McGrath v. Parker
This text of 4 A.D.3d 457 (McGrath v. Parker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In an action, inter alia, to set aside a separation agreement, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Emerson, J.), dated September 30, 2002, which, among other things, granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
A party seeking to set aside a separation agreement which is fair on its face must prove fraud, duress, overreaching, or that the agreement is unconscionable (see Wilson v Neppell, 253 AD2d 493, 494 [1998]). Here, the defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). In opposition, the plaintiff submitted affidavits that were conclusory, vague, and contradicted by documentary evidence. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to raise an issue of fact, precluding summary judgment (see Davidoff v Davidoff, 93 AD2d 805 [1983]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Davidoff v Davidoff, supra).
The plaintiffs remaining contentions are without merit. S. Miller, J.E, H. Miller, Crane and Rivera, JJ., concur.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
4 A.D.3d 457, 771 N.Y.S.2d 691, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1691, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcgrath-v-parker-nyappdiv-2004.