McKinney v. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.

632 F. App'x 37

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: January 28, 2016
• Docket: 15-1188
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Kara McKinney appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Smith, M.J.), denying her motion for a new trial. We assume.the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the.procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Plaintiff, an African American, alleged that defendant Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. discriminated against her on the basis of race because another white candidate was preferred for promotion. After a six-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Central Hudson. Plaintiff moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) on the ground that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the credible evidence.

The denial of a motion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence is not subject to appellate review. Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1199 (2d Cir.1995). “The task of reviewing and weighing all of the evidence presented at trial simply imposes too great a burden on the appellate court.” Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 910 (2d Cir.1997). Accordingly, defendants are “entitled to argue to the trial judge that the verdict [was] against the weight of the evidence ... but the denial of that challenge is one of those few rulings that is simply unavailable for appellate review.” Stonewall, 73 F.3d at 1199. As a result, the denial of the motion to set aside the verdict must be affirmed.

However, though we do not review the district court’s weighing of the evidence, a denial of a motion for a new trial “is plainly renewable to the extent that the challenge is that the district court applied the wrong legal standard,” Piesco v. Koch, 12 F.3d 332, 344 (2d Cir.1993). The court below ruled that it was inappropriate to- set aside the jury verdict because the resolution of issues at trial depended on an assessment of witness credibility, and, “[hjaving observed the several days’ worth of testimony at trial ... the Court s[aw] no reason to disturb its verdict.” Special App’x at 18. Nothing in the district court’s decision, including its affirmation that the jury is owed substantial deference in making credibility assessments, suggested that the court applied the incorrect legal standard to its analysis. See Raedle v. Credit Agricole Indosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir.2012) (“Where the resolution of the issues depended on an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, it is proper for the court to refrain from setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial.” (alteration omitted)).

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in McKinney’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.