McKinney v. Staeven

District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided November 10, 2021·No. 2:19-cv-01153·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ LENARD MCKINNEY,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 19-cv-1153-pp

SARAH STAEVEN, BRITTANEY BLAIR, CASSANDRA BAIER, MARY ALSTEEN, and RACHEL MATUSHAK,

Defendant. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 32) AND DISMISSING CASE ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Lenard McKinney, who is confined at the Racine Correctional Institution, filed this civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Dkt. No. 1. The court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §1915A and allowed the plaintiff to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim based on allegations that the defendants (all employed at Green Bay Correctional Institution, where the plaintiff was confined during the relevant period) were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need by failing, for over seven months, to address the pain caused by the plaintiff’s ill-fitting prosthesis. Dkt. No. 9 at 5-7. The defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the court should grant summary judgment in their favor because there is no record evidence that they treated the plaintiff inappropriately or provided him insufficient medical care. Dkt. Nos. 32, 33 at 1. On September 21, 2021, the court ordered the plaintiff to file his response to the defendants’ motion by October 18, 2021. Dkt. No. 39. The court advised the plaintiff that if it did not receive his response by the deadline, the court had the authority to treat the defendants’ motion as unopposed, accept all facts asserted by the defendants as undisputed and decide the motion based only on the arguments in the defendants’ brief, without any input from the plaintiff. Id. at 2. The October 18, 2021 deadline has passed, and the plaintiff has not filed a response to the motion for summary judgment. The court will treat the motion as unopposed, accept the defendants’ facts as undisputed and decide the motion without a response from the plaintiff. A. Standard of Review “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Ames v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 629 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2011). “Material facts” are those under the applicable substantive law that “might affect the outcome of the suit.” See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute over “material fact” is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. B. Facts The defendants’ unopposed proposed findings of fact indicate that the defendants provided appropriate care for the plaintiff’s prosthesis-related complaints. Specifically, from December of 2018 through July of 2019, the plaintiff was seen on five different occasions by specialized outside providers to address the fit and comfort of his prosthetic. Dkt. No. 34 at ¶¶35, 39, 45, 61- 65. Daily activities and movement of the leg may move the position of a prosthesis, which can require multiple adjustments for the best function and comfort for the individual. Id. at ¶16. Adjustments to a prosthesis are individualized and may take several attempts to adjust to operate at the most beneficial level. Id. ¶17. At the plaintiff’s April 19, 2018 appointment with the prosthesis specialist, it was noted that he had gained weight, which added pressure on his prosthesis. Id. at ¶45. Further, only advanced care providers can refer inmates to off-site providers to receive specialist consultation and advanced treatments. Id. at ¶18. The defendants responded in a timely manner to the plaintiff’s requests for medical care and provided appropriate treatment within the standards of care. For example, from December of 2018 through July of 2019, the plaintiff submitted eleven health service requests for prosthesis-related issues. Id. at ¶¶23, 26, 33-34, 37-38, 46, 49, 53, 60. Green Bay medical staff, including the defendants, treated small wounds and provided topical antibiotics to avoid infection; provided various bandages for comfort; ordered crutches; obtained prosthesis liners; refilled and increased the plaintiff’s pain medication; advised on how to mitigate pain while the plaintiff to see advanced care providers, and referred the plaintiff for a consultation to a physical medicine and rehabilitation specialist to address reported nerve pain, to evaluate his current functional status and to evaluate if a different type of prosthesis would be necessary. Id. at ¶¶26-27, 31, 39, 40, 48, 51-52, 55, 57-58. At none of the plaintiff’s appointments with the defendants did he present acute symptoms and referrals to the advanced care providers were made whenever appropriate Id. at ¶¶29-30, 37, 41, 48, 51, 54. On July 25, 2019, the plaintiff was seen by NovaCare for the replacement of his prosthesis. Dr. Schmidt noted that the fit and function were good. The plaintiff received his new prosthesis the next day and Health Services Unit staff followed up regarding the fit and function. Id. at ¶¶64-65. C. Discussion A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment where he is deliberately indifferent “to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must show (1) an objectively serious medical condition to which (2) a state official was deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.” Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008). “A medical need is sufficiently serious if the plaintiff’s condition ‘has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or . . . is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.’” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843 857 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)). The condition does not need to be life-threatening to be serious; it needs only to be “a condition that would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” if not addressed. Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff must allege “that an official actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). The plaintiff also “must show more than mere evidence of malpractice.” Id.

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