McGinley v. Luv N Care Ltd

District Court, W.D. Louisiana·Decided September 20, 2023·No. 3:17-cv-00821·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA MONROE DIVISION MICHAEL L. McGINLEY, ET AL. CASE NO. 3:17-CV-00821 LEAD VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY LUV N’ CARE, LTD., ET AL. MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

MEMORANDUM RULING

This is a patent action involving U.S. Patent No. 8,636,178 (the ’178 Patent). The ’178 Patent issued on January 28, 2014, and is related to a “flexible panel pitcher device.” Pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 301] filed by Luv n’ care, Ltd. (“LNC”), Admar International, Inc. (“Admar”), BuyBabyDirect, LLC (“BBD”), Bayou Graphics and Design, LLC (“BGD”), Control Services, Inc. (“CS”), and HHHII, LLC (“HHHII”), (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiffs Michael L. McGinley and S C Products, Inc., (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed an Opposition [Doc. No. 319], and Defendants filed a Reply [Doc. No. 360]. The matter is fully briefed. Also pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Misleading Photographs and Supporting Memorandum [Doc. No. 362]. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition [Doc. No. 387], and Defendants filed a Reply [Doc. No. 393]. The matter is fully briefed. The Court is now prepared to rule on these motions.1 I. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or defense--on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

1 After carefully considering the paper filed, the Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; LR 78.1. genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion by identifying portions of the record which highlight the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Topalian v. Ehrmann, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be . . . disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to

particular parts of materials in the record . . . ). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. If the moving party can meet the initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1994). In evaluating the evidence tendered by the parties, the Court must accept the evidence of the nonmovant as credible and draw all justifiable inferences in

its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, “a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.” Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The summary-judgment standard on a patent claim is the same as the standard for other claims. Avia Group Int'l v. L.A. Gear Calif., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1560-61 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A determination of patent infringement involves a two-step inquiry. “The court must first interpret the claims to determine their scope and meaning. It must then compare the properly construed claims to the allegedly infringing device.” Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The comparison is only to the patent claims, not to any specific embodiment in the patent specification or to the patent holder’s commercial embodiment. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The patent holder bears the burden of proving infringement by a preponderance of the evidence. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 557 (2014); Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Tech.

Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). The first step of this inquiry is a legal determination. The second step is primarily factual, though to support a judgment of infringement the accused device must satisfy every limitation in the asserted claims, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Freedman Seating Co. v. American Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Although the comparison of the claims to the accused system is a fact question, summary judgment may be granted if no reasonable jury could find infringement. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8, 117 S. Ct. 1040, 137 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1997).

II. ANALYSIS

The ‘178 Patent issued with claims directed to a container that requires, among other limitations, “continuous sidewall having a flexible portion thereof that defines a generally flat sidewall section.” ’178 Patent at Claims 1 and 6. This case is here on remand from the Federal Circuit that in an opinion dated July 29, 2020, construed the “generally flat” limitation to mean “mostly flat and not, as a whole, V-shaped, round or cylindrical.” McGinley v. Luv n’ care, Ltd., 819 Fed. Appx. 913 (Fed. Cir. 2020) [Doc. No. 258 at 13]2. The Federal Circuit explained that “[w]hile ‘generally flat,’ in this case, does not mean ‘perfectly flat,’” such a surface could be perfectly flat or conversely include some curvature. Id. (holding that the term “generally flat” “(1)

2 Citations are to the filing’s number in the docket [Doc. No.] and pin cites are to the page numbers assigned through ECF. does not foreclose perfect flatness, and (2) can allow for minor imperfections, including curved portions.”). Agreeing “with much of this [Court’s] analysis,” the Federal Circuit held that “the United States Patent and Trademark Office (‘USPTO’) issued a double patenting rejection because the claims of the ’178 patent’s underlying application were the same as those in McGinley’s own earlier patent, disclosing fully rounded pitchers.” Id. In response to this rejection, “McGinley amended the now-asserted claims [1 and 6] … to include the ‘generally flat’ limitation and argued that neither his prior patent nor the prior art claimed or disclosed, respectively, either a ‘generally

flat sidewall section’ or a ‘generally flat inwardly flexible panel.’” Id.

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