McKinney v. Larges

116 N.W.2d 761, 367 Mich. 387, 1962 Mich. LEXIS 425

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: September 7, 1962
• Docket: Docket 39, 40, Calendar 48,888, 48,889
• Status: Published

Opinions

Kavanagh, J.

The facts with reference to the above entitled cases are set forth in the opinion of Justice Dethmers. Plaintiffs appeal from directed verdicts of no cause for action entered at the conclusion of their proofs in these 2 cases, consolidated for trial and appeal.

The trial court’s reason for granting the directed verdicts at the close of plaintiffs’ proofs was that plaintiffs had failed to show any negligence on defendants’ part which was a proximate cause of the ■collision.

In passing upon whether or not the trial judge erred in granting the motions for directed verdicts for the reason given, we must view the proofs—as he should have—in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Shaw v. Bashore, 353 Mich 31; DeLuca v. Wonnacott, 358 Mich 319. The instant case may he one in which, as the trial court indicated, plaintiffs’ attorneys did not prove all the facts from which legitimate inferences could he drawn that would indicate defendants were negligent and that their negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. We and the trial judge are not to determine whether we could have done better, hut rather to determine from the facts shown whether or not, on favorable view, there were questions of fact presented for the jury to decide. We shall proceed to examine the evidence to determine if this is true.

The proofs disclose and plaintiffs’ pleadings allege that plaintiffs were passengers for hire in defendants’ common carrier taxicab; that the cab was driven at excessive speed on an icy, snowy, slippery pavement in such a manner that the defendant cab driver was unable to control the vehicle and thus avoid a collision with defendant Bouchard’s automobile, which was seen by plaintiff Bertha Lee McKinney some 3 or 4 car lengths away skidding and slipping on the icy pavement. Defendant Bonchard admits the skidding in the pretrial statement.

Viewed in the most favorable light, the proofs show the following:

Plaintiff Bertha Lee McKinney and her son Dwight boarded the cab on Chene street and asked the driver to take them to an address on East Fort street. It was snowing and the streets were icy and slippery. The cab took off at a fast speed and maintained a speed at from 35 to 40 miles per hour. Bertha McKinney warned the driver of the excessive-speed. He replied that she didn’t have anything to worry about, that they had plenty of insurance, and continued to drive at a high speed. As they approached Chene and Watson streets Bertha McKinney observed the lights of defendant Bouchard’s car 3 or 4 car lengths away. The car was skidding. She-yelled and screamed. The car and cab collided. Serious injuries resulted to both Bertha McKinney and her son Dwight McKinney.

On favorable view, we think the proofs at the time the motions for directed verdicts were made showed the cab driver was proceeding 35 to 40 miles per hour along a busy street which was covered with snow and was icy and slippery, and that he continued to drive at such a high rate of speed even after a warning from plaintiff Bertha McKinney.

It is both unnecessary and improper for us to say whether or not this constituted negligence on the part of the driver of the cab. We believe we have fulfilled our judicial function when we say, as we do, that we feel reasonable people might well disagree on that question. We suggest that jurors might infer that the defendant cab driver was driving at an excessive rate of speed on an icy, slippery street and that his speed, under the conditions prevailing, was such that he was unable to turn out to the right and avoid the oncoming skidding car of defendant Bonchard.

We suggest that under the same unusual conditions—the icy, slippery, snowy street—if the defendant cab driver had not been traveling at such a high rate of speed he might have been able to stop or avoid the accident, and that his failure to drive at a rate of. speed in keeping with the prevailing condition of the street (and particularly after the warning of Bertha McKinney) might be negligence which was a proximate cause of the accident.

It is apparent that defendant Bouchard was also driving at a high rate of speed for the existing conditions and that he was skidding and sliding sideways in the direction of defendants’ cab. It is a fair inference that Bouchard’s car was over on the cab’s side of the street when viewed by Mrs. McKinney. Why would she scream if such were not the case? We do not suggest that this necessarily constitutes proof of negligence which was a proximate cause of the accident. But again we point out that reasonable minds might differ as to whether or not a proper inference would be that Bouchard was driving too fast for conditions and, therefore, might be guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the accident.

We cannot agree with the finding of the trial court nor with Justice Dethmers’ conclusion that plaintiffs failed to establish of what specific negligence, if any, defendants were guilty; or that plaintiffs failed to show defendants had been guilty of any negligence that was a proximate cause of the injuries. We conclude, under the favorable view, that facts were submitted from which a jury might so find.

We also conclude that a jury question as to negligence and proximate cause has been shown and that the trial court’s directed verdicts of no cause for action, must be, and are, reversed and tbe matter remanded for full trial.

Plaintiffs shall have costs.

Black, Souris, Otis M. Smith, and Adams, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.