McIntosh v. Burroughs

551 P.2d 1104, 92 Nev. 417, 1976 Nev. LEXIS 624
CourtNevada Supreme Court
DecidedJune 30, 1976
DocketNo. 7622
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 551 P.2d 1104 (McIntosh v. Burroughs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McIntosh v. Burroughs, 551 P.2d 1104, 92 Nev. 417, 1976 Nev. LEXIS 624 (Neb. 1976).

Opinion

OPINION

Per Curiam:

This appeal follows a district court judgment quieting title to certain real property. Appellants contend the court erred in not recognizing their “interest in the property.” We disagree.

The land in question is a one-half acre parcel in Washoe County. In 1951, respondent Wayne Burroughs and his then wife Virgie bought the land as joint-tenants. In 1966, Virgie Burroughs by gift deed conveyed her one-half interest to her daughter, Vicky Quilici. In 1967, a trustee in bankruptcy sold Wayne Burroughs’ original one-half interest to one Samuel Bailey. In January of 1970, Bailey deeded his interest in the property to appellants. Also in January of 1970, Vicky Quilici deeded her interest to her father, Wayne Burroughs and his new wife, Vohndell (respondents).

Except for a very short period of time when Samuel Bailey used a portion of the property, no one but the Burroughs family has ever occupied the property or paid taxes thereon. At all times relevant to this dispute, the persons assessed as owners of the property for tax purposes have been the Burroughs family.

[419]*419Some time after the 1967-68 tax assessments were made, the property taxes fell delinquent. Accordingly, pursuant to NRS 361.570, the county tax receiver issued a certificate to the Washoe County Treasurer authorizing the county to hold the land for the two-year redemption period.1 Since the property was not redeemed during the two-year statutory period, a tax deed pursuant to NRS 361.590(1) was issued to the Washoe County Treasurer as trustee for the State and county.2 On January 19, 1971, upon payment of all delinquent taxes, interest and assessments, the Washoe County Treasurer issued a deed of reconveyance to respondents pursuant to NRS 361.585(3).

At all times relevant to this dispute, NRS 361.585(3) provided: “Notwithstanding the provisions of NRS 361.595 or 361.603, at any time during the 90-day period specified in [420]*420NRS 361.603, or prior to the public notice of sale by a county treasurer, pursuant to NRS 361.595, of any property held in trust by him by virtue of any deed made pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, any person who was the owner, beneficiary under a deed of trust or mortgagee under a mortgage of such property, or to whom such property was assessed, or who held a contract to purchase such property, prior to being so conveyed to the county treasurer, or the successor in interest of any such person, shall have the right to have such property reconveyed to him upon paying the county treasurer an amount equal to the taxes accrued, together with any costs, penalties and interest legally chargeable against such property.”3

Specifically, appellants contend that because of a “co-tenancy” relationship between the parties, NRS 361.585(3), in its form at that time, must be construed to contemplate that one owner accepts a reconveyance on behalf of all owners. Under the circumstances here presented, we cannot agree; nor do we deem extensive interpretation of the statute necessary.

Appellants cite authority for the proposition that one co-tenant who pays delinquencies, does so for the benefit of all co-tenants. However, the authorities cited involved statutory schemes differing from NRS 361.585(3). See for example: Lomax v. Gindell, 7 N.E. 483 (Ill. 1886).

The relationship of the present parties involved neither a fiduciary relationship, nor even circumstances from which any expectation of trust or reliance might arise. As appellants stated in their opening brief before this court: “Burroughs and McIntosh were naked tenants in common. They took under separate conveyances. They had no connection or relation with each other. They were strangers who happened to co-own property.” Appellants apparently received their interest in the property in return for the issuance of certain bail bonds necessitated by Sam Bailey’s unsuccessful criminal endeavors. The district court’s decision reflects that in early January, 1971, Wayne Burroughs called on Jay McIntosh at his Reno office. Burroughs’ purpose was to discuss the tax situation and possibly purchase appellant’s interest in the property. The taxes were not actually discussed. McIntosh indicated he was merely holding the property for Sam Bailey until Bailey got [421]*421out of prison and that Bailey “could steal enough in one night to pay him back.” The record amply supports these factual determinations. Thus, they cannot be disturbed. Western Indus., Inc. v. General Ins. Co., 91 Nev. 222, 533 P.2d 473 (1975).

Under these circumstances, we believe the district court correctly determined that respondents bore appellants no obligation, fiduciary or otherwise, in regard to the property, and correctly determined that respondents were entitled to a decree quieting title thereto.4

Affirmed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
551 P.2d 1104, 92 Nev. 417, 1976 Nev. LEXIS 624, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcintosh-v-burroughs-nev-1976.