McGrath v. United States

1 Cl. Ct. 236, 1982 U.S. Claims LEXIS 2292
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedDecember 1, 1982
DocketNo. 87-81C
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 1 Cl. Ct. 236 (McGrath v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McGrath v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 236, 1982 U.S. Claims LEXIS 2292 (cc 1982).

Opinion

OPINION

SETO, Judge:

This civilian pay case comes to this court on cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the challenge of George E. McGrath, Jr. (McGrath), to an adverse ruling by the Federal Employee Appeals Authority (FEAA). The issues have been briefed and oral argument has taken place.

George McGrath was a GS-18 writer for the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) of the Department of Agriculture. McGrath began his writing career with the Government in January 1967, as a GS-9. He was promoted to GS-11 on October 1,1967, and to a GS-12 shortly thereafter. McGrath was a writer throughout his Government career. During the first 6 months of 1976, several charges of poor performance were levied against McGrath. Of the 13 work assignments given to McGrath during that period, the SCS cited 11 of these assignments to be of such poor writing quality that dismissal was justified.

On July 16, 1976, McGrath was given advance notice of a proposal to remove him from the SCS. He was removed on October 8,1976. The FEAA, after a hearing, issued its opinion on September 10,1977, affirming 71 23of the 13 charges. McGrath now seeks review by this court, challenging the decision of the FEAA and the severity of the penalty. We uphold the administrative decision.

This court’s standard of review in civilian pay cases is limited to determining [237]*237whether “ * * * the final administrative appellate decision was in conformance with the Constitution, statutes, and regulations, was not arbitrary or capricious or taken in bad faith, and was supported by substantial evidence.” Giles v. United States, 213 Ct.Cl. 602, 605, 553 F.2d 647, 649 (1977); Moss v. United States, Ct.Cl. No. 206-80C (Order entered January 29, 1982); Summers v. United States, 227 Ct.Cl. 353, 358, 648 F.2d 1324, 1327 (1981); Boyle v. United States, 207 Ct.Cl. 27, 515 F.2d 1397 (1975); Morelli v. United States, 177 Ct.Cl. 848 (1966).

Plaintiff in the instant case, concedes that the FEAA followed all proper procedures. Plaintiff has, however, challenged the substantiality of the evidence supporting his removal by the SCS. Furthermore, he contends that removal was too severe a penalty given the subjective evaluation of his performance.

All of the charges upheld by the FEAA concerned plaintiff’s unsatisfactory performance. Specifically, plaintiff failed to meet writing assignment deadlines, to follow his supervisor’s instructions, and to meet the requirements of a GS-13 writing position. The FEAA considered evidence of McGrath’s writing,2 critiques given to McGrath at the time of his performance, and testimony as to what would have been acceptable performance of one in McGrath’s position. Thus, FEAA had substantial evidence to support its decision that McGrath did not fulfill the requirements of his job.

Plaintiff asserts that not all material evidence was presented to the FEAA, namely, that the testimony of Mr. Finley Parks, a co-worker of McGrath, was not taken. Parks submitted an affidavit, in plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, in support of McGrath. Parks’ statements are hearsay, and not based on firsthand knowledge. Two witnesses with testimonies similar to Parks were heard by the FEAA and were deemed unpersuasive for having no firsthand knowledge. Therefore, even if the FEAA had been afforded access to Parks’ redundant testimony, it would not have been persuaded to reverse its decision.

Plaintiff, in addition, contends that the SCS failed to show a nexus between the poor-writing charges alleged against him and the efficiency of SCS. Moreover, plaintiff asserts that he never repudiated his supervisor’s guidance and that he did submit drafts which could be used by the SCS. Plaintiff adduces that the charges in question arise merely because of different writing styles, i.e., plaintiff’s vis-a-vis his supervisor’s.

Plaintiff’s responsibilities included not only formulating ideas for a particular project, but also writing the material in a manner requiring minimum revision. It is not enough to acknowledge that plaintiff put forth his best efforts to complete his assignments; plaintiff was required to complete his assignments to the satisfaction of his supervisors.

We find it proper for an agency to presume that there is a nexus between the efficiency of SCS and conduct which directly relates to its employee’s work performance, i.e., poor writing ability. Staton v. United States, Ct.Cl. No. 301-80C (Order [238]*238entered July 24, 1981). In the instant case, the nexus between plaintiff’s poor writing ability and the efficiency of the agency, e.g., SCS, is “obvious on the face of the facts.” Phillips v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir.1978). SCS submitted evidence that the agency was required to have other employees edit and rewrite the work product of the plaintiff. Plaintiff’s supervisor considered McGrath’s work unacceptable, since substantial rewriting was required, as opposed to mere stylistic changes. Moreover, the fact that plaintiff’s supervisor disapproved of plaintiff’s work, dispels plaintiff’s contention that he followed his supervisor’s writing instructions.

Finally, plaintiff asserts that removal was too severe a penalty. SCS cites persuasive cases which hold that “the measure of the penalty is within the discretion of the agency” unless there is an abuse of discretion. Butz v. Glover Livestock Commission, 411 U.S. 182, 187-188, 93 S.Ct. 1455, 1458-1459, 36 L.Ed.2d 142 (1973); Harris v. United States,3 Ct.Cl. No. 5-80C (Order dated June 1, 1981); Rifkin v. United States, 209 Ct.Cl. 566 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098, 97 S.Ct. 1117, 51 L.Ed.2d 545 (1977). Plaintiff cites cases which are rare exceptions to the general rule of leaving discretion with the agency. In each of these cases, the charges against the Government employee bordered on being trivial. Such is not the case here; and therefore these cases are inapposite.

Plaintiff argues that a demotion, rather than a dismissal, is appropriate pursuant to Federal Personnel Manual Supplement 752-1, subparagraph 53-26(4).

The Federal Personnel Manual Supplement (FPMS) states: “ * * * what constitutes a proper or valid cause is essentially for the agency to decide. Section 01.3(d) of Executive Order 9830 makes agencies responsible for removing, demoting, or reassigning any employee whose conduct or capacity is such that one of these actions will ‘promote the efficiency of the service.’ ” FPM Supp. 752-1, § 3-1(a) (1976).

The sole case proffered by plaintiff pursuant to the FPMS, subparagraph 53-26(4) hereinabove mentioned, involved the reversal of a removal for inefficiency after promotion; however, it only involved a nonprofessional clerical lower grade-level Federal employee, and therefore is inapposite.

An employee had worked for a number of years in grade GS-2 and grade GS-3 clerical positions, requiring incidental and minimal general typing, but no typing of correspondence.

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