Eberhaedt, Judge.
Defendant in error urges that since plaintiff in error recites in the bill of exceptions that he “then and there accepted and herein now [sic] accepts and assigns the same as error” there is no assignment of error and nothing for this court to consider. He urges that this position finds further support in the recital in the brief of plaintiff in error that “plaintiff in the lower court then accepted and now accepts” to the judgment sustaining the general demurrer.
The language of this assignment of error in the bill of exceptions and the recital in the brief are, of course, incorrect and inept. The word “accept” means to receive with favor, to assent or agree to, to embrace, to adopt. Obviously this is not the position with reference to the judgment that plaintiff in error wishes to take or assume. Rather, he “excepts” to or disagrees with and disaffirms it, or wishes to do so, for he proceeds in the assignment to say that he “assigns the same as error upon the ground that it was contrary to law and says that the court erred in sustaining said general demurrer and in not overruling said demurrer and holding that plaintiff’s petition set forth a cause of action.” Thereby he explains and makes known his true position in the matter. The nature of law and the practice of law is such that counsel should be more careful and precise in the matter of semantics. The meaning and effect of a will, a contract or a pleading is to be ascertained and determined by the language employed in its preparation. It is the lawyer’s responsibility to his client to select and employ words in the construction of these documents that will accurately convey the meaning intended.1
[809]*809Though acute today the problem is not new, nor has it been confined to the legal profession. It will be recalled that when Hamlet came into the presence of Polonius reading and was asked “What do you read, my lord?" he answered, "Words, words, words.”2 And Jack Cade, the rebel, speaking to Lord Say charged: “Thou hast most traitorously corrupted the youth of the realm in erecting a grammar school: and whereas, before, our forefathers had no other books but the score and the tally, thou hast caused printing to be used, and, contrary to the king, his crown and dignity, thou hast built a paper-mill. It will be proved to thy face that thou hast men about thee that usually talk of a noun and a verb, and such abominable words as no Christian ear can endure to hear.”3
That this court has been unwilling to penalize for ineptitude when the true intent can be ascertained is demonstrated in Murrow v. Walden, 31 Ga. App. 163 (120 SE 545), where it was stated that “The motion to dismiss the writ of error was on the ground that the words ‘accepted’ and ‘accepts’ appear in the bill of exceptions where the words ‘excepted’ and ‘excepts’ should appear. They are followed by assignments of error in the usual form.” The motion was denied. In Kerr v. Holder, 13 Ga. App. 9 (1) (78 SE 682) a motion to dismiss on the ground that [810]*810the judge had certified the bill of exceptions to be “due” instead of “true” was denied. More recently in Hicks v. M. H. A., Inc., 107 Ga. App. 290 (1) (129 SE2d 817) we declined to dismiss where the assignment of error recited that the general demurrer had been overruled when other portions of the assignment and the record showed that it had been sustained. In Thompson v. Simmons & Co., 139 Ga. 845 (3) (78 SE 419) the Supreme Court declined to dismiss on the ground that it was recited in the bill of exceptions that “the defendant excepted and now excepts,” when it was apparent from the whole bill of exceptions that the word “defendant” had been inadvertently used for “plaintiff.” Judge Russell, later Chief Judge and afterward Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in American Investment Co. v. Cable Co., 4 Ga. App. 106, 108 (60 SE 1037) stated the position of this court when he said: “The main purpose of the creation of courts for the correction of errors is to have the questions which are presented in the litigation definitely decided. It is the settled policy of this State, as shown by several recent acts of the General Assembly, that the legal merits of every case shall be passed upon by the court of last resort, and not only that, but furthermore that the pathway to justice shall not be made difficult by technicalities.”
Let us now proceed to a determination of whether the demurrer was properly sustained. On the premise that all people who are capable of contracting shall be extended the full freedom of doing so if they do not in some manner violate the public policy of this State,4 both the Supreme Court and this court [811]*811have held that if a party to a contract contemporaneously gives the other a covenant not to sue he is bound by it. Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330 (3) (33 SE 62); Arnold v. Johnston, 84 Ga. App. 138 (65 SE2d 707); Jones v. Darling, 94 Ga. App. 641 (95 SE2d 709). Recognizing this principle but holding that it is not applicable if the covenant rests in parol are Crooker v. Hamilton, 3 Ga. App. 190 (2) (59 SE 722); Sasser v. McGovern, 11 Ga. App. 88, 89 (74 SE 797) and Tennille Banking Co. v. Ward, 29 Ga. App. 660 (2) (116 SE 347). And even a written covenant made subsequently to the original undertaking must be founded upon a new consideration. Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330, 333, supra.
But what of the covenant here? Is it severable so that it has application to one part only of the contract, or does it apply to the whole? Provision is made for two kinds of compensation— a definite fixed salary for the period of a year and a bonus in an unspecified amount. As to the salary, provision is made in paragraph 7 that in the event of its termination, “whether by death of E. Fred McIntyre, Jr., or by mutual agreement, or otherwise, said E. Fred McIntyre shall be entitled to receive the proportionate amount of his stipulated salary then due, computed on a monthly basis.” Nothing is provided in this paragraph concerning the bonus.
But in paragraph 8 provision is made. “It is also agreed that the provisions made herein, including bonus arrangement, are voluntary and no suit or action shall be brought against Zac-Lac Paint & Lacquer Co. to recover same,” and further, “in the event E. Fred McIntyre, Jr. severs his connection with the corporation before the close of any fiscal year, that he will not be entitled to receive any sums provided for herein.”
Paragraph 8 is ambiguous, for a literal construction of it may afford application of the covenant both to the salary and the bonus arrangements. It refers to the “provisions made herein, [812]*812including bonus arrangement” as being voluntary. If it refers both to salary and bonus this can not be, for the salary provision is fixed, definite and certain. It is mutual and in no sense voluntary.
Then what is the proper construction of paragraph 8? As an aid and guide let us first turn to the provisions of Code § 20-704 (6): “The rules of grammatical construction usually govern, but to effectuate the intention they may be disregarded; sentences and words may be transposed, and conjunctions substituted for each other.
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Eberhaedt, Judge.
Defendant in error urges that since plaintiff in error recites in the bill of exceptions that he “then and there accepted and herein now [sic] accepts and assigns the same as error” there is no assignment of error and nothing for this court to consider. He urges that this position finds further support in the recital in the brief of plaintiff in error that “plaintiff in the lower court then accepted and now accepts” to the judgment sustaining the general demurrer.
The language of this assignment of error in the bill of exceptions and the recital in the brief are, of course, incorrect and inept. The word “accept” means to receive with favor, to assent or agree to, to embrace, to adopt. Obviously this is not the position with reference to the judgment that plaintiff in error wishes to take or assume. Rather, he “excepts” to or disagrees with and disaffirms it, or wishes to do so, for he proceeds in the assignment to say that he “assigns the same as error upon the ground that it was contrary to law and says that the court erred in sustaining said general demurrer and in not overruling said demurrer and holding that plaintiff’s petition set forth a cause of action.” Thereby he explains and makes known his true position in the matter. The nature of law and the practice of law is such that counsel should be more careful and precise in the matter of semantics. The meaning and effect of a will, a contract or a pleading is to be ascertained and determined by the language employed in its preparation. It is the lawyer’s responsibility to his client to select and employ words in the construction of these documents that will accurately convey the meaning intended.1
[809]*809Though acute today the problem is not new, nor has it been confined to the legal profession. It will be recalled that when Hamlet came into the presence of Polonius reading and was asked “What do you read, my lord?" he answered, "Words, words, words.”2 And Jack Cade, the rebel, speaking to Lord Say charged: “Thou hast most traitorously corrupted the youth of the realm in erecting a grammar school: and whereas, before, our forefathers had no other books but the score and the tally, thou hast caused printing to be used, and, contrary to the king, his crown and dignity, thou hast built a paper-mill. It will be proved to thy face that thou hast men about thee that usually talk of a noun and a verb, and such abominable words as no Christian ear can endure to hear.”3
That this court has been unwilling to penalize for ineptitude when the true intent can be ascertained is demonstrated in Murrow v. Walden, 31 Ga. App. 163 (120 SE 545), where it was stated that “The motion to dismiss the writ of error was on the ground that the words ‘accepted’ and ‘accepts’ appear in the bill of exceptions where the words ‘excepted’ and ‘excepts’ should appear. They are followed by assignments of error in the usual form.” The motion was denied. In Kerr v. Holder, 13 Ga. App. 9 (1) (78 SE 682) a motion to dismiss on the ground that [810]*810the judge had certified the bill of exceptions to be “due” instead of “true” was denied. More recently in Hicks v. M. H. A., Inc., 107 Ga. App. 290 (1) (129 SE2d 817) we declined to dismiss where the assignment of error recited that the general demurrer had been overruled when other portions of the assignment and the record showed that it had been sustained. In Thompson v. Simmons & Co., 139 Ga. 845 (3) (78 SE 419) the Supreme Court declined to dismiss on the ground that it was recited in the bill of exceptions that “the defendant excepted and now excepts,” when it was apparent from the whole bill of exceptions that the word “defendant” had been inadvertently used for “plaintiff.” Judge Russell, later Chief Judge and afterward Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in American Investment Co. v. Cable Co., 4 Ga. App. 106, 108 (60 SE 1037) stated the position of this court when he said: “The main purpose of the creation of courts for the correction of errors is to have the questions which are presented in the litigation definitely decided. It is the settled policy of this State, as shown by several recent acts of the General Assembly, that the legal merits of every case shall be passed upon by the court of last resort, and not only that, but furthermore that the pathway to justice shall not be made difficult by technicalities.”
Let us now proceed to a determination of whether the demurrer was properly sustained. On the premise that all people who are capable of contracting shall be extended the full freedom of doing so if they do not in some manner violate the public policy of this State,4 both the Supreme Court and this court [811]*811have held that if a party to a contract contemporaneously gives the other a covenant not to sue he is bound by it. Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330 (3) (33 SE 62); Arnold v. Johnston, 84 Ga. App. 138 (65 SE2d 707); Jones v. Darling, 94 Ga. App. 641 (95 SE2d 709). Recognizing this principle but holding that it is not applicable if the covenant rests in parol are Crooker v. Hamilton, 3 Ga. App. 190 (2) (59 SE 722); Sasser v. McGovern, 11 Ga. App. 88, 89 (74 SE 797) and Tennille Banking Co. v. Ward, 29 Ga. App. 660 (2) (116 SE 347). And even a written covenant made subsequently to the original undertaking must be founded upon a new consideration. Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330, 333, supra.
But what of the covenant here? Is it severable so that it has application to one part only of the contract, or does it apply to the whole? Provision is made for two kinds of compensation— a definite fixed salary for the period of a year and a bonus in an unspecified amount. As to the salary, provision is made in paragraph 7 that in the event of its termination, “whether by death of E. Fred McIntyre, Jr., or by mutual agreement, or otherwise, said E. Fred McIntyre shall be entitled to receive the proportionate amount of his stipulated salary then due, computed on a monthly basis.” Nothing is provided in this paragraph concerning the bonus.
But in paragraph 8 provision is made. “It is also agreed that the provisions made herein, including bonus arrangement, are voluntary and no suit or action shall be brought against Zac-Lac Paint & Lacquer Co. to recover same,” and further, “in the event E. Fred McIntyre, Jr. severs his connection with the corporation before the close of any fiscal year, that he will not be entitled to receive any sums provided for herein.”
Paragraph 8 is ambiguous, for a literal construction of it may afford application of the covenant both to the salary and the bonus arrangements. It refers to the “provisions made herein, [812]*812including bonus arrangement” as being voluntary. If it refers both to salary and bonus this can not be, for the salary provision is fixed, definite and certain. It is mutual and in no sense voluntary.
Then what is the proper construction of paragraph 8? As an aid and guide let us first turn to the provisions of Code § 20-704 (6): “The rules of grammatical construction usually govern, but to effectuate the intention they may be disregarded; sentences and words may be transposed, and conjunctions substituted for each other. In extreme cases of ambiguity, where the instrument as it stands is without meaning, words may be supplied.” More than 85 years ago the Supreme Court announced that “The fundamental rule, the rule which swallows up almost all others in construing a paper, is to give it that meaning which will best carry into effect the intent of the parties. This is the object of rules of interpretation, to discover the true intent of the parties, and in doing this we are to take the whole of [the instrument] together, and to consider this with the surrounding circumstances.” Shorter v. Methvin, 52 Ga. 225 (1), 230.
The overall purpose of the contract here, as we see it, was to provide to Zac-Lac an administrative assistant to its president and to McIntyre a job for 12 months at a monthly salary of $1,000 and to provide to him an unspecified bonus from the corporate profits. The corporation was to be bound for the salary, but the bonus was to be a gratuity. In Webster’s Dictionary a bonus is defined as “money, or an equivalent, given in addition to an agreed compensation.” So it was to be here. We do not think that it was the intention of the parties to agree that, without just cause, the rag might literally be pulled from under the employee in the middle of the contract term and that he should have no recourse, nor do we ascribe to the employer any purpose to overreach its employee.
It has oft been said that “hard cases make bad law,” and this may be no exception, for it is a hard case. Oftener, perhaps, poorly worded or drawn contracts make bad law. Here again we see the importance of good and careful draftsmanship. If it be held here that the covenant in paragraph 8 applies both to the salary and the bonus arrangements it must follow that the [813]*813plaintiff has no right of action. Indeed if payment had not been made of the salary during the five months that McIntyre worked and performed services under the contract the literal interpretation would bar any suit even for the salary earned. But in the light of the overall purpose of the contract we are reluctant to hold that the parties so intended it or that it ought to be so construed. “Where the purpose of the contract would be defeated by one interpretation but given effect by another, the meaning ascribed to the ambiguous clause will be that which gives effect to the main apparent purpose of the contract.” Wright v. Piedmont Eng. &c. Corp., 106 Ga. App. 401 (2) (126 SE2d 865).
A key in ascertaining the true intention of the parties relating to the salary feature of the contract is found in the sentence in paragraph 1 which reads: “This contract shall remain in force except for the failure to perform satisfactorily the duties outlined herein.” (Emphasis supplied). This sentence immediately follows the provision that the employment is for a period of one year and the provision setting forth the salary and method of payment.
If this language means what it clearly says, then both parties intended to be legally bound by the one-year term of employment and the salary provisions as set forth in that paragraph, the only exception being the failure of the plaintiff-employee satisfactorily to perform his duties.
How then do we arrive at a reasonable, logical and fair interpretation of the covenant? In Webster’s unabridged dictionary we find that the word “including” may mean, inter alia, “embracing,” and that a synonym therefor is “comprising.” Taking that meaning and substituting it we have: “It is also agreed that the provisions made herein, comprising [the] bonus arrangement, are voluntary and no suit or action shall be brought” to recover the same. However, it may be urged that since the phrase "including bonus arrangement,” or even “comprising [the] bonus arrangement,” is set off by commas it must of necessity follow that the covenant is not limited to it. If we were bound by the rules of grammar in trying to reach an interpretation of this covenant that contention might have basis. But [814]*814since we deal with ambiguity we are not bound. “It might be possible for a case to arise in which all other considerations were evenly balanced and that the difference between these marks of punctuation5 might, like a feather’s weight, turn the scale to one side rather than the other; but this is not a case of that character. ‘The punctuation of an instrument may be considered when the meaning is doubtful, but it can not control if the meaning otherwise plainly appears. In order to arrive at the meaning of the parties, proper punctuation marks may be inserted by the court in construing the instrument.’ 17 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law 20; 13 C.J. 535, § 494 (b), and citations. In Holmes v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 98 Fed. 240 (2), 47 LRA 308, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals said: ‘Punctuation is no part of the English language. The Supreme Court says that it ‘is a most fallible guide by which to interpret a writing.’ Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. 41, 54 (9th L. Ed. 624). The Century Dictionary tells us, what is common knowledge, that ‘there is still much uncertainty and arbitrariness in punctuation.’ It is always subordinate to the text, and is never allowed to control its meaning. The court will take the contract by its four corners, and determine its meaning from its language, and, having ascertained from the arrangement of its words what its meaning is, will construe it accordingly, without regard to the punctuation marks, or the want of them. The sense of a contract is gathered from its words and their relation to each other, and after that has been done, punctuation may be used to more readily point out the division in the sentences and parts of sentences. But the words control the punctuation marks, and not the punctuation marks the words.” Bridges v. Home Guano Co., 33 Ga. App. 305, 310 (125 SE 872).
Now again applying the dictionary meaning of “including” and omitting the commas we have the covenant reading: “It is also agreed that the provisions herein made comprising [the] bonus arrangement are voluntary and no suit or action shall be brought” to recover the same. The true intent of the parties, consistent with the overall purpose of the contract, thus becomes [815]*815clear. But, without the substitution of the dictionary meaning, if we simply take the commas out we have: “It is also agreed that the provisions herein made including bonus arrangement are voluntary and no suit or action shall be brought" to recover the same. Again it is clear that the covenant is limited to the provisions which include in the contract provision for a bonus. Resort to the dictionary for the meaning of “including” becomes unnecessary.
The covenant would bar any action seeking to recover the bonus, but no recovery of that is sought here. Plaintiff declares on the obligation of the employer to pay salary. The covenant does not bar that, and the sustaining of the demurrers was error.
Judgment reversed. All the judges concur as to Division 1 of the opinion.
Carlisle, P. J., Bell, Hall and Bussell, JJ., dissent as to- Division ¡8.