McGuire v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.

78 F.R.D. 732, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17072
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJune 22, 1978
DocketCase No. 76-C-85
StatusPublished

This text of 78 F.R.D. 732 (McGuire v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McGuire v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 78 F.R.D. 732, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17072 (E.D. Wis. 1978).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

REYNOLDS, Chief Judge.

This is a maritime personal injury action arising under 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-905. The plaintiff Donald McGuire was injured on October 8, 1975, when he fell from a ladder into the hold of a ship on which he was engaged in lashing cargo. The defendant Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., (“Lykes”) is the owner of the ship in question. The defendant Hansen Seaway Service, Ltd., (“Hansen”) is a stevedore company hired by the defendant Lykes to load cargo onto the ship. Third party defendant Dawes Rigging and Crane Service, Inc., (“Dawes”), plaintiff’s employer, was hired by Hansen to assist in lashing the cargo. The additional third party defendant Advance Boiler and Tank Company, (“Advance”) was hired by Lykes to make repairs on the ship and was engaged in so doing at the time of the accident.

Lykes filed a third party complaint against Advance on May 27, 1977, for contribution or indemnification in the event that Lykes is found liable to the plaintiff, asserting that advance breached its warranty or workmanlike service to Lykes in failing to repair the ladder from which plaintiff fell in a timely manner, and further asserting that Advance was negligent in the performance of its work and in failing to post warning signs by the ladder in question or to take other measures to prevent access to the ladder. Advance has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons hereafter stated, the motion will be denied.

From the pleadings and papers filed herein, it appears that Lykes contracted with Advance on October 2, 1975, to perform repairs to the ship S.S. Jean Lykes when it docked in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on October 8, 1975. Advance was given a list of items in need of repair on the morning of October 8 when it commenced work on the ship, and additional items were included in the course of the morning, although not put onto the written list. Among those items was the ladder in hatch No. 2 from which the plaintiff fell at approximately eleven o’clock A.M. At that time, Advance asserts, it was engaged in completing other repairs, and had not yet had time to work on the ladder in question. It also asserts that it did not have effective control over the area in which the injury occurred at the time that it occurred, and therefore had no duty either to warn persons in plaintiff’s position of the defective condition of the ladder or to take precautionary measures to prevent injury.

Prior to the amendment of Title 33 U.S.C., in 1972, a shipowner had been considered to be strictly liable for injuries to longshoremen which occurred on shipboard, on the theory that the shipowner had a continuing duty to provide longshoremen with a reasonably safe place to work. In 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 905 was amended to provide in part: [734]*734Whereas even prior to the 1972 amendments, a shipowner could recover under a contract theory from a third party which breached its warranty of workmanlike service, see, e. g., Delaneuville, Jr. v. Simonsen, Jr., 437 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1971); H & H Ship Service Co. v. Weyerhaeuser Line, 382 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1967), the effect of the 1972 amendments was to abolish the doctrine of seaworthiness for tort purposes and to apply land based principles of negligence to maritime personal injury claims. See, e. g., Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., Panama, 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976); Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977). Thus, as before, liability under a contract theory should fall on the party “best situated to adopt preventive measures and thereby to reduce the likelihood of injury,” Italia Societa Per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., Inc., 376 U.S. 315, 324, 84 S.Ct. 748, 754, 11 L.Ed.2d 732 (1964); Lopez v. Oldendorf, 545 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1976); H & H Ship Service Co. v. Weyerhaeuser, supra; however, for tort purposes traditional concepts of negligence will apply. See, e. g., Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F.Supp. 1092 (D.C.Md.1975).

[733]*733“In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void. * * * . The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. * * *

[734]*734Advance asserts in its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment that the effect of the 1972 amendments has been to place the primary responsibility for providing a safe place to work for longshoremen upon the stevedore-employer or independent contractor. It states at 7-8:

“ * * * [Ojnce the stevedore is placed on notice that a defective condition exists on board the ship, it must take ‘immediate, affirmative action to correct it, and to make the ship safe for its intended use.’ [Citation omitted.] Still, even this duty is tempered somewhat as the stevedore or other independent contractor must have sufficient time between the discovery of the defect and the accident in order to correct the defect. [Citation omitted.]
“As to the stevedore or independent contractor, then, it is clear that he is liable for injuries resulting from open and obvious conditions present at the time control of the area was taken and for defects arising while the area is under his control, provided he had sufficient time to remedy the condition.”

Advance also states “that independent repairmen, on bo,ard ship for the purpose of carrying out repairs, have a similar duty to the ship and to those persons who may be lawfully found upon it. * * * . In other words, he owes the same duty as a stevedore in those areas over which he exercises control. [Citation omitted.]” (Brief at 8.)

Advance claims that the depositions and other materials on file in this action conclusively demonstrate that it did not have control over the area where the plaintiff fell prior to occurrence of the injury and that it did not have an opportunity to repair the ladder prior to that time. It asserts that it therefore cannot be liable to Lykes for indemnification or contribution in the event that Lykes is held liable to the plaintiff.1

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Bluebook (online)
78 F.R.D. 732, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17072, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcguire-v-lykes-bros-steamship-co-wied-1978.