McIntosh v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

474 N.W.2d 227, 1991 WL 163095

Opinions

OPINION

SHORT, Judge.

In a case involving insurance coverage, Twaya McIntosh argues the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company because (1) innocent persons should be compensated for all injuries arising out of the use of an uninsured’s automobile, and (2) an “accident” is not a prerequisite to the payment of no-fault benefits. We disagree and affirm.

FACTS

The parties have stipulated to the facts. On the morning of October 1, 1987, McIntosh’s former boyfriend sat in his car outside her house. When McIntosh, her minor son, and a male companion emerged from the house, they immediately got into McIntosh’s car. The former boyfriend ap proached the car on foot and confronted McIntosh regarding some household furniture. Because the former boyfriend had a gun in his coat, McIntosh drove away. The former boyfriend got back in his own car, and began chasing McIntosh’s car. The former boyfriend unsuccessfully attempted to ram McIntosh’s car with his car and fired several shots at her with a .38 caliber revolver. As the two cars sped down the highway, the former boyfriend pulled up along the side of McIntosh’s car and fired a shot that injured her. The former boyfriend was convicted of first degree attempted murder and first degree assault against McIntosh, and second degree assault against McIntosh’s male companion.

While State Farm insured McIntosh on the date of the incident for both uninsured motorist (UM) and no-fault benefits, the insurance company denied coverage because the injuries McIntosh suffered were caused by the intentional acts of her former boyfriend. McIntosh commenced this declaratory judgment action against State Farm. The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurance company, concluding the insurance policy did not afford either UM or no-fault coverage because the incident was not an “accident” within either the policy or the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act.

ISSUES

I. Is the intentional assault by McIntosh’s former boyfriend covered by her uninsured motorist policy?

II. Is the intentional assault by McIntosh’s former boyfriend an “accident” for purposes of no-fault benefits?

ANALYSIS

On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this court must determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law. Offerdahl v. University of Minn. Hosps. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn.1988). The parties have stipulated to the facts and agree the incident involved the use of an uninsured automobile. See Continental W. Ins. Co. v. King, 415 N.W.2d 876, 878-79 (Minn.1987). In addition, McIntosh does not deny her injuries were caused by an intentional act of her former boyfriend. See Woida v. North Star Mut. Ins. Co., 306 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn.1981). The issues on appeal are whether this assault is covered under the parties’ insurance policy or under the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (1990). Because interpretation of an insurance contract and a statute involves questions of law, a trial court may properly decide those issues on a motion for summary judgment. Our review on appeal is de novo. See Hibbing Educ. Ass’n v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 369 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Minn.1985); Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v. Stone, 269 N.W.2d 885, 886-87 (Minn.1978).

I.

The relevant part of McIntosh’s uninsured motorist policy states:

We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle or underinsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle or underinsured motor vehicle.

McIntosh argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for State Farm because innocent persons who suffer injuries due to the intentional conduct of uninsured motorists should always be compensated. We disagree. Every insured under the uninsured motorist statute is entitled to only such coverage as would be available if the tortfeasor had complied with the minimum requirements of financial responsibility law. See 8C J. Apple-man, Insurance Law and Practice, §§ 5067.65 5086 (1981). Uninsured motorist coverage was enacted as a complement to liability coverage, see 12A G. Couch, Couch on Insurance 2d § 45:624 (rev. ed. 1981), and was never intended to provide benefits where traditional liability insurance would not respond. See 8C J. Apple-man, Insurance Law and Practice §§ 5086, 5092.55 (1981). Our inquiry thus is: If the former boyfriend had motor vehicle insurance as required by law, would his insurance policy respond? The answer is “no” because a person cannot insure himself from having to bear the consequences of his own intentional acts. See Minn.Stat. § 65B.60 (1990). McIntosh does not deny her former boyfriend’s actions were intentional. Had the former boyfriend carried insurance as required by law, the intentional acts exclusion in his policy would have precluded coverage.

Our analysis furthers the purpose of uninsured coverage. McIntosh argues the purpose of an intentional acts exclusion in a liability policy is not furthered by denying first-party UM coverage to an innocent insured. We disagree. As we have held in two separate cases, “viewing intentional acts from the perspective of the insured under UM coverage would essentially render [the intentional acts] exclusion nugatory.” Petersen v. Croft, 447 N.W.2d 903, 905-06 (Minn.App.1989) (since all occurrences are unintended from insured’s perspective, relying on that perspective would “eliminate insurers’ ability to exclude intentional acts under UM coverage”), pet for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 12, 1990); Wilson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 451 N.W.2d 216, 218-19 (Minn.App.1990) (since no accident is intended from victim’s perspective, using that perspective would nullify intentional acts exclusion), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 22, 1990). We are mindful that many jurisdictions hold a contrary view.¹ These other courts view an incident from the victim’s standpoint and conclude the injuries are unforeseen, unintended, unexpected and therefore “accidental.” Country Cos. v. Bourbon, 122 Ill. App.3d 1061, 1067, 78 Ill.Dec. 407, 411, 462 N.E.2d 526, 530 (1984). We decline to follow this analysis because uninsured motorist coverage was never intended to provide benefits where traditional liability insurance would not respond. See 8C J. Apple-man, Insurance Law and Practice § 5092.-55, at 394-97 (1981). None of these contrary opinions explains why uninsured benefits should cover more than would be covered if the uninsured party had been properly insured.

Thus, the assault by McIntosh’s former boyfriend is not covered by uninsured motorist insurance because, had he carried insurance as required by law, his policy would not provide coverage. Nor do we believe there was an “accident” for purposes of UM coverage for the reasons set forth below.

II.

The second issue before us is whether McIntosh may recover no-fault benefits. McIntosh’s policy states:

We will pay in accordance with the No-Fault Act for bodily injury to an insured, caused by accident resulting from the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle.

The Minnesota No-Fault Act also requires an “accident” as a prerequisite to receiving benefits. See Minn.Stat. § 65B.46, subd. 1 (1990); see also Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 399 N.W.2d 95, 99 (Minn.App.1986), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 1987).

McIntosh argues she should recover no-fault benefits notwithstanding the fact the tortfeasor intentionally shot her. See Meric v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 688, 690 (Minn.App.1984) (recovery of no- fault benefits by widow of driver who was shot and killed by robber attempting to commandeer driver’s ear for use in getaway). We disagree. Meric found the injury arose out of the “use” of the automobile, see id. at 690, an issue to which the parties here have stipulated. Meric did not address whether there was an “accident” within the meaning of the policy. Whether there is an “accident” is an issue which the Supreme Court has expressly recognized is unresolved by a finding of “maintenance or use.” King, 415 N.W.2d at 879.

The “accident” requirement is another link in the causal chain between the use of a vehicle and the injury. See 8D J. Apple-man, Insurance Law and Practice § 5171 (1981). The alleged accident in this case is the act of shooting McIntosh and our inquiry must be whether that act is causally related to the “use” of McIntosh’s automobile. While McIntosh was engaged in the use of a vehicle when she was injured, that use was incidental to the injury. McIntosh’s former boyfriend intended to inflict bodily harm on her whether she was or was not using a motor vehicle. Cf., Meric, 343 N.W.2d at 690 (assault would not have happened had the victim been on foot). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the act of shooting McIntosh was not causally connected with her use of a motor vehicle. Thus, the shooting of McIntosh was not an “accident” within the meaning of the statute or her insurance policy.

DECISION

Coverage does not lie for uninsured motorist benefits where coverage would not lie had the tortfeasor carried insurance. The trial court correctly concluded an “accident” is necessary before motor vehicle benefits will be available. Because there is insufficient causal connection between the act giving rise to the injury and the use of a motor vehicle, there is no “accident.” Thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to State Farm.

Affirmed.

Footnotes

1

. See, e.g., Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 373 So.2d 1129, 1136 (Ala.Civ.App.1979); American Protection Ins. Co. v. Parker, 150 Ga.App. 732, 733, 258 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1979); Davis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 264 Or. 547, 550, 507 P.2d 9, 10 (1973); Dyer v. American Family Ins. Co., 159 Ill.App.3d 766, 773-74, 111 Ill.Dec. 530, 537-38, 512 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (1987), app. denied, 117 Ill.2d 542, 115 Ill.Dec. 399, 517 N.E.2d 1085 (1987); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 43, 57 A.2d 151, 153-54 (1948); Keeler v. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 307, 309-10 (Mo.Ct.App.1987); Kish v. Central Nat'l Ins. Group of Omaha, 67 Ohio St.2d 41, 48-49, 424 N.E.2d 288, 293 (1981); Leatherby Ins. Co. v. Willoughby, 315 So.2d 553, 554-55 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 261 N.C. 285, 291, 134 S.E.2d 654, 658 (1964); Redden v. Doe, 357 So.2d 632, 634 (La.Ct.App.1978); Wheeler v. O’Connell, 297 Mass. 549, 553-54, 9 N.E.2d 544, 546-47 (1937). See also 1 M. Steenson, Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 30-31 (2d ed. 1989).