IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE FILED BRIAN M. McKINNEY, ) March 16, 2000 ) Plaintiff/Appellant, ) Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk ) STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) Appeal No. Plaintiff Intervener/Appellant, ) M1999-00565-COA-R9-CV ) VS. ) Williamson Circuit ) No. II-98552 LEVI S. JARVIS, ) ) Defendant/Appellee, ) ) WILLIAMSON COUNTY ) HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, ) ) Defendant. )
APPEALED FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY AT FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE RUSS HELDMAN, JUDGE
FOR APPELLANT McKINNEY: FOR APPELLEE JARVIS:
MATHEW R. ZENNER CYRUS L. BOOKER Nashville, Tennessee CHARLNETTE A. RICHARD Nashville, Tennessee FOR APPELLANT STATE OF TENNESSEE:
PAUL G. SUMMERS Attorney General & Reporter
KIMBERLY J. DEAN Deputy Attorney General Nashville, Tennessee
REVERSED AND REMANDED
BEN H. CANTRELL, PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
OPINION The question we must decide is whether a state statute violates the
due process and separation of powers provisions of the state constitution when
in some civil actions it prohibits evidence of the failure to wear a car safety belt.
The Circuit Court of Williamson County held the statute unconstitutional. For
the reasons that follow we reverse the circuit court’s order.
I.
Brian McKinney sued Levi Jarvis for personal injuries suffered
while McKinney was a passenger in a pick-up truck owned and operated by
Jarvis. Jarvis answered the complaint and included as an affirmative defense
McKinney’s failure to wear his seat belt. McKinney moved to strike that defense
on the basis of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-9-604:
(a) The failure to wear a safety belt shall not be admissible into evidence in a civil action; provided, that evidence of a failure to wear a safety belt, as required by this chapter, may be admitted in a civil action as to the causal relationship between non- compliance and the injuries alleged, if the following conditions have been satisfied:
(1) The plaintiff has filed a products liability claim;
(2) The defendant alleging non-compliance with this chapter shall raise this defense in its answer or timely amendment thereto in accordance with the rules of civil procedure; and
(3) Each defendant seeking to offer evidence alleging non-compliance with this chapter has the burden of proving non-compliance with this chapter, that compliance with this chapter would have reduced injuries and the extent of the reduction of such injuries.
(b) Upon request of any party, the trial judge shall hold a hearing out of the presence of the jury as to the admissibility of such evidence in accordance
-2- with the provisions of this section and the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.
Jarvis joined issue on the motion by asserting that the statute
violated the due process and equal protection provisions of the state and federal
constitutions. The court, on its own motion, invited arguments on whether the
statute violates the separation of powers provisions of the Tennessee
Constitution. Considering all the arguments, the court refused to strike the
defendant’s affirmative defense and held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-9-604
violates Article I, Section 8 (due process) and Article II, Section 2 (separation of
powers) of the Tennessee Constitution. We granted an interlocutory appeal to
address these two issues.
II.
DUE PROCESS
Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution contains the
states’s prohibition against taking life, liberty, or property without due process:
That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.
The “law of the land” phrase is synonymous with the “due process
of law” provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. 1997). Perhaps it would
be more accurate to point out that both constitutions adopt an ancient concept of
-3- liberty as expressed in Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta: “No freeman shall be
taken, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or otherwise destroyed;
nor shall we go upon him, nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land.” See Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S.
97 (1877).
This concept of liberty has dual aspects, one procedural and the
other substantive. We do not believe that the appellee contends that the statute
in question violates procedural due process, probably because he understands that
in the passage of legislation, the legislative process itself provides sufficient
procedural safeguards. Rea v. Matteucci, 121 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Lulac, 793 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1986).
Substantive due process, on the other hand, prevents the state from
infringing on the rights to life, liberty, or property when the state action does not
promote any legitimate state interest. Vernon v. State, 18 So.2d 388 (Ala. 1944);
Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). See also Newton v. Cox, 878
S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. 1994). The test under substantive due process is whether
there is a reasonable connection between the statute and the promotion of the
safety and welfare of the community. People v. Santiago, 379 N.Y.S.2d 843
(1975). If the statute does not impinge on fundamental rights, the court’s only
interest is whether “the legislature was acting in pursuit of permissible state
objectives and, if so, whether the means adopted were reasonably related to
accomplishment of those objectives.” 16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law §
912; Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. 1994); Maryhaven Center of Hope
v. Wing, 674 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1998). In this respect the test is the same as that
-4- applied to a challenge on equal protection grounds. Eastern Enterprises v.
Chater, 110 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 1997).
The appellee does not insist that a fundamental right is curtailed by
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-9-604. Therefore, our only inquiry is whether there is
some rational connection between the statute and a legitimate state interest.
The mandatory use of automobile seat belts is a question of state
interest. Even if the states were indifferent to it, the interest has been thrust upon
them by the United States Congress. Congress declared that it was in the public
interest for the states to adopt mandatory seat belt use laws. (49 U.S.C.A. §
30127(d)). In 1994 Congress enacted a system of rewards and punishments for
compliance/non-compliance. 23 U.S.C.A. § 153(a)(2) and (h). Tennessee enacted
its own mandatory seat belt law in 1986.1 See 1986 Tenn.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE FILED BRIAN M. McKINNEY, ) March 16, 2000 ) Plaintiff/Appellant, ) Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk ) STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) Appeal No. Plaintiff Intervener/Appellant, ) M1999-00565-COA-R9-CV ) VS. ) Williamson Circuit ) No. II-98552 LEVI S. JARVIS, ) ) Defendant/Appellee, ) ) WILLIAMSON COUNTY ) HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, ) ) Defendant. )
APPEALED FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY AT FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE RUSS HELDMAN, JUDGE
FOR APPELLANT McKINNEY: FOR APPELLEE JARVIS:
MATHEW R. ZENNER CYRUS L. BOOKER Nashville, Tennessee CHARLNETTE A. RICHARD Nashville, Tennessee FOR APPELLANT STATE OF TENNESSEE:
PAUL G. SUMMERS Attorney General & Reporter
KIMBERLY J. DEAN Deputy Attorney General Nashville, Tennessee
REVERSED AND REMANDED
BEN H. CANTRELL, PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
OPINION The question we must decide is whether a state statute violates the
due process and separation of powers provisions of the state constitution when
in some civil actions it prohibits evidence of the failure to wear a car safety belt.
The Circuit Court of Williamson County held the statute unconstitutional. For
the reasons that follow we reverse the circuit court’s order.
I.
Brian McKinney sued Levi Jarvis for personal injuries suffered
while McKinney was a passenger in a pick-up truck owned and operated by
Jarvis. Jarvis answered the complaint and included as an affirmative defense
McKinney’s failure to wear his seat belt. McKinney moved to strike that defense
on the basis of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-9-604:
(a) The failure to wear a safety belt shall not be admissible into evidence in a civil action; provided, that evidence of a failure to wear a safety belt, as required by this chapter, may be admitted in a civil action as to the causal relationship between non- compliance and the injuries alleged, if the following conditions have been satisfied:
(1) The plaintiff has filed a products liability claim;
(2) The defendant alleging non-compliance with this chapter shall raise this defense in its answer or timely amendment thereto in accordance with the rules of civil procedure; and
(3) Each defendant seeking to offer evidence alleging non-compliance with this chapter has the burden of proving non-compliance with this chapter, that compliance with this chapter would have reduced injuries and the extent of the reduction of such injuries.
(b) Upon request of any party, the trial judge shall hold a hearing out of the presence of the jury as to the admissibility of such evidence in accordance
-2- with the provisions of this section and the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.
Jarvis joined issue on the motion by asserting that the statute
violated the due process and equal protection provisions of the state and federal
constitutions. The court, on its own motion, invited arguments on whether the
statute violates the separation of powers provisions of the Tennessee
Constitution. Considering all the arguments, the court refused to strike the
defendant’s affirmative defense and held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-9-604
violates Article I, Section 8 (due process) and Article II, Section 2 (separation of
powers) of the Tennessee Constitution. We granted an interlocutory appeal to
address these two issues.
II.
DUE PROCESS
Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution contains the
states’s prohibition against taking life, liberty, or property without due process:
That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.
The “law of the land” phrase is synonymous with the “due process
of law” provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. 1997). Perhaps it would
be more accurate to point out that both constitutions adopt an ancient concept of
-3- liberty as expressed in Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta: “No freeman shall be
taken, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or otherwise destroyed;
nor shall we go upon him, nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land.” See Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S.
97 (1877).
This concept of liberty has dual aspects, one procedural and the
other substantive. We do not believe that the appellee contends that the statute
in question violates procedural due process, probably because he understands that
in the passage of legislation, the legislative process itself provides sufficient
procedural safeguards. Rea v. Matteucci, 121 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Lulac, 793 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1986).
Substantive due process, on the other hand, prevents the state from
infringing on the rights to life, liberty, or property when the state action does not
promote any legitimate state interest. Vernon v. State, 18 So.2d 388 (Ala. 1944);
Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). See also Newton v. Cox, 878
S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. 1994). The test under substantive due process is whether
there is a reasonable connection between the statute and the promotion of the
safety and welfare of the community. People v. Santiago, 379 N.Y.S.2d 843
(1975). If the statute does not impinge on fundamental rights, the court’s only
interest is whether “the legislature was acting in pursuit of permissible state
objectives and, if so, whether the means adopted were reasonably related to
accomplishment of those objectives.” 16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law §
912; Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. 1994); Maryhaven Center of Hope
v. Wing, 674 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1998). In this respect the test is the same as that
-4- applied to a challenge on equal protection grounds. Eastern Enterprises v.
Chater, 110 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 1997).
The appellee does not insist that a fundamental right is curtailed by
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-9-604. Therefore, our only inquiry is whether there is
some rational connection between the statute and a legitimate state interest.
The mandatory use of automobile seat belts is a question of state
interest. Even if the states were indifferent to it, the interest has been thrust upon
them by the United States Congress. Congress declared that it was in the public
interest for the states to adopt mandatory seat belt use laws. (49 U.S.C.A. §
30127(d)). In 1994 Congress enacted a system of rewards and punishments for
compliance/non-compliance. 23 U.S.C.A. § 153(a)(2) and (h). Tennessee enacted
its own mandatory seat belt law in 1986.1 See 1986 Tenn. Pub. Acts 866 (now
codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-9-603, 604, amended by 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts
661).
Prior to the legislative mandate, however, a majority of the states
rejected the seat belt defense, meaning that they did not recognize a common-law
duty to buckle up. Amend v. Bell, 570 P.2d 138 (Wash. 1977). Among the
reasons the Amend court cited why the state might wish to exclude evidence of
the failure to use a seat belt were (1) the defendant should not be able to diminish
the consequences of his negligence by the plaintiff’s failure to anticipate the
defendant’s part in causing the accident itself; and (2) allowing the seat belt
1 Tennessee has had a seat belt law since 1963, and the same prohibition against using the failure to wear a seat belt as a defense has been in place since then. 1963 Pub. Acts 102. The mandatory requirement came later.
-5- defense would lead to a veritable battle of experts as to what injuries would have
or have not been avoided had the plaintiff been wearing a seat belt. In Fischer
v. Moore, 517 P.2d 458 (Colo. 1973), the court said that a tortfeasor must accept
the plaintiff as he finds him, and that he may not rely upon the injured party’s
failure to utilize a voluntary protective device to escape all or a portion of the
damages which the plaintiff incurred as a consequence of the defendant’s
negligence.
We think these are legitimate interests for the state to deal with.
Everyone may not agree with the choice made by the legislature, but the choice
does have a rational connection to the legitimate state interests.
III.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Article II, Section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution divides the
powers of the government into three departments: the legislative, the executive,
and the judicial. Article II, Section 2 prohibits anyone belonging to one
department from exercising any of the powers properly belonging to either of the
others, except as the constitution itself directs or permits. The trial judge held
that under these constitutional provisions it is the sole domain of the judiciary to
decide what evidence may be excluded from the trier of fact in a comparative
fault case. Therefore, the legislature crossed the line into the judicial domain
when it passed Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-9-604. We disagree.
-6- In our discussion in Part II of this opinion we may have already
answered this question. By finding that the statute addressed a legitimate
question of public policy, we have implicitly found that it is a question that falls
into the legislative realm. The legislative power is the authority to make, order,
and repeal law; the judicial power is to interpret and apply the law. State v. King,
973 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Brackett, 869 S.W.2d 936 (Tenn. Cr. App.
1993). It is primarily for the legislature to determine the public policy of this
state. Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Tenn. 1996). “When the legislature
. . . has spoken upon a particular subject, its utterance is the public policy of the
State upon that subject, and the courts are without power to read into the
Constitution a restraint of the legislature with respect thereto.” Cavender v.
Hewitt, 239 S.W. 767 at 768 (1922).
In many instances the legislature has determined that the people of
the state would be better served by restricting the evidence that may be used in
court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-203 (the Dead Man’s Statute); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 47-2-202 (the Sales Articles’s Parol Evidence Rule); Tenn. Code Ann. §
47-3-117 (the restriction on proof of other agreements affecting negotiable
instruments). The various testimonial privileges and statutes of frauds found
throughout the code could be placed in the same class. We think these statutes
are the products of legitimate legislative activity.
The judgment of the court below holding that Tenn. Code Ann. §
55-9-604 violates the due process and separation of powers provisions of our
constitution is reversed. We remand the cause to the Circuit Court of Williamson
-7- County for further proceedings. Tax the costs on appeal to the appellee, Levi S.
Jarvis.
_______________________________ BEN H. CANTRELL, PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR:
____________________________ WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE
____________________________ PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE