Id. at 10-12.) Plaintiff also alleges state law claims for 1 discrimination and for negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 10-13.) Plaintiff identifies 2 as Defendants in his complaint the Washington Department of Corrections (“DOC”), various 3 SCCC and DOC employees, and a contract mental health counselor.1 Plaintiff requests 4 declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages. (Id. at 13-14.)
5 Defendant DOC removed the case to this Court in February 2021. (Dkt. # 1.) Defendant 6 asserts in its notice of removal that this Court has original jurisdiction of this civil action under 7 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and that removal was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 because Plaintiff 8 alleges in his complaint violations of his federal constitutional rights and specifically references 9 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id.) 10 On March 11, 2021, Defendant DOC filed a motion to stay this proceeding, and all 11 discovery, pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine. (Dkt. # 7.) Defendant DOC argues 12 therein that a stay pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine is appropriate here because 13 Plaintiff filed a personal restraint petition in the Washington appellate courts in August 2020 14 asserting claims similar to those asserted in this action and the petition remains pending at this
15 time. (See id. at 4-6.) Defendant further argues that even if the Court determines Younger does 16 not apply, it should still stay this proceeding as a matter of discretion. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff has not 17 opposed Defendant DOC’s motion to stay. 18 The general rule concerning federal jurisdiction is that federal courts are bound to 19 adjudicate cases within their jurisdiction. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New 20 Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358-59 (1989) (“NOPSI”) (abrogated in part on other grounds by 21 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711 (1996)). The abstention doctrines are 22
23 1 At this point, only the DOC has been served. (Dkt. # 1 at 2.) Plaintiff has filed a motion requesting that the Court serve the remaining Defendants. (Dkt. # 6.) The Court addresses that motion in a separate Order. 1 “extraordinary and narrow exception[s]” to the rule that federal courts must exercise the 2 jurisdiction that has been conferred. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 3 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “[a]bstention 4 is not in order simply because a pending state court proceeding involves the same subject
5 matter.” Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013) (citing NOPSI, 491 U.S. 6 at 373). 7 The Younger abstention doctrine “forbid[s] federal courts [from] stay[ing] or enjoin[ing] 8 pending state court proceedings.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). “In civil cases . . . 9 Younger abstention is appropriate only when the state proceedings: (1) are ongoing, (2) are 10 quasi-criminal enforcement actions or involve a state’s interest in enforcing orders and 11 judgments of its courts, (3) implicate an important state interest, and (4) allow litigants to raise 12 federal challenges.” ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 13 759 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Sprint, 571 U.S. at 81-82; Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 977- 14 78 (9th Cir. 2004)). “If these ‘threshold elements’ are met, we then consider whether the federal
15 action would have the practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings and whether an 16 exception to Younger applies.” Id. (quoting Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 978, 983-84). The abstention 17 doctrine is properly applied only when each of the elements of the doctrine’s requirements is 18 satisfied. AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007). 19 There is no question that Plaintiff’s personal restraint petition was filed in state court 20 prior to the filing of the instant action and that the petition remains pending at this time. (See 21 Dkt. # 8, Ex. 1.) Thus, the first Younger requirement is satisfied. There is also no question that 22 Plaintiff was allowed to and did, in fact, raise federal challenges in his personal restraint petition. 23 (See id.) The fourth Younger requirement is therefore satisfied as well. However, the same 1 cannot be said of the second and third Younger requirements. Plaintiff’s ongoing personal 2 restraint proceeding does not constitute a “quasi-criminal enforcement action” nor does it 3 “involve a state’s interest in enforcing orders and judgments of its courts.” Rather, Plaintiff’s 4 personal restraint proceeding involves a challenge to the conditions of his current confinement
5 which falls outside the categories of cases to which Younger abstention applies. Thus, the second 6 Younger requirement is not satisfied. 7 The third requirement – that the state proceeding implicate an important state interest – is 8 likewise not satisfied here. The third requirement is satisfied when “the State’s interests in the 9 [ongoing] proceeding are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard 10 the comity between the States and the National Government.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 11 U.S. 1, 11 (1987). “The importance of the [state’s] interest is measured considering its 12 significance broadly, rather than by focusing on the state’s interest in the resolution of an 13 individual case.” AmerisourceBergen, 495 F.3d at 1150 (citing Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 14 332 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2003); Champion Int’l Corp. v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th
15 Cir. 1984) (“[A] challenge[ ] [to] only one . . .
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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 8 ARTHUR McKINNON, 9 Plaintiff, Case No. C21-5097-BHS-MLP 10 v. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT DOC’S MOTION TO STAY 11 WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., 12 Defendants. 13
14 Plaintiff Arthur McKinnon is a state prisoner who is currently confined at the Stafford 15 Creek Corrections Center (“SCCC”) in Aberdeen, Washington. Plaintiff initiated this civil rights 16 action in Thurston County Superior Court in December 2020 alleging violations of state and 17 federal law relating to restrictions imposed by the Washington Department of Corrections and its 18 employees on Plaintiff’s visitation and communications with his wife and minor child. (See Dkt. 19 # 1-3.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights 20 when they denied his wife’s application seeking permission for him to visit with his son, when 21 they improperly rejected and/or confiscated photos and correspondence relating to his wife and 22 son, and when they retaliated against him and his family for challenging the restrictions 23 regarding visitation and communications. (Id. at 10-12.) Plaintiff also alleges state law claims for 1 discrimination and for negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 10-13.) Plaintiff identifies 2 as Defendants in his complaint the Washington Department of Corrections (“DOC”), various 3 SCCC and DOC employees, and a contract mental health counselor.1 Plaintiff requests 4 declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages. (Id. at 13-14.)
5 Defendant DOC removed the case to this Court in February 2021. (Dkt. # 1.) Defendant 6 asserts in its notice of removal that this Court has original jurisdiction of this civil action under 7 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and that removal was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 because Plaintiff 8 alleges in his complaint violations of his federal constitutional rights and specifically references 9 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id.) 10 On March 11, 2021, Defendant DOC filed a motion to stay this proceeding, and all 11 discovery, pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine. (Dkt. # 7.) Defendant DOC argues 12 therein that a stay pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine is appropriate here because 13 Plaintiff filed a personal restraint petition in the Washington appellate courts in August 2020 14 asserting claims similar to those asserted in this action and the petition remains pending at this
15 time. (See id. at 4-6.) Defendant further argues that even if the Court determines Younger does 16 not apply, it should still stay this proceeding as a matter of discretion. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff has not 17 opposed Defendant DOC’s motion to stay. 18 The general rule concerning federal jurisdiction is that federal courts are bound to 19 adjudicate cases within their jurisdiction. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New 20 Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358-59 (1989) (“NOPSI”) (abrogated in part on other grounds by 21 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711 (1996)). The abstention doctrines are 22
23 1 At this point, only the DOC has been served. (Dkt. # 1 at 2.) Plaintiff has filed a motion requesting that the Court serve the remaining Defendants. (Dkt. # 6.) The Court addresses that motion in a separate Order. 1 “extraordinary and narrow exception[s]” to the rule that federal courts must exercise the 2 jurisdiction that has been conferred. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 3 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “[a]bstention 4 is not in order simply because a pending state court proceeding involves the same subject
5 matter.” Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013) (citing NOPSI, 491 U.S. 6 at 373). 7 The Younger abstention doctrine “forbid[s] federal courts [from] stay[ing] or enjoin[ing] 8 pending state court proceedings.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). “In civil cases . . . 9 Younger abstention is appropriate only when the state proceedings: (1) are ongoing, (2) are 10 quasi-criminal enforcement actions or involve a state’s interest in enforcing orders and 11 judgments of its courts, (3) implicate an important state interest, and (4) allow litigants to raise 12 federal challenges.” ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 13 759 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Sprint, 571 U.S. at 81-82; Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 977- 14 78 (9th Cir. 2004)). “If these ‘threshold elements’ are met, we then consider whether the federal
15 action would have the practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings and whether an 16 exception to Younger applies.” Id. (quoting Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 978, 983-84). The abstention 17 doctrine is properly applied only when each of the elements of the doctrine’s requirements is 18 satisfied. AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007). 19 There is no question that Plaintiff’s personal restraint petition was filed in state court 20 prior to the filing of the instant action and that the petition remains pending at this time. (See 21 Dkt. # 8, Ex. 1.) Thus, the first Younger requirement is satisfied. There is also no question that 22 Plaintiff was allowed to and did, in fact, raise federal challenges in his personal restraint petition. 23 (See id.) The fourth Younger requirement is therefore satisfied as well. However, the same 1 cannot be said of the second and third Younger requirements. Plaintiff’s ongoing personal 2 restraint proceeding does not constitute a “quasi-criminal enforcement action” nor does it 3 “involve a state’s interest in enforcing orders and judgments of its courts.” Rather, Plaintiff’s 4 personal restraint proceeding involves a challenge to the conditions of his current confinement
5 which falls outside the categories of cases to which Younger abstention applies. Thus, the second 6 Younger requirement is not satisfied. 7 The third requirement – that the state proceeding implicate an important state interest – is 8 likewise not satisfied here. The third requirement is satisfied when “the State’s interests in the 9 [ongoing] proceeding are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard 10 the comity between the States and the National Government.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 11 U.S. 1, 11 (1987). “The importance of the [state’s] interest is measured considering its 12 significance broadly, rather than by focusing on the state’s interest in the resolution of an 13 individual case.” AmerisourceBergen, 495 F.3d at 1150 (citing Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 14 332 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2003); Champion Int’l Corp. v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th
15 Cir. 1984) (“[A] challenge[ ] [to] only one . . . order, not the whole procedure” is “not a 16 substantial enough interference with [a state’s] administrative and judicial processes to justify 17 abstention.”)). The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that “[t]he goal of Younger abstention is to 18 avoid federal court interference with uniquely state interests such as preservation of these states’ 19 peculiar statutes, schemes and procedures.” Id. at 1150 (emphasis in original). 20 Plaintiff asserts in his personal restraint petition that the DOC arbitrarily deprived him of 21 visitation with his biological son based on a provision in his criminal judgment and sentence 22 which does not actually exist. (See Dkt. # 8, Ex. 1.) Defendant, in its motion to stay, argues that 23 the state has an interest “in not having this Court make rulings that could call into question the 1 actions of a State Court that is deciding the same issues of law.” (Dkt. # 7 at 5.) Defendant also 2 argues that the state “has a strong interest in protecting the interests of children, especially in 3 cases where a convicted child rapist would like contact with a child.” (Id.) Accepting these 4 assertions as true, it remains the case that Plaintiff challenges in his personal restraint
5 proceedings a single order of the DOC relating to his visitation rights, not any broader processes 6 or procedures of the state. The state’s interest in adjudication of Plaintiff’s challenge to the denial 7 of visitation with his son does not qualify as sufficiently important to satisfy the third 8 requirement for Younger abstention. See AmerisourceBergen, 495 F.3d at 1150. 9 Because Defendant does not satisfy each element required for Younger abstention, 10 Defendant’s motion to stay this proceeding based on the abstention doctrine must be denied. 11 Defendant argues that even absent a mandatory stay of proceedings under Younger, a federal 12 court may stay proceedings based on comity. (Dkt. # 7 at 11.) However, the Court, in 13 undertaking the Younger analysis, has already considered whether comity requires it to pause this 14 action and has determined that, under the prevailing law, no such pause is warranted. There is
15 simply nothing that prevents Plaintiff’s state court action and this action from proceeding 16 simultaneously. See AmerisourceBergen, 495 F.3d at 1151-52. 17 // 18 // 19 // 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 // 1 Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
2 (1) Defendant DOC’s motion to stay (dkt. # 7) is DENIED. 3 (2) The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Order to Plaintiff, to counsel for 4 Defendant DOC, and to the Honorable Benjamin H. Settle. 5 DATED this 11th day of May, 2021. 6 A 7
MICHELLE L. PETERSON 8 United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23