RAPER, Chief Justice.
This appeal deals with an application for a private road to a parcel of landlocked property. The application was filed pursuant to §§ 24-9-101 et seq., W.S.1977.1
The contestants-appellees, Dan and Loretta McGuire, filed their petition naming [1281]*1281the contestees-appellants, Fred and Mickey McGuire, as well as Two Bar Ranch Company.2 The appellees wanted a private road over the lands of either the appellants or Two Bar Ranch. A hearing was had before the Platte County Commissioners on June 6, 1978.3 An additional hearing was conducted on July 12, 1978. In addition to the testimony heard by the county commissioners at these proceedings, there were a significant number of exhibits and other items of evidence placed in the record. At those hearings, Eldon and Elaine Allison were added as parties because they had purchased the 80 acres in question from the appellees4 and were the record owners. Thus, the Allisons are also appellees. Our future references to appellees thus include both the McGuires and the Allisons.
On September 6, 1978, the county commissioners issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order which dismissed the appellees’ application for a private road. The commissioners’ dismissal was based on several grounds:
[1282]*1282“1. Dan McGuire and Loretta McGuire were, prior to August 13, 1975, the owners of 80 acres of land commonly described as the NWVí SWV4 and SWV4 NWVi of Section 10, T23N, R69W of the 6th P.M., Platte County, Wyoming.
“2. Subsequent to the filing of this petition, the contestants sold the described property on August 13, 1975, to Eldon Allison and Elaine Allison, husband and wife, under a Contract of Sale and Guarantee Agreement. Dan McGuire and Loretta McGuire are not the legal owners of the property in question, having conveyed the same by Warranty Deed to Eldon Allison and Elaine Allison, husband and wife, by Warranty Deed recorded on October 25, 1976, in Book 194 at Pages 163 and 164, Platte County records.
“3. Subsequently, on May 13,1976, Eldon Allison and Elaine Allison resold the property under a Contract of Sale to Raymond Flynn and Darlene Flynn, husband and wife. Dan McGuire and Loretta McGuire were not parties to the said Contract of Sale, although they approved the terms thereof. This sale was subject to obtaining a road right of way to said premises.
“4. Eldon Allison and Elaine Allison are the holders of legal title to the 80 acres. The owners of said 80 acres, subject to the terms of the Contract of Sale, are Raymond Flynn and Darlene Flynn, who paid the taxes thereon for the year 1977.
“5. At the June 6, 1978, hearing, Eldon Allison and Elaine Allison were joined as contestants and applicants. At no time were Raymond Flynn or Darlene Flynn joined as applicants or contestants. * * * * * *
“13. There has been no evidence presented by the applicants as to the purposes for which the road is desired, future type or extent of use of any proposed road, or of the proposed use of the 80 acres. Accordingly, the Board of County Commissioners is unable to determine the impact which any proposed road would have upon adjoining landowners which the road might cross. The only interest of the Contestants-Applicants in obtaining a private road is financial, which interest the Board finds to be an inadequate basis for granting the application.
“14. The 80 acres in question are not presently used by the McGuires, the Alli-sons, or the Flynns. Use of such property has been limited to hunting and other minor activities upon the property.
“15. There are no fences surrounding the 80 acres, although there is a boundary fence on the south side of the property. There are no improvements except for a homestead cabin ruin. The 80 acres are situated in extremely mountains [sic] property.
“16. Section 3 of the Unlawful Enclosure of Public Lands Act (43 U.S.C. § 1063 prevents obstruction of free passage over public lands of the United States of America.
“17. No evidence as to the necessity or need for such road has been presented in this proceeding.
“18. The Board of County Commissioners finds that the private road is not necessary, as required by Section 24-9— 101, Wyoming Statutes 1977, for the reason that the applicants presently have access to the property and such access has not been denied. The adjoining landowners over whose lands the requested private road may be located will suffer more from the granting of the application than will the applicants from its denial.
“19. Access to the property has never been denied, and access by the McGuires has traditionally been from the west, north or the east of the property.
“20. For in excess of 40 years, there has been an established road to the north of the property on the Muleshoe Flats, which branch off of County Road No. 271. Said road is across BLM lands, and has been used by members of the public during that time. The public lands over which such roads pass have not been reserved for any public use. [1283]*1283“21. 43 U.S.C. Section 932 provides: ‘The right of way for the constructing of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted.’
“Although the statute was repealed effective October 21, 1976, the two roads which branch off the County Road to the north across Muleshoe Plats were previously laid out and used by the public sufficient to constitute acceptance and dedication of the offer contained in that statute, and therefore an established road is deemed to exist across the public lands of the United States.
$ sfi * * *
The commissioners then concluded:
“CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“1. The application herein is filed pursuant to Section 24-9-101, Wyoming Statutes, 1977.
“2. The proposed private road is unnecessary.
“3. No viewers or appraisers should be appointed by this Board to determine damages to the property of the contestees caused by location of a road over their property until contestants have shown necessity, lack of access, and that any such road over the property of contestees will be lawfully and legally continued over the lands of all landowners whose property lies between the public road and the lands of contestees, which proof has not been established.
“4. The said 80 acres has an outlet and connection with a public road, which outlet is convenient and available to the applicants!5!
“5. The Board of County Commissioners has jurisdiction over the parties hereto as well as the subject matter hereof!6!
“6. The State of Wyoming and the United States of America are necessary and indispensable parties to this proceeding and the Board has no jurisdiction to determine if a private road should be granted in the absence of notice to all the owners of land over which the private road is applied for.
¡k * * * *
The 'appellees then sought review of this .action by the county commissioners in the district court. The district court considered the matter and entered an order reversing the action of the commission on June 4, 1979. In pertinent part that order provides:
“1.
“That any road to the South that would cross the land of the Contestee, Two Bar Ranch Company, would of necessity, have to cross land belonging to the State of Wyoming. Under Article 18, Paragraph 3 of the Wyoming Constitution and the various regulations adopted by the Board of Land Commissioners, a private road may not be granted across State land. Pursuant to this authority and various statutes, the Board of County Commissioners Action should be affirmed insofar as it pertains to the lands of Two Bar Ranch Company, and said Company should be dismissed as to further proceedings!7!
“2.
“That proper notice was given to all owners of land over which the private road is applied for by Contestants. Since a private road cannot be acquired over State land, it was not necessary to give them notice. It was not necessary to give [1284]*1284notice to the U.S. Bureau of Land Management, as the evidence shows there is a public road across the Bureau of Land Management land that can be joined with the private road from Contestants land. [See fn. 7.]
“3.
“That Section 24-9-101 of the Wyoming Statutes 1977 states that, any person whose land shall be so situated that it has no outlet to, nor connection to a public road, may make application in writing to the Board of County Commissioners of his county at a regular session, for a private road leading from his premises to some convenient road . . The statute then proceeds to state that ‘. . .if the said Board shall find that the applicant has complied with the law, and that such private road is necessary, said board shall appoint three (3) disinterested freeholders and electors of the county as viewers and appraisers . It was stipulated between the Contestants and Contestees, Fred McGuire and Mickey McGuire, that the eighty (80) acres in question has no outlet to a public road.
“4.
“It is the finding of the Court that the undisputed fact that the land of Contestants is land-locked is in and of itself a necessity, and that the Board of County Commissioners, in failing to appoint three (3) disinterested freeholders and electors of the county as viewers and appraisers, were in error, and that their decision should be reversed and the case remanded to the Board of County Commissioners.
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this matter be remanded to the Board of County Commissioners of Platte County and that said Commissioners shall appoint the three (3) viewers and appraisers as provided under Section 24-9-101, Wyoming Statutes, 1977, and to thereafter follow the procedure set forth in said Section with instructions to the viewers and appraisers that in viewing and locating a .private road according to the application of the Contestants, that they shall not proceed south of said eighty (80) acre tract.
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Two Bar Ranch Company be dismissed as a Contestee.”
It is conceded, and it has been a stipulated fact from the very outset of this case, that the appellees have no outlet to a public . road. The issues as presented by the appellants are:
1. The district court erred in finding that the trail across the BLM lands is a public road. It is not a public road.
2. The district court erred in providing the relief it did because the appellees failed to give notice to all other landowners whose lands lie between the 80-acre parcel and the convenient public roads in the area.
3. The district court erred in finding that any road to the south which crossed Two Bar Ranch property would of necessity cross lands belonging to the State of Wyoming.
4. The district court erred in overruling the county commissioners on the issue of necessity.
5. The district court erred in finding that a private right-of-way may not be obtained over State lands.
The appellees are fully satisfied with the relief given by the district court and they defend its judgment (order) without reservation.
We will affirm the district court’s remand to the county commissioners but with different directions.
In this case, we have an appeal from the Board of County «Commissioners of Platte County to the district court. The district court is sitting as an intermediate appellate court with power only to review the action taken by the county commissioners. It is not within the prerogatives of courts to substitute their judgment for administrative authority or to perform duties assigned by law to administrative boards, [1285]*1285committees, and officers. Sweetwater County Planning Committee for Organization of School Districts v. Hinkle, Wyo.1972, 493 P.2d 1050.
The district court conducts its review in accordance with § 9-4-114, W.S.1977:8
“(a) Subject to the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted and in the absence of any statutory or common-law provision precluding or limiting judicial review, any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency in a contested case, or by other agency action or inaction, or any person affected in fact by a rule adopted by an agency, is entitled to judicial review in the district court for the county in which such administrative action or inaction was taken, or in which any real property affected by such administrative action or inaction is located * * *. The procedure to be followed in such proceeding before the district court shall be in accordance with rules heretofore or hereinafter adopted by the Wyoming supreme court.
* * * * * *
“(c) The court’s review pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be limited to a determination that:
“(i) The agency acted without or in excess of its powers;
“(ii) The decision or other agency action was procured by fraud;
“(iii) The decision or other agency action is in conformity with law;
“(iv) The findings of facts in issue in a contested case are supported by substantial evidence; and
“(v) The decision or other agency action is arbitrary, capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion.” 9
The central concerns of the district court’s review are to ensure that the county commissioners adhered to the governing statute and to ensure that their factual conclusions are supported by the evidence. The county commissioners were charged with the responsibility of entertaining appellees’ application under the statute and to render a decision in good faith and in conformity with the evidence presented to them.
It is this court’s obligation to make sense out of a statute and give full force and effect to the legislative product. • Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, Wyo.1979, 595 P.2d 965. In construing statutes, the intention of the law-making body must be ascertained from the language of the statute as nearly as possible. Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Casper, Wyo. 1976, 551 P.2d 687. We must not give a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of another interpretation.
The parties stipulated that there was no outlet from the 80-acre parcel to, nor connection with, a public road. This is also abundantly clear from the record. There is no requirement in § 24-9-101, supra, that the land be in use at the time the application is filed or that the nature of its future use be disclosed. The appellees were therefore entitled to proceed under the statute. The first thing the appellants had to do was petition the county commissioners for a private road “leading from his [their] premise's to some convenient public road.” The applicant complied with the notice requirements. It appears plain in the statute that the applicant must ask for the road with some specificity because the viewers are to “meet on a day named * * * on the proposed road, and view and locate a private road according to the application therefor.” The appellees merely said they wanted a road and gave notice to two parties and suggested that the road should go over the lands of one or the other but appellees did not know which, saying that was up to the viewers.. The statutory language requires the applicants to set out a description of the road it proposes.
In this case, the appellees did not get beyond that first requirement. Their application did not fully comply with the law, [1286]*1286and the county commissioners failed to follow the language of the statute. The parties and the agency are bound to follow the statutory procedure. Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of Canada Ltd. v. Y-Tex Corporation, Wyo.1979, 590 P.2d 1306. Under these circumstances, it was incumbent upon the district court in its process of review to reverse the findings and conclusions of the county commissioners and direct entry of an order dismissing the application, without prejudice, for failure of the applicants to describe a road.
Some additional holdings are appropriate in order to return the case with some guidance in that it appears the matter will, in all likelihood, be renewed. It is proper for an appellate court to decide questions that are bound to arise again. Chicago and North Western Railway Company v. City of Riverton, 1952, on reh. 70 Wyo. 119, 247 P.2d 660. We agree with the district judge that the county commissioners’ finding that the road was not “necessary” was unsupported by the evidence. The evidence clearly demands the opposite conclusion. We hold that any person whose land is so situated that it has no outlet — no legally enforceable means by which he can gain access — has demonstrated necessity, as a matter of law, without there being a further need to show that he lives on that land or that it is being, or will be, used for some specific purpose nor was it proper to inquire into impact on adjoining owners (other than the owners whose land will be taken), financial interest of applicants, use for hunting, fences and improvements, or whether permissive access had been denied. In our view, the word “necessary” in the statute refers only to the lack of the type of outlet we have described to a “convenient” public road.
The district court’s order contains some surplusage in the light of our holding that the applicants must initially propose a road by some adequate description. The ultimate power to locate the road as proposed by the applicants rests with the viewers to be appointed by the county commissioners.
Once the commissioners have made their dual finding that the applicant has complied with the law and the road is necessary, the viewers then go to that spot and mark out the road. Of course, the applicant must make his request in good faith and the route chosen must be reasonable 10 and convenient — but, the route chosen does not have to be the most convenient and reasonable route possible taking into account all possible routes. It must be simply a reasonable and convenient route. See generally 2A Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 7.626 (3d ed. 1979); Solana Land Co. v. Murphey, 1949, 69 Ariz. 117, 210 P.2d 593, 598. Applicant may not leave on the doorstep of the viewers a request that they map out a convenient private road for the applicant. The applicant has the responsibility for studying alternative routes and asking in good faith for one that is reasonable and convenient. Only then may the applicant be said to have complied with the law so that the county commissioners have jurisdiction to proceed.
Once the viewers arrive at the proposed road, they then ascertain whether it is located “so as to do the least possible damage to the lands through which such private road is located.” Section 24-9-101, supra. We read the language of the section to say that if the road as proposed is not so located, the viewers may alter its course and “stake out,” one that does. In either event, the viewers after approving a route then proceed to ascertain damages “sustained by the owner or owners” over which the road is to be established and make a return to the county commissioners of their findings in that regard, along with a plat of the road they have located and marked.
When carefully studied, the statute is quite simple and must be followed. It has been made unnecessarily complicated by [1287]*1287both the county commissioners and the district judge. Neither the county commissioners nor the district court are at liberty to graft onto the statute that which they think ought to be included or to delete that which they find inconvenient. Neither they nor we have authority to add to or delete from a statute. Lo Sasso v. Braun, Wyo. 1963, 386 P.2d 630.
There remains one question. In their brief and at oral argument, the appellees pointed out that their real objective is to cross the lands of the appellants Fred and, Mickey McGuire to join up with what is identified as the BLM road across lands of the United States, which road joins with a public road. According to the testimony of a BLM representative, it is used by the public; and the county commissioners found that it had been used by the public for some forty years. No authority has been presented that an individual may condemn land of the United States for a private road nor was the United States joined in this action.
The question then is whether connecting to the BLM road satisfies the terms of § 24-9-101, supra, as a convenient public road to which appellees may connect by the private road they desire to acquire.
The statutory section we examine does not define public road. Nixon v. Edwards, 1953, 72 Wyo. 274, 264 P.2d 287, cited by appellants, is not helpful because it involves no question of connecting to a federal road across public lands, such as we have here. State statutes pertaining to state and county roads and which do contain some definitions are not applicable to roads such as the BLM road, the latter being under the jurisdiction of the United States. We cannot adjudicate its status so as to in any fashion bind the United States.11 We are limited to generally describing it in the light of the statute we have before us.
The statute does not require connection with a public road that is state or county controlled. The evidence discloses that the public has traversed the BLM road for many years and a realty specialist from BLM testified that any United States citizen may travel existing roads or trails on public lands unless specifically closed by BLM and there appear to be no plans to close the road. The Board of County Commissioners specifically found as a fact which is probably a conclusion of law that § 3 of the Unlawful Enclosure of Public Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 106312 prevents obstruction of free passage over public lands of the United States.
There is nothing in the record or findings of the Board of County Commissioners which would indicate that the public does not have free access to and across the BLM road. Upon that premise, then, we are at liberty to determine whether it is a public road within the contemplation of § 24-9-101, supra. It must be realized that public roads at the time of statehood were not what we conceive them to be under existing Wyoming statutes applicable to state and county roads. It is interesting to note that 43 U.S.C. 1063 was enacted the year (1885) before the territorial legislature adopted (1886) the predecessor to the statute we now have before us for interpretation.
[1288]*1288We must, therefore, define a public road in the general sense, keeping in mind what the enacting legislature must have intended at the time of passage of the act, when the State was just coming to life.
The status of BLM roads has been considered by at least one other court. In Major v. Douglas County, 1971, 6 Or.App. 544, 488 P.2d 808, the court there considered the test to be the right of the public to use it. There, like here, the general public had for many years enjoyed the right to use the BLM road; so, therefore, it was a public road within Oregon statutory language, “any public road within the county.” That holding is no different conceptually than the general one used in the absence of an applicable statutory definition. A public road is one that the public generally — not merely a portion of the public — is privileged to use. In re Penn Avenue, 1956, 386 Pa. 403, 126 A.2d 715; Galloway v. Wyatt Metal & Boiler Works, 1938, 189 La. 837, 181 So. 187, 189; Sumner County v. Interurban Transp. Co., 1919, 141 Tenn. 493, 213 S.W. 412, 413, 5 A.L.R. 765; Heninger v. Peery, 1904, 102 Va. 896, 47 S.E. 1013. Within the facts reflected by the record, then, we must conclude that the BLM road is a public road within the terms of § 24-9-101, supra.
Because of our dispositions, it is unnecessary for us to address definitively the other issues raised by the appellant.
A response to the dissent is in order. This method of obtaining a way of necessity originated in 1886. The language of the territorial statute as it appeared in 1886 was:
“Sec. 13. Any person whose land shall be so situated that it has no connection with any public road, may make application in writing to the county commissioners of his county at a regular session, for a private road leading from his premises to some convenient public road, and thereupon the said commissionere [sic] shall appoint three disinterested householders of the county as viewers, and cause an order to be issued directing them to meet on a day named in such order to view and locate a private road according to the application, and to assess the damages to be sustained thereby, and after being duly sworn or affirmed, faithfully and impartially to discharge the duties of their appointments, and after at least three days’ notice given to all persons through whose lands such private road is to be located, such viewers shall proceed to locate and mark out a private road thirty feet in width, from certain point on the premises of the applicant to some certain point on the public road, so as to do the least possible damage to the lands through which such private road is located, and they shall also at the same time assess the damages sustained by the person and persons owning such land.”
The statute remained into statehood in this form until it was amended in 1901. Ch. 11, §§ 1-3, Wyo. Sess. Laws. The statute has remained virtually unchanged since 1901. We consider it readily apparent that the legislature intended the procedure to provide in a local forum a readily available, economically affordable, and time efficient method whereby a landowner could obtain a means of access to his property.
Seemingly, there are few early cases interpreting or applying this statute. In McIlquham v. Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Co., 1909, 18 Wyo. 53, 104 P. 20, this court implicitly found that the statute was an alternative remedy and it was not intended to supplant the common-law right of a grantee to a means of access to his land over the lands of his grantor.
In Hoffmeister v. McIntosh, Wyo.1961, 361 P.2d 678, rehearing denied 364 P.2d 823, this court addressed several questions relating to the procedure for appeal from a determination made by a county commission. Perhaps the most significant aspects of that opinion are its suggestion that Rules 72 through 76, W.R.C.P.,13 govern the procedure to be followed on appeal in the district court and its holding that the district court is without authority to adjudicate, as a fact, the question of necessity. In the opinion [1289]*1289denying a rehearing, this court provided rather clear guidance to the district courts when it pointed out:
“ * * * This means, of course, that the trial in the district court will be a review of the record and not a trial de novo. However, in that connection it should be remembered that such administrative tribunals are obligated in their disposition of cases to consider all relevant evidence and argument, and in an appeal from an inferior tribunal, the minutes, if incomplete, are subject to supplementation by competent evidence which would show actual occurrences before the agency.” (Footnotes omitted.) Hoffmeister v. McIntosh, supra, 364 P.2d at 823-824.
This court gave some detailed attention to a similar proceeding in Snell v. Ruppert, Wyo.1975, 541 P.2d 1042. That case answered several questions left open in the early case of Mcllquham v. Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Co. supra, and made it clear that the proceedings before the county commissioners were administrative in nature, and that the appeal to the district court is an administrative review. A related matter was addressed by this court in Big Horn County Commissioners v. Hinckley, Wyo.1979, 593 P.2d 573. From the Snell and Hinckley cases, it is readily discernible that appeals from proceedings had before a county commission under § 24-9-101 are now governed by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act and Rule 12, WRAP. For years it has been recognized that county commissioners grant private roads.
We cannot agree that §§ 24-9-101 et seq., supra, were either impliedly or directly repealed by § 1-26-405, W.S.1977, or Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P. Implied repeals are not favored. Nehring v. Russell, Wyo.1978, 582 P.2d 67; Thomas v. State, Wyo.1977, 562 P.2d 1287.
Section 1-26-405 does not impliedly repeal §§ 24-9-101 et seq. Sections 1-26-405 and 24-9-101 are not so repugnant that the earlier enactment, § 24-9-101, must fall. Section 1-26-405 read in context contemplates an action or proceeding in a judicial forum, as does Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P.
Section 1-26-405 first appears in a revision of Title 1, of the Wyoming Statutes as a part of ch. 188, § 1, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws.14 This statute has reference to ways of necessity in relation to:
“ * * * reservoirs, drains, flumes, ditches including return flow and waste water ditches, underground water pipelines, pumping stations and other necessary appurtenances, canals, electric power transmission lines, railroad trackage, sidings, spur tracks, tramways or mine truck haul roads required in the course of their business for agricultural, mining, milling, electric power transmission and distribution, domestic, municipal or sanitary purposes, or for the transportation of coal from any coal mine or railroad line. $ * * fy
Articles 1, 2 and 3 of ch. 27 dealing with public buildings and school sites; public utility plants and necessities; railroads; road ditch and flume companies; pipeline, telegraph, telephone; and, electric transmission companies, each haVe provisions requiring that the proceedings be conducted pursuant to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. It, therefore, appears that the section only applies to Art. 4, ch. 27, which upon publication in the Wyoming Statutes appears as part of Art. 4, ch. 26 [sic]. Nowhere is there any reference in ch. 27 [26] to its application to Title 24, of the Wyoming Statutes where this particular statute is found. The context and position of the section in the act are unmistakable indicia that the legislature intended to prescribe a different forum and different procedures for all the above listed types of condemnation than for private roads. Hoffmeister v. McIntosh, supra.
Section 24-9-101 provides a method to be initiated before an executive agency for the establishment of a private road. A close [1290]*1290reading of pertinent statutes indicates that the McGuires would not qualify to pursue condemnation under §§ 1-26-401, et seq., W.S.1977. The procedure established by § 24-9-101, supra, has been appropriate to the needs of the people of this state, and apparently has worked satisfactorily over the years. The Board of County Commissioners is an appropriate body to deal with most such problems of a local nature, and avoids the necessity of burdening the district courts with these matters initially. No authority has been presented by the dissent which gives the judicial branch exclusive jurisdiction over eminent domain proceedings.
The assertion that Rule 71.1, supra, can be interpreted to have directly repealed §§ 24-9-101, et seq., also seems to stray beyond the bounds of this court’s power to supersede acts of the legislature. We are empowered to make rules that are procedural in nature. Sections 24-9-101 et seq., create a substantive and jurisdictional right that our rule-making powers cannot change. To do so would be to usurp a power clearly vested in the legislature. This court cannot legislate by repealing that section.
The rule-making power of the Wyoming Supreme Court is restricted by statute.15 We cannot by rule in any way change substantive rights or enlarge the jurisdiction of any court. It is obvious from the language of § 24-9-101, supra, that the legislature has granted county commissioners jurisdiction to adjudicate the establishment of private roads. This court has no authority to transfer that jurisdiction to the district courts which would then apply Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P. to such a proceeding.
“Jurisdiction” is the power to hear and determine the matter in controversy between the parties. Begley v. Nall, 1946, 62 Wyo. 254, 166 P.2d 466. A number of things are necessary to confer jurisdiction in its complete form. First, it must have general power over matters of the kind involved in a particular case; next, the proceeding must be initiated in some particular manner; and finally, there must be notice to the parties. Padlock Ranch, Inc. v. Washakie Needles Irr. Dist., 1936, on reh. 50 Wyo. 253, 273, 61 P.2d 410, 411. In State ex rel. Yohe v. District Court of Eighth Jud. Dist. In and For Natrona Cty., 1925, 33 Wyo. 281, 288, 238 P. 545, 547, this court rather extensively discusses jurisdiction; and, jn its definition of “power,” points out that a primary prerequisite is that a court before proceeding must have authority to do so. The county commissioners have statutory power in an original proceeding to condemn private roads. The district court has power to review those proceedings but not original jurisdiction.
In the case before us, the legislature has conferred authority on the county commissioners as a tribunal to create private roads. The district court can no more assume authority to create private roads than it can usurp the authority of the Public Service Commission to fix utility rates, or the authority of a city to grant liquor licenses or the state engineer to grant irrigation per[1291]*1291mits. Nor can it require the county commissioners to follow Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P. The above authority compels us to respond to the theory set out in the dissent.
The order of the district court is affirmed only in that it reversed the commissioners and remanded for further proceedings. The matter is remanded by this court to the district court with directions that it vacate its order and enter one reversing the order of the county commissioners and directing that any future proceedings be in conformity with the sense of this opinion.