McKINLAY v. MORRISH

62 U.S. 343, 16 L. Ed. 100, 21 How. 343, 1858 U.S. LEXIS 651
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 31, 1859
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 62 U.S. 343 (McKINLAY v. MORRISH) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McKINLAY v. MORRISH, 62 U.S. 343, 16 L. Ed. 100, 21 How. 343, 1858 U.S. LEXIS 651 (1859).

Opinion

Mr. Justice WAYNE

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is the ease of a foreign vessel having'been libelled in a port of the United States when about to leave it;' her master having refused to pay for the damage said to have been sustained on a shipment of soap, made at Liverpool, to be carried to San Erancisco,. California, via Honolulu. The shipment' was made by Matthew Steele & Son. It was said in the bill of lading to be in good order and condition, and the undertaking was to deliver it so to Messrs. McKinlay, Garriock, & Co., or to their assigns.

The consignees libelled the ship, alleging that, though they' were always willing to receive the shipment in good order, the master of the ship had not made it, and that they had refused to receive it, on account of the injury it had sustained from a want of proper care in loading, storing, landing, re-landing, and re-storing the soap, and owing to the careless, negligent, and improper manper of storing it under the deck of the ship, which was open and leaky, through which water passed, and damaged it to the amount of nine thousand five hundred dollars.

The respondent meets the charges by a direct denial of them, averring if the soap had been in any way injured, it may have been from causes beyond his control by any care whatever, and should be attributed to causes or perils excepted to, as they were expressed in the bill of lading, viz: “ all and every danger and accident of the seas and navigation of whatsoever nature.” The respondent also declares that his ship was, at the time of her sailing from Liverpool, in good, tight, and strong condition, well manned, and that her cargo was well dunnaged and stowed; but that, in the course of the passage-to Honolulu, she encountered heavy storms and gales, which strained and caused her to leak, and had compelled him to throw overboard a part of the cargo, for the preservation of the rest of it, and of the vessel; and that during the passage *346 he had used every precaution to preserve the cargo that was within Ais power and that of his officers and crew.

The libel and answer are directly at issue, and no answer can be made more responsively to the charges in a .bill than ■ this is.

Accordingly, then, to the rules of pleading in admiralty, there is no necessity for doing so; nor are. we permitted to consider much of the testimony in this record. When litigants make their case in express allegations and by express denials of them, and then introduce testimony inapplicable to the issues they have made, it is not a part of the case, unless as it shall, inferentially bear upon other evidence properly in it, upon which the parties rely for the determination of their controversy. This case furnishes as apt an illustration of the rule just mentioned as can be given. The libellants put their case upon bad and careless stowage, &c., of the soap, and upon leaks in the deck of the ship, through which water passed and damaged it. The respondent denies both; but he goes on to state that his ship was tight and strong for the voyage when he left Liverpool, and both parties question the witnesses as to that fact; though the libellants had not charged that their goods had been injured from that cause, and had not put in issue at all the soundness and seaworthiness of the ship for the voyage she was about to make. This same point of pleading was before this court in the case of Lawrence v. Minturu, 17 Howard, 100, 110, 111, which was as learnedly argued, and as deliberately decided, as any other casé in admiralty has been in our time. This court then said: “We find the conduct of the master in making, the jettison to have been lawful; and the remaining inquiry is, whether the necessity for it is to be attributed to any fault on the part of the master or owners. The libel alleges the loss of the goods to have been through the mere carelessness (just as the libel in this case does) and misconduct of the master and mariners. We were at first inclined to the opinion that this allegation is not broad enough to put in issue what the libellants have at the hearing so much insisted upon, and what we think is the main question in this part of the case, the sufficiency of the ship to carry the cargo. It *347 is no doubt tbe general rule, that the owner warrants his ship to be seaworthy for the voyage with the cargo contracted for. But a breach of this implied contract of the owner does not amount to negligence or want of skill of the master and mariners. There would be much difficulty, therefore, in maintaining, as a general proposition-, that an allegation of negligence of the master would let in the libellant to prove unseaworthiness of the vessel.” And in the next paragragh of that opinion, page 111, it will be seen that the rule of pleading in such cases was not enforced only upon the ground that the inquiry in that ease necessarily led to an examination whether the Jei iison was occasioned by the negligence of the master in overloading the ship.

It was a nice distinction, but a true one, and it will have its influence, hereafter upon other cases having the same difficulties as that had. It has been adverted to, to warn the profession that the irregularities of pleading in admiralty, now too frequently occurring, have attracted our attention, and will be treated hereafter according to the rules and practice for pleadings', and proofs , in admiralty cases. Without doing so, the jurisdiction of admiralty may often be practically extended to controversies not belonging to it; and though.that may be inadvertently done, it will not be the less mischievous.

With this rule in view, we will not examine much of the testimony in the case before us, though it was made much of the argument of the respective counsel representing the parties. It. excludes from the merits of the case all in the record relating to the storm in the Bay of Biscay, the leak which it caused, and the repair of it. Both parties have treated it, by their pleadings, as having in no way caused any damage to the soap; also, the storm which afterwards tried the seaworthiness of the ship to the utmost, when she was weathering Cape Horn, without any diminution of it, except s.o far as to inquire if it could have been that the seas which she then' shipped had damaged the soap, by the water passing through the seams of a deck imperfectly caulked. And we exclude, also, all that testimony made up-of the opinions of supposed experts in regard •to the- causes of the alteration in the - quality of the soap, ex- *348 c.epting such of them as are sustained by facts which have the character of legal proof.

By treating-the case in-this way, the controversy becomes exclusively one upon the alleged want of proper care in stowing, &c., the soap; and upon the charge made against the captain of the ship, that he had negligently allowed the seams of her deck to be in an open and leaking condition, by whicbwater had passed through them upon the soap.

Our examination of the case has been made accordingly. It will be found to coincide with the admissions made in his argument by the learnéd counsel of the appellants.

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Bluebook (online)
62 U.S. 343, 16 L. Ed. 100, 21 How. 343, 1858 U.S. LEXIS 651, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mckinlay-v-morrish-scotus-1859.