McKenzie v. Big Apple Training Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 17, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-09554
StatusUnknown

This text of McKenzie v. Big Apple Training Inc. (McKenzie v. Big Apple Training Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McKenzie v. Big Apple Training Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK KELLYANN A. MCKENZIE, Plaintiff, 1:22-cv-9554-GHW -against- ORDER BIG APPLE TRAINING INC., Defendant. GREGORY H. WOODS, United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this pro se action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 to 297; and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 to 131.1 She alleges that her employer discriminated against her based on her age, religion, and national origin. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court also may dismiss an action for failure to state a claim, “so long as the plaintiff is given notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Wachtler v. County of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994)

1 Plaintiff paid the filing fees for this action. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). DISCUSSION A. Age Discrimination in Employment Act The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge any individual or otherwise

discriminate against any individual with respect to h[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). The ADEA’s prohibitions on age discrimination are “limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age.” 29 U.S.C. § 631(a); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 590-91 (2004) (“[T]he ADEA was concerned to protect a relatively old worker from discrimination that works to the advantage of the relatively young”). Plaintiff alleges that she was born in 1986. Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 4. She does not allege any facts in the complaint giving rise to an inference of discrimination because of her age. Because Plaintiff is under 40 years old, she is not protected by the ADEA. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s ADEA claim for failure to state a claim. B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against her based on her American national origin and Seventh Day Adventist religion. Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful

employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII prohibits employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), and from retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under Title VII. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013)

(quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)). At the pleading stage in an employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against h[er], and (2) [her] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87. National origin discrimination Plaintiff’s claim of national origin discrimination is based on the following allegations. In spring 2021, Jackie Bowen, the 70-year-old Jamaican director of Defendant’s school in the Bronx, interviewed and hired Plaintiff as a phlebotomy and EKG instructor. Plaintiff taught several courses. Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 3. On an unspecified date, “Director Jackie Bowen took over a couple of classes, stating [that] students were complaining about Plaintiff.” Id. Eventually, Plaintiff was not

offered a new course to teach. She explains the basis for her claim that the failure to continue her employment was the result of national origin discrimination: Plaintiff believes she was discriminated against because of her national origin (American). Director is Jamaican and although Plaintiff is of Jamaican descent, she is fully aware that Jamaican people do not like American people because of their opportunities for success. Jamaican people are not afforded the same opportunities in Jamaica and have to struggle and fight more. It is for this reason, they have a vendetta against Americans and want to [i]nduce the same struggle and limit their opportunities, as seen in this petition. Id. ¶ 9. These vague allegations that Jamaicans “have a vendetta against Americans” are insufficient to give rise to a plausible inference that Director Bowen, who had hired Plaintiff a few months earlier, discontinued Plaintiff’s employment based on her American national origin.

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Related

Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co.
526 U.S. 574 (Supreme Court, 1999)
General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline
540 U.S. 581 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Chukwuka v. City of New York
513 F. App'x 34 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Patane v. Clark
508 F.3d 106 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Hardaway v. Hartford Public Works Department
879 F.3d 486 (Second Circuit, 2018)
Wachtler v. County of Herkimer
35 F.3d 77 (Second Circuit, 1994)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District
801 F.3d 72 (Second Circuit, 2015)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
McKenzie v. Big Apple Training Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mckenzie-v-big-apple-training-inc-nysd-2022.