McGill v. Shinn

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: May 14, 2025
• Docket: 2:21-cv-01728
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Jimmy LaShawn McGill, No. CV-21-01728-PHX-DJH

10 Petitioner, ORDER

11 v.

12 David Shinn, et al.,

13 Respondents. 14 15 Before the Court is the January 26, 2023, Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of 16 Magistrate Judge Camille D. Bibles (Doc. 21) recommending the Court deny Petitioner 17 Jimmy LaShawn McGill’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 18 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”) (Doc. 1). Petitioner challenges the sentences imposed on 19 him by an Arizona state court for first-degree murder, sexual assault, and second-degree 20 burglary. (Doc. 21 at 1) (quoting State v. McGill, 2017 WL 3048454, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 21 July 19, 2017)). Petitioner, through counsel, timely filed Objections to the R&R on 22 February 9, 2023 (Doc. 22). The Respondents filed a Response to Petitioner’s Objections 23 on February 22, 2023 (Doc. 23). For the following reasons, the Court overrules Petitioner’s 24 objections, adopts the R&R as the Order of the Court, and denies the Petition with 25 prejudice. 26 I. BACKGROUND 27 Magistrate Judge Bibles recounted the factual and procedural background of 28 Petitioner’s post-conviction cases in state court. (Doc. 21 at 1–3). Neither party objected 1 to this recounting and the Court hereby accepts and adopts it. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 2 140, 152 (1989) (“There is no indication that Congress . . . intended [the Federal 3 Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)] to require a district judge to review a 4 magistrate’s report to which no objections are filed.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) 5 (“The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition 6 that has been properly objected to.”). 7 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 8 A district court “must make a de novo determination of those portions of the 9 [magistrate judge’s] report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or 10 modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 11 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A district court is only required to review those portions 12 objected to by a party, meaning a court can adopt without further review all portions not 13 objected to. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) 14 (en banc). 15 III. LEGAL STANDARD 16 Petitioner is in custody based on state court convictions. Accordingly, the 17 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 applies. 18 Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2013). For Section 2254(d) claims, the Court 19 reviews the last reasoned state court decision addressing the claim. E.g., Ylst v. 20 Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). A federal court cannot grant habeas relief based 21 on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state 22 court’s decision was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 23 established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) 24 “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 25 the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 26 For a federal court, whether the “state court err[ed] in determining the facts is a 27 different question from whether it errs in applying the law.” Cf. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 28 333, 342 (2006). Generally, § 2254(d)(1) applies to challenges to purely legal questions 1 resolved by the state court and § 2254(d)(2) applies to purely factual questions resolved by 2 the state court. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). 3 A. Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) 4 Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) unless he can 5 establish that the state court proceedings “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 6 involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 7 the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In applying “Federal law” the state court 8 only needs to look to Supreme Court precedent. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 9 (2006). The “ ‘clearly established’ phrase ‘refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, 10 of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.’ ” 11 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 12 412 (2000)). A federal court must look to “the governing legal principle or principles set 13 forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Id. at 71–72. 14 “A state-court decision is contrary to [the Supreme Court’s] clearly established 15 precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme 16 Court's] cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a 17 decision of [the Supreme Court] but reaches a different result.” Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 18 133, 141 (2005) (emphasis added). 19 Whether “the state court’s application” of the United States’ Supreme Court 20 precedent “was unreasonable,” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011), is different 21 from whether it was merely “incorrect or erroneous.” Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); 22 see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable application of 23 federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”) (emphasis in 24 original). The state court’s decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly 25 established federal law to the facts only if it is objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico 26 v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010). “[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state 27 court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. The Court 28 “must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported the 1 state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could 2 disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 3 decision of [the United States Supreme] Court.” Id. 4 Petitioner “must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in 5 federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 6 comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id., 7 562 U.S. at 103. This is a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings 8 and demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Felkner v. 9 Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). 10 B. Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) 11 Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) unless he can 12 establish that the state court decision in his case was “based on an unreasonable 13 determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 14 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court decision based on a factual determination is “not 15 unreasonable merely because the federal court would have reached a different conclusion 16 in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). The factual determination 17 must be “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court 18 proceeding.” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (emphasis added). This 19 means that even if “[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree” about the 20 finding in question, “on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s . 21 . . determination.” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341–342 (2006). 22 To find that a factual determination is unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2), the court 23 must be “convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate 24 review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” Taylor 25 v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Cullen v. 26 Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 185 (2011). “This is a daunting standard—one that will be 27 satisfied in relatively few cases.” Id.; see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 28 (2007). “State-court factual findings, moreover, are presumed correct; the petitioner has 1 the burden of rebutting the presumption by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Collins, 546 2 U.S. at 338–339 (quoting § 2254(e)(1)). This “clear and convincing evidence standard . . 3 . pertains only to state-court determinations of factual issues, rather than decisions.” 4 Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 341 (emphasis added). 5 IV. ANALYSIS 6 Petitioner contends his sentence for crimes he committed as a juvenile is a de facto 7 life sentence and violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition as articulated by Miller v. 8 Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing 9 scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders”), 10 and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208–09 (2016) (holding Miller applies 11 retroactively). Petitioner presented this claim to the Arizona state courts, which denied 12 relief on the basis that Miller and related cases do not apply to juveniles that received “a 13 parole-eligible life sentence, irrespective of whether that defendant had been sentenced to 14 consecutive prison terms for other offenses.” State v. McGill, 2021 WL 3286282, at *1 15 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2021). The Magistrate Judge concluded the Arizona state court’s 16 denial was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 17 law as determined by the United States Supreme Court and was not based on an 18 unreasonable determination of the facts. (Doc. 21 at 6–18). For the following reasons, the 19 Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge, overrules Petitioner’s objections, and adopts the 20 Magistrate Judge’s R&R. 21 A. The Court Overrules Petitioner’s Objections Regarding the R&R’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) Recommendations. 22 The Magistrate Judge concluded the Arizona state court’s denial was not contrary 23 to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the 24 United States Supreme Court because “there is no clearly established Supreme Court 25 precedent holding that an aggregate sentence that is ‘functionally equivalent’ to a sentence 26 of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, which includes a parole-eligible 27 sentence on a homicide conviction, violates the Eighth Amendment.” (Doc. 21 at 6–18) 28 (citing Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101). Petitioner objects to the R&R’s findings and 1 recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Doc. 21 at 6–14) and says the R&R: 2 (1) “totally ignores” Petitioner’s argument that the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Soto- 3 Fong, 474 P.3d 34 (Ariz. 2020) misconstrued Miller and related cases, which is contrary 4 to or an unreasonable application of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 5 (1996) (Doc. 22 at 2); (2) interprets Miller and related cases “too narrowly and directly 6 contrary” to Supreme Court precedent (id. at 2–6); and (3) ignores Ninth Circuit precedent 7 interpreting clearly established federal law. (Id. at 6–7). 8 1. Failure to Consider Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida 9 Petitioner first objects that the Magistrate Judge failed to address his argument that 10 the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Soto-Fong, 474 P.3d 34 (Ariz. 2020) “improperly 11 dismissed the binding Supreme Court precedent as mere dicta,” which Petitioner says was 12 contrary to or an unreasonable application of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 13 U.S. 44 (1996). (Doc. 22 at 2). The Court overrules this objection. Petitioner’s issue with 14 the Arizona Supreme Court’s holding in Soto-Fong is misplaced. The question before this 15 Court is whether “the Arizona appellate court’s decision denying relief in [Petitioner’s] 16 post-conviction action on his Eighth Amendment claim was contrary to” Montgomery, 17 Miller, and Graham. (Doc. 21 at 6). In finding that the state appellate court decision was 18 not contrary to” Montgomery, Miller, and Graham, the Magistrate Judge clearly explained 19 why the state court in Petitioner’s case did not unreasonably apply clearly established 20 federal law. (Doc. 21 at 7–10). The R&R did not err by not addressing Petitioner’s 21 perceived legal errors in Soto-Fong. 22 The Magistrate Judge did not directly address Seminole Tribe but provides a 23 comprehensive analysis addressing Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment habeas claim. 24 Omitting Seminole Tribe does change that the R&R reached the correct conclusion. The 25 Court overrules this objection. 26 2. Interpretation Too Narrow and Directly Contrary to Miller and 27 Montgomery 28 Petitioner next objects that the R&R interprets Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 1 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016). (Doc. 22 at 2–3) too narrowly. 2 However, the Magistrate Judge explained that when reviewing a state court decision under 3 § 2254(d)(1), if there is no “‘clear answer’” to the issue before the state court, then it cannot 4 be said such court “ ‘unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.’” (Doc. 21 at 5 5) (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008)). An “unreasonable application 6 of” those holdings must be “objectively unreasonable,” not merely wrong; even “clear 7 error” will not suffice. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75–76. If the Court must “extend [the 8 Supreme Court’s] rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand,” then such rationale 9 was not “clearly established at the time of the state-court decision.” Yarborough v. 10 Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666 (2004). Absent clearly established Federal law, a state court 11 is not required to “extend [the Supreme Court’s] precedent or license federal courts to treat 12 the failure to do so as error” warranting grounds for relief under § 2254(d)(1). White v. 13 Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 426 (2014) (citation omitted). Therefore, a state court 14 unreasonably applies the Supreme Court’s precedent “if, and only if, it is so obvious that a 15 clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts” and “there could be no ‘fairminded 16 disagreement’ on the question.” Id., 572 U.S. at 427 (citation omitted). 17 The Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner’s claim “does not fall squarely 18 within the controlling legal standard” of Miller and Montgomery’s interpretation of Miller 19 because Petitioner’s sentence involves a parole-eligible sentence for a homicide crime, 20 followed by consecutive sentences for non-homicide crimes. (Doc. 21 at 10–11). Plaintiff 21 also tacitly acknowledges the Supreme Court has never held that a juvenile defendant’s 22 consecutive sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 22 at 5) (“[T]he facts, 23 reasoning, and words of Miller, Montgomery, and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) 24 all directly and necessarily implicate any sentence resulting in a juvenile offender spending 25 the rest of their life in prison, no matter whether that sentence is formal of [sic] de facto.”) 26 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 27 For Miller and related cases to apply, the state court would have had to extend the 28 Supreme Court’s reasoning to find that Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment rights were 1 violated; its decision not to make such an extension was therefore not a decision that was 2 contrary to clearly established federal law. See Woodall, 572 U.S. at 426 (“‘[I]f a habeas 3 court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand,’ then by definition 4 the rationale was not ‘clearly established at the time of the state-court decision.’”) (quoting 5 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666 (2004)). Section 2254(d)(1) “does not require 6 state courts to extend that precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as 7 error.” Id., 572 U.S. at 426 (citation omitted) (finding state supreme court’s application of 8 Fifth Amendment was not objectively unreasonable warranting federal habeas relief under 9 § 2254(d)(1)). Given that the holding of Miller does not expressly apply to Petitioner’s 10 case, this Court cannot conclude that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an 11 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law. 12 3. Failure to Follow Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of Clearly Established Federal Law 13 Petitioner also argues that the R&R improperly distinguished Moore v. Biter, 725 14 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2013), and relied on Demirdijan v. Gipson, 832 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 15 2016) and Amaral v. Ryan, 2021 WL 5984981 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2021). (Doc. 22 at 6–7). 16 Petitioner says the fact that the defendant in Moore was convicted of only non-homicide 17 was an improper basis to distinguishes Moore, because “the distinction between homicide 18 and non-homicide crimes affects only the scope of the remedy, not whether the Eighth 19 Amendment is implicated at all.” (Doc. 22 at 6). But the fact the defendant in Moore was 20 sentenced to “254 years’ imprisonment for non-homicide offenses, committed as a 21 juvenile” was what brought that case within the ambit of Graham. 560 U.S. at 63 (“The 22 instant case concerns only those juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole solely 23 for a nonhomicide offense.”). Petitioner was convicted of homicide offenses. This was 24 not an improper basis to distinguish Moore. It also does not change the conclusion that 25 Moore does not provide Petitioner a basis for habeas relief. 26 The Supreme Court has “repeatedly emphasized . . . [that] circuit precedent does not 27 constitute clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.” Glebe v. 28 Frost, 574 U.S. 21, 24 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); Lopez v. Smith, 574 U.S. 1 1, 6 (2014) (affirming that § 2254(d)(1)’s “clearly established” requirement is based on the 2 Supreme Court’s precedent, not by any court of appeals’ refinement of a general principle 3 of Supreme Court jurisprudence) (emphasis added). As correctly noted in the R&R, circuit 4 court decisions are only persuasive for determining what is clearly established federal law 5 and whether the state court unreasonably applied the law. (Doc. 21 at 4) (citing Cooper v. 6 Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 920 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). This reason alone is sufficient 7 to overrule Petitioner’s objections concerning the R&R’s alleged failure to follow one 8 Ninth Circuit decision but not another. 9 Petitioner fails to establish that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or 10 involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law under 11 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 12 B. The Court Overrules Petitioner’s Objections Regarding the R&R’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) Recommendation 13 Petitioner also objects to the R&R’s findings concerning § 2254(d)(2). (Docs. 21 14 at 15–18, 22 at 7–8). The Magistrate Judge concluded the Arizona state court’s denial was 15 not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts because “there was no erroneous 16 ‘finding of fact’ by any state court in the instant matter, and § 2254(d)(2) is not relevant to 17 the decision under review in this matter.” (Doc. 21 at 18). Petitioner’s objection of alleged 18 unreasonable “factual determinations” concerns the Arizona Supreme Court in Soto- 19 Fong’s interpretation of Miller and related cases. For the reasons below, the Court 20 overrules Petitioner’s objection and adopts the R&R. 21 First, § 2254(d)(2) expressly contemplates an “unreasonable determination of the 22 facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 23 § 2254(d)(2) (emphasis added). The factual determinations that are the basis of this 24 objection are beyond the scope of § 2254(d)(2), as Petitioner does not complain of 25 unreasonable determinations made from the factual record before the state court. See 26 Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181–82. A state court renders an unreasonable determination of 27 the facts if it “plainly misapprehends or misstates the record in making its findings or where 28 the state court has before it, yet apparently ignores, evidence that supports petitioner’s 1 claim.” Andrew v. Davis, 944 F.3d 1092, 1107 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations 2 omitted). This means that this Court reviews only those factual determinations made by 3 the state court to deny Petitioner’s claim. See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 18 (2013) (stating 4 that as to § 2254(d)(2), the federal court must look at “the factual basis for a prior state- 5 court decision rejecting a claim.”). Petitioner does not object that the state court in 6 Petitioner’s case made any unreasonable determinations of facts presented in his case. 7 Rather, Petitioner contends the Arizona Supreme Court in Soto-Fong, made unreasonable 8 determinations of facts. In other words, Petitioner’s § 2254(d)(2) claim is based on the 9 Soto-Fong court’s decision to consider a particular case that is also factually unrelated to 10 Petitioner’s claim. This is not a valid basis for relief under § 2254(d)(2) and the Magistrate 11 Judge thoroughly addressed this argument. (Doc. 21 at 16–18). 12 For these reasons, the Court overrules this objection, accepts and adopts the R&R, 13 and denies Petitioner’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 14 C. The Court Declines to Issue a Certificate of Appealability 15 The R&R recommends that this Court deny the issuance of a certificate of 16 appealability (“COA”). (Doc. 21 at 19). Petitioner objects to this recommendation. 17 (Doc. 22 at 8–10). 18 “A state prisoner whose petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied by a federal 19 district court does not enjoy an absolute right to appeal.” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 20 (2017). To appeal, he must first obtain a COA from a district or appellate court. Id. This 21 Court may issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial 22 of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Petitioner makes a substantial showing 23 by “demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution 24 of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate 25 to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 26 (2003) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 27 Upon review of the record in light of the standards for granting a certificate of 28 appealability, the Court finds that this Court’s resolution of the constitutional claims is not || debatable among reasonable jurists nor are the issues presented adequate to deserve □□ encouragement to proceed further. Though the breadth of Miller may still be an open 3 || question, it is not debatable that the Arizona Court of Appeals decision was not contrary to 4|| or an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law. 5 Accordingly, 6 IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Bible’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 21) is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED as the Order of this Court. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) is DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 11 || § 2254 Cases, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED because reasonable jurists would not find the procedural ruling debatable nor are the issues presented adequate to deserve 13 | encouragement to proceed further. 14 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall terminate this action 15 || and enter judgment accordingly. 16 Dated this 14th day of May, 2025. 17 18 OF a ————/ 19 JAY

20 United States Dict fudge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-ll-